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NOTICE TO READERS: * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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Personnel Changes in Shkoder District

AU2907153190 Tirana ATA in English 0806 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] Tirana, July 29 (ATA)—The Shkoder District People's Council convened on July 28. It elected Comrade Terezina Marubi chairman of the Executive Committee of the District People's Council instead of Bashkim Sykja who is charged with the duty of the minister of light industry. Terezina Marubi is a deputy, member of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, former directress of the copper wires and cables plant and her trade is engineer.

This meeting also analysed the activity of the Executive Committee of the District People's Council during the period between the two meetings of the People's Council. There a report was forwarded on the fulfilment of the plan of the first half and the tasks deriving for the fulfilment of the plan of the second half and of the whole year. The advisers discussed on the implementation of the new economic mechanism in enterprises, particularly concerning the material-technical supply, the promotion of the best achievements in the field of export.

The meeting was also attended by the alternate member of the Political Bureau of the party Central Committee and first secretary of the District Party Committee, Xhemal Dymylja, who spoke at the meeting.

Soviet Foreign Ministry Delegation Arrives

AU2907182890 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1800 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] A delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics arrived in Tirana (?yesterday), led by [name indistinct], deputy minister of foreign affairs, which [words indistinct] diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Socialist Republic of Albania. [words indistinct]

Lukanov Said To Present Cabinet Resignation

AU2807142290 Sofia BTA in English
1312 GMT 28 Jul 90

["We Do Not Deserve an Excellent Mark, Premier Lukanov Says"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, July 28 (BTA)—After a six-month-long administration, Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov, who will give in the resignation of his cabinet next week, considers that their work does not deserve "an excellent mark." "I do not know if it is possible at all for somebody else to get an excellent mark in the present conditions," he goes on to say in an extensive interview held with the DUMA daily.

Forecasting the members of the future cabinet, Mr. Lukanov, from whose answers it becomes clear that he does not intend to form a new cabinet, says: "It is not possible for a cabinet to work successfully in Bulgaria if it does not enjoy the broadest possible public and parliamentary support. According to me, there are only two realistic variants—a coalition government or a cabinet comprising personalities who can rely on a parliamentary consensus. The second variant is more probable."

Mr. Lukanov underlines that now it is the duty of all politicians to overcome their political leanings and their personal interests.

The 52-year-old politician, who occupied high-ranking posts in the leadership of the Communist Party and the government at the time of Todor Zhivkov, who was ousted on November 10, 1989, says that he is not much willing to stay in politics for a long time.

He says he would recommend to the future cabinet to speed up the economic reform and to be more open with the people concerning the real situation of things.

According to Mr. Lukanov the most difficult decision he had got to make during his six-month term was the decision to stop the payments on Bulgaria's foreign debt. But our efforts have been earnest, fair and responsible, he says.

Lukanov Discusses Market Economy Measures

AU3007081390 Sofia VECHERNI NOVINI
in Bulgarian 26 Jul 90 p 1

[Report on interview with Council of Ministers Chairman Andrey Lukanov by Simeon Danevski; place and date not given: "Is This Shock Therapy?"]

[Text] [Danevski] For several days our country has been living with new gasoline prices and new prices for several fuel products. The increase was quite drastic and is certainly going to involve price increases in other services. No one is making a secret of this.

However, critical voices were heard from the opposition saying that this unpopular measure of the government's is likely to result in shocks and waves of countrywide discontent. Could this be the first step toward "shock therapy?" We addressed this question to Andrey Lukanov, the country's premier.

[Lukanov] No, this is no "shock therapy," but a necessary measure for our development at this stage. I know that it is difficult and that this is going to provoke discontent among some people, but there was simply no other way out. If someone could further maintain the old fuel prices under the present circumstances of our economic situation, he is welcome to do so!

[Danevski] Nevertheless, why was this measure adopted so drastically? Why did it have to hit the Bulgarian citizens so unexpectedly?

[Lukanov] It was not an unexpected measure—it was known and had to be expected. With the exception of about 20 basic consumer goods and foodstuffs, the prices of numerous other goods and services will be liberalized. A market economy, which we are aspiring for, cannot be introduced with half measures. No one should delude himself in this respect.

[Danevski] When are the remaining prices expected to increase?

[Lukanov] A program is under preparation in this respect, but I cannot tell you the exact date. It will soon be announced, however. The state shall reserve for itself the right of a certain control, if things should get out of hand in certain cases. Nevertheless, I do not think that this will happen because the market itself is a good controller and regulator.

[Danevski] It remains only to say a few words about the compensation which citizens in our country are expected to receive.

[Lukanov] Compensation is not intended for all strata of our population, only for the socially weak groups. We are preparing a draft in this respect in cooperation with both trade union organizations. I think we shall also find a sensible understanding. All incomes will be taken into consideration, the lower pensions, scholarships, and children's allowances included.

I would like to state clearly and categorically that the reform is beginning and the first steps are difficult. These difficulties not only involve prices. Price policy is important, but it is not the only measure involved. For this reason I ask you to pay attention to other questions that will be of great importance for the country's further development.

[Danevski] As it unmistakably appears from the prime minister's statement, the "shock therapy model" shall not be applied to our economy. A gradual transition to a real market economy is expected instead.

Views Nov Events, Economic Issues

AU2907194290 Sofia BTA in English
1833 GMT 29 Jul 90

["There Was No Coup on November 10, Lukanov Says"—BTA Headline]

Sofia, July 29 (BTA)—On November 10, 1989 Todor Zhivkov was not ousted in a coup, but in accordance with the provisions contained in the statute of the Communist Party, Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov stated today.

In the live interview aired on television which was more than one hour long he did not deny that when Zhivkov was ousted there was the danger of armed resistance to this act, the latter being avoided because of the general feelings in the country, the international situation (mainly the developments in the GDR) and the firm position of the people in the Communist leadership who wanted this change. Mr Lukanov underlined that much of the credit for it goes to General Dzhurov.

Todor Zhivkov understood that he could not get things under control any more and in his mind he was ready for the change, Mr Lukanov said.

In connection with Zhivkov's forthcoming appearance at the Grand National Assembly, Mr Lukanov said he had doubts as to how much it could help clarify the truth about the crisis in Bulgaria.

He stated that the next two weeks will be the most decisive for the fate of democracy in Bulgaria and stressed he would not accept to head a one-party government.

Compromises in parliament are needed and it is us the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), who should make the compromises, Mr Lukanov said.

We are not trying to evade our responsibility, nor do we want the responsibility for the causes of the present crisis to be shared by the opposition, the Prime Minister stated. Bulgaria needs "a historical compromise which would unite the nation and eliminate the political polarization in society", he went on to say.

Mr Lukanov said that otherwise the stability of civil peace in the country would be in danger.

The prime minister who is going to give in the resignation of his cabinet after its six-month administration in a few days considers that the country can rely on foreign economic help only if there is certain stability in its political and economic life.

Mr Lukanov said that there are people in the BSP who think that once the party has won the election, it should make no concessions in parliament. According to him some people in the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) also maintain extreme positions. Extremes are the greatest obstacle to solving the question of power, Mr Lukanov said.

He is categorical that declaring martial law, as it was the case with Poland ten years ago, would be a catastrophe for Bulgaria.

During the interview the prime minister answered a lot of questions about the progress of the economic reform and stated it should be implemented at a much more rapid pace. He declared himself to be against rationing foodstuffs.

In his view a number of decisions of the former monocratic regime in the sphere of the macroeconomic policy and the systematic disparagement of agriculture and the food industry have been the most disastrous ones for the country's economy, plunging it into the present crisis.

Mr Lukanov announced that Bulgaria's currency reserve is dropping quickly and now, together with her gold reserve, it amounts to about 500-600 million U.S. dollars.

Saying that Russia's President, Mr Boris Yeltsin, is "a great optimist" because of his statement that the situation there could be improved within 500 days, Mr Lukanov said that if he were Bulgaria's future prime minister, if there is political stability in the country and if it receives foreign help, it would take two or three years for the situation to improve.

"Which is the word you say to yourself the most often", the last question of the interviewer was. "Calmness", Mr Andrey Lukanov answered.

'City of Truth' Residents Insult Lukanov

AU2907194790 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
24 Jul 90 p 1

[Unattributed DUMA report: "Incident Involving the Premier"]

[Text] On Sunday, 22 July 1990, Premier Andrey Lukanov was booed and insulted with vulgar expressions by "inhabitants" of the "city of truth" in Sofia.

The premier was walking from the Nine September Square to the Georgi Kirkov Hall of the Party House. As soon as he turned the corner of the building, a group of people with white headbands surrounded him. They cried: "Resignation," "End of Communism," "Mafia," and so forth. The most critical moment emerged at the entrance of the Bulgarian Socialist Party Supreme [BSP] Council headquarters. The door was attacked by some "inhabitants" of the tent city. The premier was rescued thanks to a group of BSP supporters who formed a living chain around him, thus permitting him to enter the building.

The event was filmed by a video camera of the opposition, but according to eye witnesses, Andrey Lukanov remained silent.

The incident was reported by several people who visited our editorial office last night. They submitted a letter signed by Sofia citizens Plemen Nikolov, Dimitur Kirchev, Mariana Petkova, Zlatka Milenkova, Sonya Buchvarova, Krayu Kraev, Stefanka Milanova, Tosho

Tsvetanov, and Mirela Nikolova, describing the situation and the actions of the offenders.

The letter ends by calling for counteraction against such noisy loudmouths, so that the National Assembly may peacefully proceed to its work.

Debate Over Zhivkov Hearing Proposals

AU2707193290 Sofia BTA in English
1900 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Sofia, July 27 (BTA)—A commission with the participation of the parliament bureau and representatives of the parliamentary factions proposed to the M.P.'s today that Todor Zhivkov should speak in parliament for two hours, in the first hour he should make an exposition, while in the second, answer questions, so that his meeting with M.P.'s [members of parliament] will not only turn into one of the unprecedented cases not only in tha Bulgarian history, but into a political sensation. This had to be voted.

The SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] leader Dr. Zhelev asked for time so that his faction will be able to consider the commission's proposal. Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] leader Lilov demanded the same.

According to the commission proposals the questions to Zhivkov should be prepared in advance by the parliamentary groups and handed to him by July 30, on Monday. They should refer only to his political responsibility. They should also not be too many, and there should not be discussions after them. The questions can only be asked by the parliamentary factions' spokesmen, the proposal says.

If it is necessary and if Zhivkov wants he can think about the answers of additional questions and consult his defence, who cannot be present in the conference hall, however.

The opposition was indignant with the commission's proposal that Zhivkov's appearance in parliament should not be directly emitted on the radio and TV. The opposition insisted on this. The commission does not allow the mass media [to] make private announcements.

The emission of Zhivkov's exposition and his replies to M.P.'s questions should be broadcasted on the radio the same day, on the TV and by the BTA, reads the commission proposal, but it insists that this emission should be seen in advance "in view of not voicing a state secret or leaking information which can impair Bulgaria's relations with other countries."

These proposals will be subjected to voting later this night or on Monday.

A few minutes after people heard on the radio about the proposal to censor Todor Zhivkov's statement, a few thousand people besieged the National Assembly building crying: "Zhivkov before the people!"

Semerdzhiev Threatens Resignation

AU2707204490 Sofia BTA in English
2002 GMT 27 Jul 90

["Dramatic Scenes in the Grand National Assembly"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, July 27 (BTA)—Colonel General Atanas Semerdzhiev stated today his resignation before the Grand National Assembly and said that if he had a pistol on him he would have shot himself to death at the rostrum.

"I am sorry the guards didn't give me a pistol," he said, and left the hall.

His turbulent behaviour, which the opposition met with indignation and the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] faction in silence, was a result of the hot debate about the proposal that the statement of former dictator Todor Zhivkov should not be directly emitted on the radio and TV and should be censored, "so as not to leak a state secret and impair Bulgaria's relations with other countries." Upon hearing this proposal on the direct radio emission from the National Assembly session, a few thousand people immediately besieged the parliament building crying: "Zhivkov before the people!" The opposition accused the BSP M.P.'s [members of parliament] that they wished Zhivkov's statement censored. This accusation caused the reaction of the minister of interior. Many of the BSP M.P.'s rushed after him when he left the hall.

More on Zhivkov Hearing Proposal

AU2707214490 Sofia BTA in English
2113 GMT 27 Jul 90

["Todor Zhivkov Rouses Again the Bulgarian Parliament"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, July 27 (BTA)—The M.P.'s [members of parliament] were calmly going at the end of the day towards approval of the permanent commissions when the storm burst out, and this time again because of Todor Zhivkov.

It was not only the people who gathered in front of the parliament crying "Zhivkov before the people" who opposed the still unvoted decision of the commission which includes the parliament bureau and factions' representatives. Opposition spokesman Ganev even before hearing about disturbances outside said they would not accept that Zhivkov would not be shown directly on TV and demanded that he would have an exposition which was not an hour, but 15 to 20 minutes long, so that he would be left time to answer questions.

"But it was the opposition wish that he wouldn't be shown on TV," said one of the Socialists and mentioned the name of Rumen Vodenicharov. The opposition looked totally perplexed.

"It was really me who proposed that," Vodenicharov explained, "as there is a great risk. I would like to protect the Bulgarian people from some shameful scenes." "That's only your own opinion," some M.P.'s of the opposition cried.

"This time the Socialists are not to blame for disturbances in parliament (as firstly Zhelev, backed later on by Lilov, proposed that the discussion of the commission proposal be postponed for Monday) but things outside were disturbing," Elka Konstantinova, the leader of Radical Democrats said.

The opposition was accused that it had organized the commotion in parliament.

New skirmishes with words followed as well as mutual accusations between Socialists and the opposition. Meanwhile information arrived in the hall from the lobbies that outside things are still disturbing. Minister of Interior Atanas Semerdzhiev took the floor and said that if he had a pistol he would have shown how, according to him, a worthy man should behave. Semerdzhiev accused the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] of a lack of political culture.

After further debates both from the rostrum and the hall opposition M.P. Kornazhev said that the Socialists in the commission were against Todor Zhivkov's appearance on TV at all and that Vodenicharov had proposed a compromise version; that the emission will not be direct but on a tape. It was the Socialists who were surprised this time.

Ludzhev from the opposition proposed that debates should stop, as there was some misunderstanding among the SDS. He proposed that they go out and calm the people. "We have gone out without pistol," Ludzhev said, which made Minister Semerdzhiev reply.

Strongly moved, he said that if he had a pistol he would have shot himself. "I strip myself of my powers of a minister," he said, and left the hall. A few of the Socialist M.P.'s went after him. In the break which was announced soon after Semerdzhiev was in one of the National Assembly rooms and leaders of the BSP and the opposition Dertliev, Vulkov, Dzhurov, Lukanov, Zhelev, and Lilov, went to him.

There was a break for conference of the parliamentary factions.

Prime Minister Lukanov told a BTA reporter that General Semerdzhiev is firm and has confirmed before him his resignation.

Meanwhile the several hundred demonstrators around the National Assembly building calmed a bit after talks with M.P.'s from the opposition.

After a one-hour session of the parliamentary factions and consultations the M.P.'s decided to return the proposal to the commission which is preparing Todor Zhivkov's appearance before parliament for further work and discussion on Monday. The discussion and voting of the presidential candidatures is to continue then, too.

Parliament To Continue Debate

AU2807130390 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] We have received numerous telephone calls from listeners who did not hear the end of the live relay of the Grand National Assembly session last night [27 July], which ended shortly after midnight. I will remind you that, after stormy debates on the parliamentary hearing of Todor Zhivkov, a decision was reached. A little before the end of the sitting, Zhelyu Zhelev, leader of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], announced the decision of the main political parties in the Grand National Assembly that the document setting out the procedure for the Todor Zhivkov hearing should be returned for further work on it, and that the final form of the document would be agreed at the next sitting, which opens at 1500 [1200 GMT] on Monday [30 July].

Press on Semerdzhiev Resignation

AU2807142490 Sofia BTA in English 1210 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] Sofia, July 28 (BTA)—The dramatic session of the Grand National Assembly which went on until late last night and at which Colonel General Atanas Semerdzhiev, minister of the interior, gave in his resignation and stated he was ready to kill himself because some national representatives are prone to succumb to the "pressure of the street" is the main topic in all papers today. Depending on their political affiliations, the dailies describe last night's developments in the Bulgarian Parliament in more or less detail, using a strictly official or a bit ironical tone. The papers stress the almost unanimous decision to decide on Monday whether Todor Zhivkov's appearance at the Grand National Assembly should be directly aired on television and radio; Todor Zhivkov will appear before the national representatives in few days, but after the election of a president—a question, the debates on which are going on on Monday.

Students To Strike if Parliament Fails To Act

AU2807161490 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Statement issued by representatives of the strike committees of higher education instutions after a conference in Sofia's St. Kliment Okhridski University on 28 July]

[Text] In connection with the disastrous management of Andrey Lukanov's government, which led to the escalation and deepening of the existing economic crisis, the executive committees of the Young Democracy Political Club, the Federation of Independent Student Associations, and the Young Democracy Academic Forum adopted a decision at their meeting to keep the existing strike organization structures in a state of alert. We hope that the Grand National Assembly will adopt a constructive position in the nearest future; otherwise, it will be answerable to the nation for the consequences. At the moment, the representatives of the strike committees are discussing practical actions in individual higher education establishments in connection with bringing them into a state of instant readiness to strike. A strike post has already been set up in front of the building of one higher education institution.

Poll Reveals Most Students Anticommunists

AU2707191290 Sofia BTA in English
1653 GMT 27 Jul 90

["Bulgarian Students Are Anti-Communistically Minded"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, July 27 (BTA)—A large part of the Bulgarian Students discover "the image of their adversary" in "Communism" (as a synthetic image of their attitude towards past decades). This is the conclusion to which experts from the Centre for Research of Democracy have come after an enquiry with students from Sofia made immediately after the students' sit-in strike had ended, which led to the resignation of the former president Mladenov.

It is still not possible to say what the number of students who participated in this strike was, but according to this enquiry a third of the students say that they took part in the strike. The poll also included youths who did not participate.

About 70 percent of the polled stand for a permanent confrontation with power so as to "put once and for always" an end "to communist rule." At the same time, while as many as 90 percent of those polled stand for anticommunism, over half of them believe that "anticommunism is a justifiable position for young people, which should, however, be carefully backed, as not all Communists are alike." The additional interviews which were taken show anticommunist moods among some of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] supporters, too.

The research shows that the assertions for a polar difference between those who went and those who did not go on strike are untrue. About a fifth of all polled, as well as of the strikers, answered that all means are possible in the struggle of students for justice. 80 per cent of the strikers approve of the struggle "for putting once and for always an end to communist rule," while among all of those polled this percentage is 68.

At the same time, the students who stand for an end of communist rule have shown realism as regards this country's prospects. Almost 70 percent of the polled believe that Bulgaria will turn into "a modern European state by the end of this century," while less than a tenth think that this can happen "even today."

The students are aware that political democratization is a prerequisite for this country's "Europeanisation." About half of the polled insist for a "final" democratization of the political power by the end of this year, while about a fifth of them are indicating a longer period of time.

The research has shown a rather high political confidence of the students. Sixty-two per cent of those polled think that "students are the most progressive part of society and without their actions it will not become fully democratic." About half of those polled believe, however, that the aims of these actions should be reached "by means which will not bring about to violence among people" and only a fifth agrees that "all means are good, as long as justice will triumph."

About 40 per cent of those polled said they would leave the country if the rates of democratization did not meet their requirements.

BSP Accuses Own 'Radicals' of Causing Confusion

AU2907200590 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
24 July 90 p 4

[Georgi Mishkov article: "Misgivings About Radicals' Lack of Clarity"]

[Excerpts] On 2 July 1990, the Council of the Initiators for Radical Changes within the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] expressed some reservations and misgivings of principle in connection with Aleksandur Lilov's evaluations and his report to the Supreme BSP Council on 29 June 1990. The warning expressed by the council against excessive optimism and against overestimating the BSP's real influence is justified. Nevertheless, the "party's renewal" as a factor for the election victory should not be placed on the same level as "numerous other factors, such as the still unstable democratic structure, the fear of drastic changes, the lack of experience and mistakes committed by the opposition in the election campaign." The Council of Radical Change Initiators quite timidly refers to the opposition's lack of experience and mistakes. The opposite is true: The opposition was supported by the experience of its foreign protectors and its election campaign proceeded very efficiently. It was managed with great skill. The BSP, on the other hand, was rescued by its calm and analytical work, despite the "Trojan horses," (such as the Alternative Socialist Party and the Alternative Socialist Association, to a certain extent). The success of the BSP was even surprising, considering the immense pressure, the insinuations, and slanders to which it was subject during the election campaign.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to explain the passivity of the party intelligentsia in facing the aggressive and subversive activities of certain chameleons from the former nomenklatura and from affiliated intellectual circles which became the supporters of the students on strike. It is incomprehensible why the party remained silent in facing the violation of the roundtable agreements on banning political activities from working places and educational institutions. The opposition leaders tried, with great delay, to hide the instigators and supporters of the students' minority actions, which threatened civil peace and greatly obstructed the normal functioning of state institutions, behind the "blue" olive branch of peace. [passage omitted]

The struggle against "bureaucratic and conservative circles within the BSP" is justified, but who are they as a matter of fact? An organization cannot possibly exist without some kind of administrative forces. In certain respects, the old apparatus and its routine are preferable to the chaotic state of the new apparatus. Consistency and continuity are called for in connection with the renewal of cadres. In numerous cases, aggressive, new elements are infinitely more dangerous than the conservative, but steadier, older ones.

The struggle between younger and older generations should not be based on age, but primarily on the individual's capabilities. In my opinion, the "old" Lilov, for example, has no equal competitor among the younger, radical cadres, today. This may be unfortunate for the party, but it is a fact. The "whole new generation" that has been integrated within the party should not try to push out the loyal cadres of the old generation.

I am convinced that all forces within the BSP are inspired by the wish for a constructive dialogue with the opposition, but such a dialogue can take place only on a reciprocal basis. For the time being however, the opposition is involved in almost primordial anticommunism and its unity relies solely on the common hatred of the BSP. I think that critical remarks of the Initiators' Council related to Aleksandur Lilov's aforementioned speech accusing him of underestimating the exceptionally important issue of the BSP's relations with the opposition are unjustified. This issue has been one of the party's major concerns since the opposition appeared. However, party cadres should not be sacrificed for the sake of a dialogue with the opposition, the outcome of which is uncertain. We should not expose our cadres to verbal lynchings just for the sake of this dialogue. [passage omitted]

We should certainly avoid all forms of artificial unity within the BSP, but we should not expel certain loyal party members from our ranks just because they have different opinions on ideological issues and on questions of principle. There should be a place for old and young cadres within the party, for different platforms, which should not be sacrificed to the unity of so-called radical trends against the rest of the members masses. This would mean dooming the party to a blind alley.

BSP Clubs for Radical Change Open Conference

AU2807130190 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] A conference of the Clubs for Radical Change of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] opened this morning in the Georgi Kirkov Hall in Sofia. The conference was opened by Anzhel Vagenshtayn, who spoke about the situation in society and the BSP itself, which is beginning the preparations for its fateful congress. In the main report, Asen Zhablenski set out the reasons why a radical change was needed, and gave answers to a number of questions: Why Bulgaria needs a left socialist party of a modern European type; what the essential characteristics of such a party are; and what are the possible ways of achieving the change. Georgi Karasimeonov spoke about the future idea of the BSP image—as a party based not on a single doctrine, but on a pluralism of ideas, a party which relies on all ideas which help it achieve its basic values. The conference is continuing with other reports on the organizational structure and parliamentary activity of the BSP.

Further on 'Radical' Change Conference

AU2807183890 Sofia BTA in English 1738 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] Sofia, July 28 (BTA)—The purpose of the first National Conference of the Clubs for Radical Change, which opened here today, is to urge the decisive renewal of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). The supporters of the different radical tendencies and platforms within the BSP will try to determine the most rational ways for carrying out a sweeping change and to create the conditions for the unification of all reform-minded forces in the party.

Defining the conference as most timely and one of paramount significance, the participants in it expressed the opinion that in some aspects it is even late. One of the most important appeals which were made from the rostrum was to take action the soonest possible, thus cutting short the process of stagnation in the BSP. The radicals consider that the BSP structures at all levels are still paralyzed. The behaviour of the BSP Supreme Council is still bearing the recurrences of the election campaign. What is more, the BSP Council and the Presidium have actually turned their back to the renewal of the party. The radicals suggest a way out of this situation, the concrete measures being laid down in their draft programme for action.

The report presented by Prof. Asen Zhablenski outlined the ideological and organizational principles on which the renewal should be based, along with the essential characteristics of a modern socialist party which admits the supremacy of universal human values. According to the speakers who took the floor, the survival of the BSP is possible if the party itself makes a critical review of its history and assumes the responsibility for the present condition of the society. The BSP should give up its totalitarian and Bolshevist habits and methods of work and should uncompromisingly part with all discredited and corrupted personalities in its ranks.

BSP Supreme Council Chairman Aleksandur Lilov took part in the conference.

BSP 'Radical' Conference Ends

AU2907191890 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] The First National Conference of the Movement for Radical Change Within the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] ended today. The debates related to the nature and methods of innovating in the BSP continued in the morning. Aleksandur Lilov's statement evoked particular interest. He stressed his positive approach to the radical movement, which should become a primary source of new ideas and should embody the party's radical energies. Not only the spokesmen, but the rank and file workers of renewal should participate in the movement. Aleksandur Lilov also spoke on the methods of implementing the second phase of the BSP's restructuring.

The other speakers at the conference touched upon the subject of cadres who have disgraced themselves. Chavdar Kyuranov defined this subject as more important than the question of the party's consolidation. Zakhari Zakhariev declared that people who have disgraced themselves not only destabilize the BSP, but all our society. The cadre renewal should take place in a legitimate manner, and should not be identified with depriving the cadres of leadership.

The conference adopted the following documents:

A program of action and an address to the BSP members.

A declaration to the political forces in the country and to the citizens of Bulgaria expresses concern that the work of the Grand National Assembly at its very beginning is threatened by the danger that parliamentary mechanisms might be obstructed by ultimatums.

Grand Assembly Approves 15 Standing Committees

AU2807140190 Sofia BTA in English 1239 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] Sofia, July 28 (BTA)—The Grand National Assembly has approved fifteen standing committees; there will be several subcommittees to some of them.

Besides the standing committees there will be a Committee for the Working Out of the Draft of the New Constitution.

The standing committees are as follows: on human rights and the ethnic problem; on the territorial and administrative structure and the local state bodies; on the economy (with five subcommittees); on the budget; on the agrarian policy and the reform in agriculture; on labour, the social protection and the insurance of the people; on health care; on sports; on science and education; on culture; on radio and television; on the protection of environment; on the national security; on foreign policy; on ethics in parliament.

The formation of three ad hoc committees has been suggested: on the country's foreign debt, which will study its background and the causes for it and will seek a way out of the situation; on state property and the property of public organizations; and a commission of enquiry into the political and the economic crisis. Later on the national representatives will make a decision as to the setting up of a committee on youth.

Opposition Insists on SDS Presidential Candidate

AU2607204290 Sofia BTA in English 1911 GMT 26 Jul 90

[Text] Sofia, July 26 (BTA)—The opposition will not give up its claim on the presidency. It believes that once the chairman of the parliament is a BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] member and once the Socialists will have to form a one-party government to comply with the election results, the opposition is entitled to have the presidency. Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) M.P.'s told the three-day debate that in this way the powers will be apportioned between the ruling party and the opposition. "What we need is a balance of power," they said both in the chamber and in the lobbies.

The SDS leaders were adamant throughout the three days that they will not compromise.

In the SDS view, only a president from its midst can guarantee that no violence will be used in public life: "Socialists now behave arrogantly because they control the key ministries: The defense and the interior," Prof Dr Elka Konstantinova M.P., the leader of the Radical Democratic Party, said in a speech today.

There were opinions that an opposition president gives Bulgaria a better chance to get foreign economic aid, as this would be seen as visible progress towards democracy.

The Union of Democratic Forces upholds its candidate, Dr Petur Dertliev. Even after the dramatically failed fourth round of voting, the SDS did not put forward another nomination.

Dr Dertliev is immensely popular, charismatic and authoritative, the opposition M.P.'s say. The Socialists acknowledge this in lobby conversations.

"Dertliev is bold enough to take decisions and to commit himself to unpopular measures," said Prof Dr Aleksandur Chirkov M.P., a fellow Social Democrat. He believes, and he said it more than once, that Dr Dertliev is the only personality which can reunite "split Bulgaria." This, however, did not work with the "split" parliament. One possible reason is the Socialists' Party discipline. "It seems that we can't elect a president if the party leadership does not give a directive," an opposition M.P. said referring to the Socialists.

M.P.'s Propose Presidential Candidates

AU2707192690 Sofia BTA in English 1700 GMT 27 Jul 90

["Simeon the Second, Metropolitan Pankratiy, and a Woman"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, July 27 (BTA)—The Green Party has in mind the candidature of Simeon the Second, former Bulgarian king, for a president. M.P.'s of this party confirmed this news in parliaments' lobbies but requested to remain unnamed.

They stressed they do not intend to raise this nomination on Monday, when the fifth round is to take place, as they are still backing the candidature of the opposition, Dr. Petur Dertliev. They will do that only as a final version if debates about the president come to a slipping. For the time being, on Monday, the M.P.'s will again have to choose between Kyuranov from the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party], Dertliev from the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] and Vulkov from the BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union]. Other nominations have still not been officially raised.

The idea of the Green Party that Simeon of Saxe de Coburg Gotha would become the Bulgarian president was "in principle," "after a time," as one of this party's M.P.'s specified in a talk with a BTA reporter. The Green Party has not raised his nomination so far as they were aware of the strong resistance which they will have from the Nikola Petkov Agrarians and from the Social Democrats. "The Agrarians from the BZNS 'Nikola Petkov' cannot forgive the guilt of Simeon's father Tsar Boris the First, for the assassination in 1923 of their leader Aleksandur Stamboliyski, while the Social Democrats will not stand against their leader Dertliev who is competing now with Kyuranov and Vulkov for the president's chair," an M.P. from the Green Party said.

A few days ago Socialist M.P. Dragomir Draganov, associate professor in history, said he saw in Metropolitan Pankratiy, also an M.P., a person who is worthy of the president's position, who can play the uniting role which Bulgaria so badly needs now. Pankratiy already took the floor in parliament several times. The M.P.'s fervently applauded his firm position that the death sentence in Bulgaria should be removed, though many M.P.'s who took the floor before Pankratiy were against that.

The opposition M.P. Krasen Stanchev mentioned another idea in the lobbies. After the failing of all possible versions, the present election between Kyuranov, Dertliev and Vulkov, an independent candidate, a compromise candidate, satisfying the parliament forces, another sociocultural phenomenon, well familiar in Europe, could, according to Stanchev, be actuated: A woman may be appointed president. Stanchev did not wish to mention names nor did he say whether some talks are being held in this respect. According to records, there are 32 women in parliament. Some of them have already complained from the rostrum that the men M.P.'s are not gentlemen. But it was not only for a gentleman's reason that Stanchev told his idea.

'Towns of Truth' Hold National Meeting

AU2907194490 Sofia BTA in English 1855 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] Sofia, July 29 (BTA)—Inhabitants of the "towns of truth" as the three-week-old tent camps situated in front of and near the buildings of the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the state administration in Sofia and other cities are called, today gathered for their first national meeting.

The inhabitants of the "towns of truth" approved a declaration in which the national representatives at the Grand National Assembly are accused of deliberate manipulations aimed at creating parliamentary crisis and declaring martial law. It is insisted that the Bulgarian Socialist Party should withdraw the nomination of its presidential candidate.

After four unsuccessful election rounds, tomorrow the Grand National Assembly is going to resume the debates on the election of the country's president.

Thermal Power Stations Face Difficulties

AU2807152990 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] It is unlikely that the eighth 215-Megawatt thermal generating unit in the second extension of the Maritsa-East 2 Thermoelectric Power Plant will be commissioned on time. The reason for this is doubts, not only on the part of our correspondent Nayden Rangelov, but also on the part of the construction workers, arising from the lack of delivery or incomplete delivery of equipment.

The situation is no better with the other two thermoelectric power plants—the Purva Komsomolska and Dimo Dichev Plants—where preparations were supposed to have begun for extension, reconstruction, and modernization of the generating capacities. Fears are increasing that electric power generation at the Purva Komsomolska Plant will stop completely by the end of the month, unless the power workers are guaranteed normal working conditions.

Green Party Demonstrates at Romanian Embassy

AU2907192790 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 24 Jul 90 p 2

[Lyubomir Rozenshtayn report: "Appeal Submitted by the Green Party"]

[Text] The Green Party supports all actions of the Ruse citizens and calls upon all organizations within the country to join in various forms of protest—including radical ones—if the poisoning of the atmosphere in Ruse should persist. The responsibility shall rest with the two governments which remain passive.

This appeal adopted by the Green Party was submitted last night to the Romanian ambassador in Sofia by the party's Chairman Aleksandur Karakachanov.

The appeal was first read to members and supporters of the Green Party who demonstrated in front of the Romanian Embassy in Sofia.

The ambassador reportedly reassured Mr. Karakachanov that he agrees to hear the opinion of an independent international experts commission on the subject.

TANJUG Reports Rationing in Some Towns

LD2707211390 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1446 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Sofia, July 27 (TANJUG)—Local authorities in Blagovgrad and some other Bulgarian towns will today introduce rationing, despite the government stand not to interfere in economic developments.

Ration books will allow citizens to buy 1 kg of sugar, a packet of detergent, two toilet and two washing soaps. Bulgarian shops have been short of these goods for a long time now.

The parliament, which has been sitting for fifteen straight days, has not devoted a single session to the economic situation, except Lukanov's brief explanation on how the gas prices had gone up.

The multiparty parliament now seems to be more interested in political confrontations about the election of the state president and mutual accusations between party leaders than in the appalling economic situation.

The prices of a number of goods and services have already increased.

Yugoslav Authorities Refuse Entry to Dertliev

AU2907181890 Sofia BTA in English 1542 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] Sofia, July 29 (BTA)—Today the Yugoslav customs officers refused entry to a Bulgarian delegation who wanted to lay a wreath on the grave of Gotse Delchev (1872-1903), leader of the National Liberation Movement of the Bulgarians in Macedonia against Ottoman yoke. Gotse Delchev's grave is in the St. Savior Church in Skopje, SR Macedonia.

Dr Petur Dertliev, leader of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BSDP) and opposition presidential candidate, was refused entry by the Yugoslav customs officers at the Kalotina Checkpoint although he had a diplomatic passport. Other activists of the BSDP were also refused entry. The documents of all Bulgarians who were not allowed to cross the border were in order.

Announcing these facts on television, Mr Angel Akhryanov, a national representative at the Grand National Assembly, said that the act of the Yugoslav customs officers could be probably explained by the forthcoming celebration of the 87th anniversary of the Ilinden-Preobrazhenie uprising against Ottoman yoke of the Bulgarians in Macedonia. He said that "now in Yugoslavia they are afraid of a revival of the Bulgarian national self-identity in Macedonia".

Emigration Up 40 Percent Since Elections

AU3007122890 Sofia BTA in English 0908 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Sofia, July 30 (BTA)—According to the latest survey held by the Institute of Sociology with the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, after the elections on June 10, 1990, the emigration wave has increased by 40 percent.

Half of the emigrating Bulgarians are university graduates, one in every five of them has a [higher] degree. To provide ground for comparison, it should be noted that the university graduates in Bulgaria total eight or nine percent.

Sixty-two percent of those leaving Bulgaria have housing of their own, permanent jobs and relatively good prospects for making career. The greatest is the percentage of "brain drain" of engineers and technicians and people who have secondary technical education.

Sixty-six percent of the emigrants are 21 to 40 years of age.

Their motives are mainly two: One of them is the lack of any opportunities to show their worth in the country and the other one is directly related to the political situation here.

"I don't want my children to be humiliated; I'll try to make provisions for a better life for them," said a programmer with 20-year-long service and head of a section at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.

"I want to continue my studies and I will work my way through university," a law student who is going to France stated.

Schwarzenberg on Havel Austria Visit, Bohunice

AU2807200290 Vienna KURIER in German 28 Jul 90 p 2

[Interview with Karl Schwarzenberg, chancellor and head of the President's Office, by Karl Wendl; place and date not given: "Discussions Are Normal"]

[Text] [Wendl] Prior to President Havel's visit to Salzburg, there was some discussion about the handshake between Havel and President Waldheim. The visit is now over. How would you assess it?

[Schwarzenberg] President Havel was very happy to visit Salzburg and Austria. There were discussions about the handshake in both countries. In the CSFR, it was Charter 77 and some other groups that were opposed to this. Whenever decisions are involved, there are always discussions. This is quite normal.

[Wendl] What was the reason for Havel's hasty departure?

[Schwarzenberg] First of all, the president is a very busy man. Second, the largest international gypsies' meeting started in Brno on Friday [27 July]. It was particularly important for Havel to visit this first world festival of Romany culture. Before that, he had to go to Prague, and, in addition, presidents should also sleep sometimes.

[Wendl] Your behavior during the state visit caused some irritation. Why did you attack photographers who wanted to take a picture of Havel shaking hands with Waldheim?

[Schwarzenberg] I was very amused when I heard of these reproaches during breakfast today. I did not attack anybody, I was simply pushed backward amid the chaos. That is all I can say.

[Wendl] Were there negative voices in the CSFR when you were appointed head of the President's Office?

[Schwarzenberg, laughing] As is known, the person concerned usually does not know about such discussions.

[Wendl] Will there be further talks between the CSFR and Austria on the Bohunice nuclear power plant?

[Schwarzenberg] There will certainly be further meetings. However, these talks will not be conducted at the presidents' level, but by government members and expert commissions from Austria, the EC, and the CSFR.

Talks With Austria on Bohunice Inconclusive

AU2707135490 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 26 Jul 90 p 2

[Jozef Drab report: "Czechoslovak-Austrian Talks on the V-1 Power Station: So Far Without Specific Results"]

[Text] Talks between Austrian and Czechoslovak delegations on the operation of the V-1 nuclear power station at Jaslovske Bohunice were held in Bratislava at the beginning of this week. They were attended by Marilies Flemming, Austrian minister of family affairs and environmental protection; Gabor Zaszlos, Slovak deputy premier; Minister Josef Vavrousek, chairman of the Federal Committee for the Environment; Minister Ivan Tirpak, chairman of the Slovak Commission for the Environment; as well as by experts in the field.

The talks proceeded relatively smoothly, were marked by a constructive spirit, and it seemed that they would result in a joint communique. This did not happen and, in the end, the talks did not lead to any specific conclusions. We asked Ivan Tirpak, one of the participants in these talks, why. He said that the talks concerned the specific situation at Jaslovske Bohunice from the viewpoint of safety. The Czechoslovak side pointed out that the article by Engineer Jiri Beranek, expert of the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission, [in the 14 June issue of the Slovak weekly NOVE SLOVO] which stirred controversy over the operational safety of this power station, provides a realistic account, although it contains some inaccuracies. However, it is taken out of context. Since 1986, Czechoslovakia has been implementing a comprehensive program designed to raise the originally projected and implemented safety parameters of the V-1 nuclear power station. This program has been implemented for four years and, as such, was not adopted in response to the present reaction in Austria. The Czechoslovak officials involved in the issue have advanced an offer to the Austrian partners to participate in the survey to be conducted by the Siemens company at Jaslovske Bohunice as of 7 August this year. Siemens carried out a survey on a similar power station in the GDR. The Austrian side accepted the offer, as it had introduced the group which carried out the survey in the GDR. [sentence as published] The agreement was reached to issue a joint communique.

The problem is that the Czechoslovak side had not consulted Siemens in advance to inquire whether it was willing to accept a third side in the group of experts. This has prolonged the talks. For this reason the CSFR was unable to promise that even information which is protected by Siemens would be available to the Austrian side. This prompted Mrs. M. Flemming to disagree with the formulation in the joint communique that the experts nominated by Austria would have only observer status in this commission and that they would not have access to Siemens, but only to Czechoslovak, information.

Independently of the Siemens survey, the International Atomic Energy Agency will carry out a survey [at Bohunice] this October. The results of both will be synthesized and published. At any rate, it is up to the Czechoslovak side to make any decisions [on the basis of the experts' recommendations], I. Tirpak said.

Regarding the Austrian side's offer to help Czechoslovakia with energy supplies, the chairman of the Slovak Commission for the Environment said it is currently impossible to import energy from Austria, owing to the problematic state of transmission lines and problems with securing (other) channels of transport. Apart from this, the energy situation of Austria itself and its dispositions are known to us. Austria can supply some energy to us only in the brief summer period. In the winter months, on the other hand, the Austrian grid itself relies on imports.

Stracar Discusses Trade Problems in Moscow

AU2707135090 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 26 Jul 90 p 1

[CTK report: "Czechoslovak-Soviet Negotiations"]

[Text] Moscow—Yesterday Slavomir Stracar, CSFR minister of foreign trade, continued his negotiations with Konstantin Katushev, USSR minister of foreign economic relations. He also met with Stepan Sitarjan, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Foreign Economic Relations.

The main topic of discussion was next year's Czechoslovak-Soviet trade exchange, which should be carried out in freely convertible currencies. According to Boris Sterbak, director of the minister's office, the talks were conducted in the spirit of Tuesday's [24 July] edict by the Soviet president on the conversion to accounting in freely convertible currencies between the USSR and all the CEMA member countries from 1 January 1991.

Both sides also concentrated on the problem surrounding this year's trade exchange, especially, on the shortfalls in the complete fulfillment of contracts for certain commodities. Boris Sterbak refused to be more specific about the contents of these talks. He merely stated that the issue of the future fate of this year's and last year's unfavorable Soviet balance was also discussed.

Stracar Views Future Trade Ties With USSR

LD2807090190 Prague Television Service in Czech 2015 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Interview with Federal Foreign Trade Minister Slavormi Stracar by unidentified reporter in studio on 27 July—live or recorded; Stracar speaks in Slovak]

[Excerpts] [Reporter] Mr. Minister, you came to our studio because you returned yesterday from the Soviet Union, where you held talks on supplies of Soviet raw materials to Czechoslovakia. What were the results?

[Stracar] [passage omitted on background material]

[Reporter] There is one question everybody is interested in: Will the Soviets fulfill their obligations to supply us with materials, above all with crude oil?

[Stracar] The Soviet Union—specifically, my counterpart, the minister of foreign trade—neither said officially that the Soviet Union would not fulfill its supplies of crude oil to Czechoslovakia, nor confirmed that it would increase current supplies in the quanity we requested or the usual quantity, which is necessary for our industry. We requested the minimum supplies of 40,000 tonnes of crude oil daily, and the Soviet Union neither confirmed this quantity nor expressed a firm obligation on which date it would fulfill its obligations to Czechoslovakia regarding crude oil.

[Reporter] In case the Soviets do not fulfill their obligations, do we plan some kind of sanctions?

[Stracar] Sanctions among the CEMA countries used to be taken according to the general CEMA regulations, and usually they were calculated only after the expiration of the given contract, i.e., at the end of the year, and calculated only on the basis of the amount not supplied, up to eight percent. Nevertheless, if the supplies fall by more than has happened already, I think it would have wide- ranging consequences for our entire economy, and it is difficult to put it in numbers now.

[Reporter] A decisive word now: Do we plan sanctions or not?

[Stracar] Of course, at the end of the contract period next year we will discuss the issue and if the Soviet Union does not fulfil its obligations under the contract, then we will proceed with appropriate sanctions according to the trade agreements still valid this year. [passage indistinct]

[Reporter] The last question, Mr. Minister: So far the Soviet Union has been our number one trade partner; is this going to change?

[Stracar] In my view, the Soviet Union will continue to be our partner because the 40 years of trade, the 40-year-long relationship that in many cases was not always the most suitable relationship but the one that existed will continue to have an impact in our country for a long time. This is one thing; the other [words indistinct] is that the Soviet Union continues to be a big market, big country, a country that has not yet completed the building of its infrastructure, does not have adequate city communication networks, has not built enough buildings, furniture, etc. Therefore, I think that it is in the interest of our republic not to lose this market. [passage omitted on need for new kind of trade relations]

Hungarian Foreign Ministry Official Pays Visit

Warns of Minority Issues 'Inherent' Dangers

LD2707224490 Prague CTK in English 1630 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Bratislava July 27 (CTK)—Hungarian Foreign Ministry State Secretary Tamas Katona voiced satisfaction here today with increased attention being paid to nationality minorities in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but warned against certain dangers inherent in the problem.

Tamas Katona, who arrived here earlier today for a short working visit, was received by Deputy Chairmen of the Slovak National Council (parliament) Milan Zemko and Laszlo Nagy.

Urging quick solution to nationality minorities, he said that the problems of the Slovak minority in Hungary can be tackled, for instance, through setting up a chair of Slovak history and the Slovak language at Szeged University, and establishing a Slovak culture centre in Bekescsaba, centre of the Slovak minority in Hungary. Hungarians living in Slovakia should also preserve their national identity.

Laszlo Nagy stressed the necessity of promoting cooperation between the two countries' parliaments, especially in questions of foreign affairs, autonomy of towns and villages, and also human rights.

On the same day, the guest was received by Slovak Deputy Premier Jozef Kucerak. Discussed were especially mutual investments in border areas and also the joint Czechoslovak-Hungarian water scheme on the Danube Gabcikovo-Nagymaros the construction of which has been suspended by the Hungarian side mainly for ecological reasons.

Speaking about still valid bilateral Czechoslovak-Hungarian agreements, Tamas Katona stressed they are outdated and therefore should be replaced with new ones which would reflect the overall socio-political and economic situation in the two countries and all Europe.

Views Slovak Cooperation Prospects

LD2707230490 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1630 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Tamas Katona, state secretary for the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, paid a brief working visit to Bratislava today. In our capital, he met the representatives of the Slovak parliament and Slovak Government. They discussed in particular the position of minority nationalities in both republics, as well as mutual economic cooperation and the establishment of new contacts between state bodies. In this connection, we asked Tamas Katona where he sees the further possibilities of Hungarian-Slovak cooperation.

[Begin Katona recording in Hungarian, fading into Slovak translation] On the one hand, I believe that the historical traditions that link us do not consist only of bitter experience, but that there are also many things which could give us mutual strength and courage for the future. We do not want only to be good neighbors but also good friends, although this word has been frequently abused in the recent past. Therefore, we will be glad if both our countries, which started to follow the path toward democracy of a Western-type, establish the closest possible contact. I not only mean their government but also their parliaments elected in the free and democratic elections.

For example, we have proposed a specific cooperation between two parliamentary committees in the area of foreign policy, self- administration, and human rights. Both countries are now before municipal elections, and, therefore, their self-administration bodies should also find a way to each other.

During the time of the totalitarian regimes, we did not make sufficient use of cooperation in the fields of culture and economy. Today we put forward with your representatives a number of proposals which can be used, and now it is a task for experts to implememt them. [end recording]

Foreign Ministry Official on Asylum Policy

AU2707135190 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 25 Jul 90 p 12

[Interview with Bronislav Kulawiec, director of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs consular section, by Alena Walekova; place and date not given: "What Will Happen To Refugees Next"; first paragraph is NARODNA OBRODA introduction]

[Excerpts] A few days ago, Czechoslovakia was the first country to help the Albanians, who took refuge in the Czechoslovak Embassy in Tirana. Today the 51 Albanians are lodged in TJ Motorlet in Prague. Even more dramatic events surrounded the Cuban refugees in Havana. We wanted to know how Czechoslovakia will proceed in the matter of refugees. We asked Dr. Bronislav Kulawiec, director of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs consular section, for an interview.

[Walekova] What are the possibilities and ways of obtaining asylum in our country?

[Kulawiec] The legal guideline is based on Article 33 of the Constitution, which states that Czechoslovakia grants asylum to foreigners persecuted for protecting the interests of working people, participating in the struggle for national liberation, scientific or artistic work, or protecting peace. The principles are given by directive No. 1048 of 16 November 1962. According to this directive, it is the government that decides on asylum. The application is presented by the interior minister—following a discussion with the foreign minister—and the Czechoslovak Red Cross social affairs section expresses its standpoint toward it. Abroad, the application is filed at the Czechoslovak Embassy, and the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses its standpoint on it.

[Walekova] This guideline is almost 30 years old. The international situation, as well as the Czechoslovak situation, have changed in the meantime. Does the guideline meet current requirements?

[Kulawiec] It is obsolete and inconvenient. [passage omitted] The entire procedure for granting asylum will have to undergo fundamental changes, and it will also have to reflect the increasing importance of humanitarian aspects in some applications. [passage omitted] In order to speed up the entire matter we have elaborated draft principles for awarding legal status to refugees. We have drawn from the experience of other countries. We have sent a draft to the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Apart from Albanians, there are applications particularly by Vietnamese, Soviets, and Afghans. [passage omitted] It seems that it would be best to establish a specialized state administration organ—as it is in a number of other countries. Of course, it would be directly related to the UN Commissioner's Office for Refugees and other UN branches.

[Walekowa] Readers will be very interested in the current situation. How many asylum applications do we have?

[Kulawiec] The number varies—currently it is about ten applications.

[Walekova] What about applications for permanent residence?

[Kulawiec] Their number is incomparably higher; we expect this number to be higher than 2,000 persons. In connection with the planned departure of the individuals who are currently working in Czechoslovakia, this number will certainly increase. We expect a greater number of citizens from European countries suffering complex economic problems.

[Walekova] Specifically, how will Czechoslovakia proceed in order to solve the current situation? The existing guidelines for providing asylum do not meet expectations, and a new law has not been passed yet.

[Kulawiec] Irrespective of the fact that we are not a signatory of the Geneva Agreement and Protocol on the Legal Status of Refugees, we fully respect its political and philosophical aspect, and we subscribe to humanitarian aid. We have proved this in Albania. [passage omitted] Of course, it is unavoidable—besides elaborating directives and mechanisms for granting asylum—to also establish necessary economic conditions. It is necessary to figure in support for refugees in the state budget. On the other hand, we should consider the possible use of these people in some suitable workplaces.

Visa-Free Travel to Various Countries Outlined

AU2707114890 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 25 Jul 90 p 1

[Zdenek Vavra report: "The World Is Wide Open, but our Pockets Are Empty"]

[Excerpt] Prague (From our own correspondent)—We can travel without visas to 18 countries of the world. Since November last year, the CSFR has newly established mutual visa-free travel with Austria, Italy, Denmark, the FRG, France, Norway, and Sweden.

Also, U.S. and Canadian citizens can travel visa-free to our country. Czechoslovak citizens need visas for these two countries, but they do not have to pay fees for their visas. As stated by Dr. Bronislav Kulawiec, director of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs consular section, at a news conference on Tuesday [24 July], talks about abolishing visa obligations with Spain, Switzerland, the Benelux countries, and some other countries are being held. There are problems in the talks with Britain, which does not want to abolish visa obligations yet, allegedly because it does not have an internal police registry system. "It is a weak argument," commented Dr. Kulawiec. In our country, on the contrary, the abolition of the registration duty for foreigners staying less than 30 days in the country is being prepared.

During the past six months, 17.5 million foreigners visited our country. Of this number, 13 million were from nonconvertible currency countries and four million from convertible currency countries. Compared to the same period last year, it is 50 percent more in the first category and five times more in the second category. Six million Czechoslovak citizens traveled abroad—three times more than in the first half of 1989. [passage omitted]

Havel Speaks at Romany Culture Festival

LD2707221190 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1630 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] The first world festival of Romany culture opened at Marianske Udoli in Brno Lisen this afternoon. The festival's opening was attended by Vaclav Havel, president of the republic; Jozef Miklosko, deputy federal premier; Petr Miller, federal minister of labor and social affairs; and Milan Uhde, Czech minister of culture. In his short address, Vaclav Havel stressed, among other things:

[Begin Havel recording] The democratic state we are building must be based on the idea of human rights. This is the only way it can rank within the family of civilized states. Human rights include also the right for equality before the law, for an honorable life, and for national or ethnic self-determination. [applause] People are not good or bad because they belong to this or that race or this or that nation. He who does not recognize this basic truth is a racist. [applause] Many various races, peoples, ethnic groups, tribes, live in the world. They differ by their history, their faith, their tradition, their social habits; often they also differ in the way they think, by their behavior and temperament. However, all of them are people, they are equal before God and, as individuals, they have responsibility for their good and bad deeds. [applause] They should form one big community whose members respect one another and mutually respect also the ways in which they differ.

I got to know many brilliant people and many dishonest people both during my military service and in prison. Many helped me and many reported on me. The dividing line between them went across their national origin and did not even depend on the level of their education. This experience only reinforced my resistance to all the manifestations of racism. [applause]

Unfortunately, there were some manifestations of racism in our country recently. Boys with shaved heads beat up the Romanies, many people despise the Vietnamese, some talk scathingly about the Africans. One can, from time to time, also observe nationalistic prejudices in the relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks, the Slovaks and the Hungarians, Czechs and Germans: Recently someone even tried to glorify a person who was sending the Jews and Romanies to their deaths. [applause] In a certain sense, all this is a consequence of long years of suppressing all the national identities which could not develop naturally and thus find a way to mutually coexist. But one cannot make do with this sort of an explanation. First, and above all, these racial manifestations are expressions of human pettiness, pettiness and various complexes, which are being compensated for by aggression. This is an expression of mental laziness. Many are making their spiritual life easier by trying to localize the causes of everything bad, including their bad conscience, in some easily recognizable group of fellow citizens.

The new democratic power in Czechoslovakia is determined to fight hard all the manifestations of racism. [applause] The law which applies to them must be adhered to. National and social identity of everybody must be honored. I promise that I will fight for this with all the firmness of which I am capable, using all the powers I possess. [end recording]

Interior Minister Comments on Police Role

LD3007085490 Prague CTK in English 0811 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Prague July 30 (CTK)—The police was put aside even in such a police state as Czechoslovakia used to be, new Czech Interior Minister Tomas Hradilek told CTK today with reference to equipment available to police for its work.

He said that people now, fortunately, start realizing that if they want to live in a safe country they must behave accordingly towards those who ensure order.

The period of screening is over so the police can start work properly, not fearing for social certainties, Tomas Hradilek, a signatory of the Charter 77 document, said and added that he teaches policemen to be self-confident and proud of the profession they have chosen. It is also necessary to make laws and create organizational prerequisites, the minister, who wants to restore the good name of the police, stated.

He went on to say that obviously policemen must behave as fit for them and that they should be friends of citizens but at the same time they must be resolute in their actions.

He said that he is an optimist and that he believes peoples will be joining the police if the public relation to them gradually improves, if policemen are paid better and if better conditions are created for their work.

Asked about security measures to be taken in Prague to tackle increasing criminal activity here, the Czech interior minister said that the number of policemen will be considerably increased in Prague and that the mayor of Prague and the city prosecutor's office have been involved. These measures should bring effect by the end of the summer, he said.

Social Democrats, Socialists Berate Federal Policy

AU2707120090 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 25 Jul 90 p 4

["(r)"-signed report: "For a Democratic State"]

[Text] On Monday [23 July] in the People's House in Prague—as we have already announced—representatives of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, headed by its chairman, J. Horak, met representatives of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, headed by its acting deputy chairman, M. Adam. We have now ascertained detailed conclusions from these talks:

Both parties consider the system of political parties as irreplaceable for the establishment of a democratic parliamentary state and they consider the operation of the political parties to be a condition for a multiparty system which allows the confrontation of various opinions in the interests of the state and society. It is known that there is no working democratic political system anywhere in the world that is not based on political parties.

I stress that the current standpoint of the state branches toward the property of political parties (originally intended against undesirable operations by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) has become an inoperative factor in the activities of democratic parties. This standpoint is also reflected in the tax policy, which regards the political parties as taxpayers for income tax purposes.

Due to the fact that specific steps have not been worked out, the existing economic policy of the government is unacceptable and hazardous, as stated during the Federal Assembly debates and as documented by the development of the situation in the market in recent days—be it food or gasoline price increases, or the creation of confusion regarding detergents. At the same time, it is serious that there is no specific idea about privatization and denationalization, including relations toward foreign and legal subjects. It would be absurd to assume that there are prerequisites for price liberalization by 1 January 1991. We also lack a concept for developing the standard of living and social security for the population.

Both sides are requesting that the law on local elections be made public 90 days prior to the election date, so that the situation of the past elections can be avoided, when, for example, the law on elections to the Czech National Council was published only after the list of candidates had been presented. During the elaboration of the law, the opinions of other parties must be taken into account, including those that are not represented in the Czech National Council, and also the opinions of citizens.

When preparing and elaborating the drafts of territorial self- administrations and the draft constitutions, it is necessary to implement a form of nationwide discussion.

The Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party and the Czechoslovak Socialist Party recommend to their members that they establish local coalitions during the local elections in accordance with local conditions and that they give priority to those candidates who enjoy the citizens' confidence. Both parties will establish permanent contacts at all levels aimed at discussing serious questions and at verifying the possibility of joint actions.

Socialist Party Leadership Criticizes Own Daily

AU2707103290 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 25 Jul p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Czechoslovak Socialist Party Leadership's Standpoint"]

[Text] We have recently noted a few embarrassing events which have damaged relations between the fraternal Slovak and Czech nations. In Banovce, a plaque commemorating J. Tiso, first president of the Slovak State, was unveiled. The Slovak National Democratic Movement, in its turn, is demanding the removal of plaques, statues, and names associated with the name of Dr. Eduard Benes, former president of the Czechoslovak Republic. We are not going to pretend that these facts do not disturb us.

In the 20 July edition of SVOBODNE SLOVO we read—with a feeling of complete condemnation—imbalanced and rude accusations against Andrej Hlinka. In no uncertain terms, we state that the leadership of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party distances itself completely from the standpoints published in SVOBODNE SLOVO and considers the content of the article to be unacceptable.

By its action, SVOBODNE SLOVO has seriously damaged relations between Czechs and Slovaks. The Czechoslovak Socialist Party, which owns the Melantrich publishing house in which SVOBODNE SLOVO is printed, will draw personal conclusions regarding the author of the article and regarding the responsible officials of this daily. It is not permissible, under the cover of so-called journalists' independence, to consistently tolerate irresponsibility, untruths, and a lack of professionalism, which deprive the readers of the right to objective information.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Party is for the unity of the Czechoslovak Republic, in which both our nations live as brothers. We have expressed this many times in our standpoints. No nation is allowed to offend another nation's pride. If this has happened a few times, then we have to ask: What purpose does this serve? With condemnation and with sorrow we must state that the daily SVOBODNE SLOVO has played an exceptionally bad role these days.

Reply by Lubomir Petrik, SVOBODNE SLOVO chief editor, to the Czechoslovak Socialist Party's Standpoint:

According to the public's response, the quoted article about A. Hlinka has undoubtedly caused serious consequences for relations between Czechs and Slovaks and has contributed to making nationalist problems more acute. The article, as we stated on Saturday [21 July] was published through gross negligence. I cannot but identify myself with the statements contained in the Czechoslovak Socialist Party standpoint, or in other reactions, both private and official. In light of the past weeks' events, during which we fought for our editorial staff's right to sovereignty, I refuse to allow the intervention of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party in the administration of the editorial staff and I reserve the right—in the framework of the chief editor's rights and obligations—to draw the consequences at my discretion. Of course, I cannot ignore the principle that the freedom of the press has its reverse side, that is, responsibility, as President V. Havel reminded us in his personal letter. I will draw pertinent conclusions from the violation of this principle, which also damaged the reputation of our newspaper.

Slovak Movement Member Clarifies Policy Statement

LD2707213190 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1000 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] [Announcer] At the end of last week the Slovak National Democratic Movement was founded in Bratislava on the initiative of members of Stur Society and the Independent Party of Slovaks. Journalist Igor Matlon interviews Lubo Gregor, member of the preparatory committee of the movement, to clarify many equivocations contained in the movement's policy statement.

[Matlon] You say in your policy statement—I quote—that the main aim of the Slovak National Democratic Movement is to secure the spiritual and material well-being of Slovaks during the transformation of the Slovak Republic as an independent entity on the stage of international policy, on the basis of national and democratic ideas. Does it mean that you are for Slovak independence?

[Gregor] I believe that the quotation you have just mentioned shows this clearly. It is not of course quite that simple. We cannot consider it only from the spoken context. We must make our views on this statement known from the standpoint of making public events happen as well. Therefore, the statement has several points which are directed toward this aim.

[Matlon] Could you give some examples?

[Gregor] We want to see our political and nonpolitical forces united so that these forces can determine a joint course of action and cooperate on public life in Slovakia in a national and democratic spirit. We have appealed to all these political and nonpolitical forces to think about this and join the movement in this sense. This of course presupposes one thing of greatest importance: that the Slovak language will be legally made the official and state language on the territory of Slovakia. We want the Slovak National Council to deal with all nationality issues in Slovakia in its capacity as the highest Slovak body, because these issues concern the Slovak National Council, the Slovak Government and the Slovaks, and to prevent someone who has not a right to deal with these things from managing these things, to prevent the federal government and the administration of Prague Castle, which is far away from these things, and which, it seems to us, has failed to understand fully the matter, from usurping these rights. We also demand of course that the sovereign integrity of the Slovak territory be preserved, that municipal elections, which will take place toward the end of the year be not only a formal legal matter—as perhaps was the case in the last elections—but that these elections be valid in Slovakia, that is that they be fair, that we avoid some irredentist attempts, mainly on the part of Hungarian chauvinists in Slovakia, and that this be realized in the Hungarian Republic as well. We are not against the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Poles, the Germans, against honest people. We simply want to see the sovereign rights of this nation respected at last.

Another inevitable thing is the constitution of the Slovak Republic, to formulate it and to accept it. Another important thing is to prevent assimilation trends, which were very strong here. Various regimes were trying to implement them for 70 years.

[Matlon] You have said that the aim of your movement is to unite all nationally orientated forces. However, two parties, the Slovak National Party and the Freedom Party, have so far distanced themselves from you in their statements, and, in my view, these are two parties in Slovakia directed most toward the question of a nationality.

[Gregor] This situation might be slightly paradoxical. When two people do the same thing it is not always the same thing. I think we should share the same interests, and maybe we do. Other things might play their roles. The aim should not be to follow our personal, careerist, and political aims. We must see this in less personal terms, put aside our personal pains and ambitions, and try to promote national ambitions.

[Matlon] What real force does your movement represent at the moment?

[Gregor] It is difficult to answer this one. So far the real strength is only in our belief that the Slovak nation will understand us and that a national front will be created, and that all Slovaks will act together in the spirit of this national front for the national rights of the Slovaks.

[Matlon] Your policy statement devotes quite a lot of space to the reassessment of historical personalities of Slovakia and Czechoslovakia for the past 70 years.

[Gregor] We want to see the setting up of adequately competent commissions of experts, which will have to assess the period from 1918 forward and make their views known on various figures prominent in Czech and Slovak public and political life. On the one hand blame is being cast on Tiso and Hlinka for various reasons. We demand that these figures be reassessed, incompetent opinions from various sides are uprooted, that the personality of Tiso is reevaluated, that whatever wrongs Tiso had committed against the Slovak nation for political or other reasons be weighted against everything good he did. We shall see what such a comparison would reveal and which side will outweigh the other. We firmly reject the trend of regarding Tiso as an international war criminal: It has been proven and stated that this was not the case.

On the other hand we demand that the reputation of Mr. Benes also be reassessed from this viewpoint, especially in the period between the fall of the first republic in 1938 until 1948, because not everything this gentleman did concerning Czech policy and the Czecho- Slovak was pure. This includes certain trends in relation to Germans, and this is very important. It is rather paradoxical that some Czech groups have taken this very path and have forgotten that they should speak about those other things, too. You know if collective responsibility is demanded, for example, the Slovak nation's responsibility for the Jewish question, this is too much. It has been proven in which way Hungarian and Slovak Jews were transported from Slovakia, who was a mediator in these matters, what the Slovak Government did to save a certain number of Jews. We are in favor of Slovakia making its stance known on the issue, to apologize in its way on behalf of the government of that time for what happened, to erect a memorial to the Jewish population to give recognition to the Jews who had suffered. However, to throw a collective responsibility on the Slovak nation is truly unprecedented.

Slovak Government on Oil Shortage, Other Topics

AU3007100890 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 25 Jul 90 pp 1, 2

["NO"-signed report: "Communique from a Slovak Republic Government Session"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava— The Government of the Slovak Republic held a session in Bratislava yesterday. It approved the plan of its main tasks for the second half of 1990. [passage omitted]

After an extensive and, at times, heated debate, it acknowledged a report by the minister of labor and social affairs on the possibilities of the employment of graduates in the conditions of the emerging labor market. The transition to a market economy is making itself felt, among other things, in the diminishing interest of enterprises in graduates of secondary schools and universities. The Ministry of Education, Youth, and Physical Training currently registers 1,296 university and college graduates who have not found a job. [passage omitted] Unless the conditions of umployment change, the number of unemployed is expected to increase. The government assigned to the minister of labor and social affairs the task of working out, in cooperation with other ministers and the heads of other central bodies of state administration, a fundamental systemic solution to the employment of school graduates. It is to be submitted to the government by the end of August.

The government took note of the resolution of the CSFR Government No. 417 of 14 June 1990 on ways of meeting the consumption of motor vehicle gasoline in the third quarter of 1990, by which it agreed to set aside 525 million in foreign exchange for the import of 133,000 tonnes of motor vehicle gasoline from states with convertible currencies in the June to September 1990 period. Of this sum, 375 million korunas in foreign exchange are allocated for the Czech Republic and 150 million korunas for the Slovak Republic. This measure will temporarily increase the state debt. Jan Holcik, minister of industry of the Slovak Republic, provided information on the current situation in crude oil refining, particularly in the production of gasoline, in the production of plastics for packaging material, and in the production of additives for detergents. The situation in the Slovnaft refinery in Bratislava is good; the crude oil reservoirs are almost full.

The government established the Government Committee for Women and the Family as a body with an advisory, coordinating, and initiating role. Magdalena Malovecka became the committee's chairwoman and Zuzana Vranova its secretary. Of the other 14 members of the committee, 10 are women. Gabor Zaszlos, deputy premier of the Slovak Republic, is the committee's coordinator.

The government appointed Engineer Adolf Smolik, LLD., to the post of commissioner of the Slovak Republic Government for the settlement of property rights between the Greek Catholic and Orthodox Churches in Slovakia until the end of this year.

The Slovak Republic Government discussed also some other issues.

Religious Instruction in Slovak Schools

AU2707134890 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 26 Jul 90 p 1

["(NO-JC)"-signed report: "Religion As a School Subject"]

[Text] Bratislava—A final agreement on education was recently concluded between the Slovak Republic Ministry of Education, Youth and Physical Training, and church representatives on teaching religion as a subject at primary and secondary schools. Religion will not be a regular subject. However, each school is obliged to provide the necessary educational premises for teaching religion. Parents who want their children to take courses in religion will have to apply at the parochial office of the appropriate religion. Neither the school director nor any organ of state administration will supervise the course. The lecturer will be responsible for the safeguarding and health of the participants during the courses. The ministry will issue a separate directive stressing that the courses should not be scheduled for late hours. Schools are also supposed to make the courses available during the working hours of after-school care facilities or shortly prior to the lunch break, if the daily schedule permits it.

Budaj Responds to Charges of StB Collaboration

AU2707170890

[Editorial Report] Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA and Bratislava SMENA in Slovak on 20 July both publish interviews with Jan Budaj, chairman of the Slovak Council of the Public Against Violence movement, in which he responds to accusations that have been raised against him by Viliam Ciklamini, former federal deputy minister of interior, who claims that, prior to November 1989, Budaj had voluntarily collaborated with the State Security Corps (StB). The controversy over Budaj's alleged collaboration with the StB is also the subject of a 600-word Frantisek Melis commentary in Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 23 July.

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 20 July on page 3 carries a 300-word excerpt of an interview with Jan Budaj published by the Slovak trade union daily PRACA (neither the date of the interview nor of the relevant PRACA issue are given). Asked about his reaction to Ciklamini's recent statements about him, Budaj says: "These statements are untrue. To protect my good name I will be forced to sue Mr. Ciklamini—and not only him. The attacks on me have become frequent of late. At the same time I have to admit that I detest having to take legal action. If I were to characterize Mr. Ciklamini's public pronouncements, I would say that they are very colorful, ill-judged, and often exaggerated and that he tends to construe his own reality." Budaj says that people expect him to "cleanse himself," which is difficult, however, because the Budaj dossier has disappeared and the accounts of his interrogations by the StB have been destroyed. The only documents speaking in his favor which he can furnish are past summons to the StB. As Budaj observes, "every expert knows that StB collaborators were never summoned for interrogations."

Bratislava SMENA in Slovak on 20 July on page 1 carries a 600- word interview with Jan Budaj by SMENA correspondent Juraj Gressner, which was conducted in the SMENA editorial office in Bratislava on 19 July. Referring to Ciklamini's accusations, Budaj says: "Every person knows that I had signed a promise to provide the StB with information [in order to receive a passport]. I have already explained how this happened and why. I deny having ever denounced my friends." Asked what he believes were Ciklamini's motives to raise his accusations now, Budaj replies: "That is a complete mystery to me. Mr. Ciklamini, who had seized my dossier at the Federal Ministry of Interior, could have done it earlier—for example, prior to my planned election as chairman of the Slovak National Council. Why did he not announce then that I had been a collaborator of the StB? He could have also done it before the elections."

Asked whether Ciklamini's attacks are "just a private war" or whether their aim is to compromise the Public

Against Violence movement as the winner of the elections in Slovakia and thus to bring about a political crisis, Budaj says: "These are too many questions in one. But even if your suspicion were based on reality, I am convinced that our people cherish democracy and are in the position to successfully defend it. I believe that there is no way back for the CSFR, not even to a Gorbachev-style progress, which may have been the vision of people like Viliam Ciklamini." Budaj denies that there may have been some personal "misunderstandings or conflicts" between Ciklamini and himself.

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 23 July on page 2 carries a 600- word Frantisek Melis commentary entitled "Completely on His Own?"

Referring to the latest controversy over Budaj, Melis observes that "the evident reluctance of the Public Against Violence Coordinating Center to assume a stand on the whole affair is astonishing." Melis wonders whether this is because the Coordinating Center's main spokesman, Fedor Gal, is currently in the United States (attending a language course) or because the other leading members are vacationing or "too busy." Melis believes that, "be that as it may, the present members of the Public Against Violence movement have not behaved in the spirit of colleagiality toward Jan Budaj. They left him alone in this unpleasant matter, despite the fact that he is the leading representative of the leading political force in Slovakia. After all, this awkward affair does not concern just Jan Budaj, but the whole Public Against Violence movement." Even Slovak Premier Meciar, who used to hold "fiery speeches in Jan Budaj's defense" in the past, "is silent now," as Melis observes.

Melis concludes his commentary by asking: "Why do all those who only recently declared that Jan Budaj is an 'absolutely honest, perfect guy' and the like suddenly leave him completely on his own?"

Civic Forum Social Democrats Berate Horak Group

LD2807023890 Prague CTK in English 1816 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Prague July 27 (CTK)—The club of Social Democrats of the Civic Forum political movement today issued a statement rejecting the expulsion of Rudolf Battek from Czechoslovak Social Democracy on June 22.

The expulsion of a representative of the club of Social Democrats of the Civic Forum is tantamount to a split of Czechoslovak Social Democracy into two independent political centres, i.e. the present Czechoslovak Social Democracy led by Jiri Horak and the group of Social Democrats who, for reasons of principle, identify themselves with the Civic Forum and actively work in it, the statement said.

Rudolf Battek was expelled from the party since he had criticized it and its concrete policy several times before the June 8-9 parliamentary elections. He was opposed to the party's withdrawal from the Civic Forum list in the elections, ran for it and was elected to the Federal Assembly (parliament) for it.

The Civic Forum club of Social Democrats said in its statement that Battek's expulsion, a step back, was evidently motivated by the effort to present Battek and the whole club of Social Democrats as the main culprits in the election failure of Czechoslovak Social Democracy (it did not win the necessary five per cent of votes in the June elections to get into the parliament), which in fact confirmed the doubtful character of the political line of the present leadership of Czechoslovak Social Democracy (Czechoslovak Social Democracy, renewed after the November 1989 revolution, is led by Jiri Horak, who lived in exile throughout the Communist regime installed in Czechoslovakia in 1948).

A second motif for the expulsion was the wish of the Czechoslovak Social Democracy executive committee to get rid of any opposition and competition in the party, and to intimidate other possible critics of its policy, the statement said.

Civic Forum Agricultural Section Meets

LD2807212690 Prague Television Service in Czech 1730 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] The new situation in the sphere of agriculture demands a quick solution to a number of fundamental problems. This was the spirit of the deliberations of today's session of the Civic Forum agricultural section.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified reporter] The officials of the former power structures will only pretend that they cooperate, or will not cooperate at all—this was the view voiced today several times during a discussion at the national conference of farmers and experts who are the activists of the agricultural sections of the Civic Forum. The representatives of these sections, which were set up in 54 districts of the Czech Republic, spoke about the privatization that allegedly has not yet progressed much, about economy and production, about the fact that nothing is known yet about grain loans, and above all about political situation. Civic Forum has not made much impact in our countryside in the sphere of agricultural policy. What is the way to change this situation?

[Unidentified speaker] At present our agriculture is in a very difficult situation following the state interventions in economic policy, as our state tendency is to reduce subsidies for agriculture very quickly. This fact has a substantial influence also on political feelings in our countryside. The task of Civic Forum will be to become more involved in actions at slowing down the unfavorable development trend of economic impact.

[Reporter] What do you mean specifically?

[Speaker] Our state cannot restrict its policy of subsidies so quickly. This would, to a substantional degree, destabilize agricultural production and my calculations show that if we proceed at this pace, in 1990 our profit would be two billion korunnas less than was our agriculture profit of about 11 billion in 1989. This siuation is untenable, as it would totally destabilize the position of the Civic Forum, not only in our countryside but in our entire state.

[Reporter] The organizational structure of our agrocomplex is undergoing a fundamental change. All the district departments of the Ministry of Agriculture are to be abolished in the next few days, and they will be replaced in the Czech Republic by about 30 sections set up according to the territorial regions, but with a totally new function and new staff. This was announced by Bohumil Kubat, [Czech] minister of agriculture, at today's session of the representatives of the Civic Forum. [end recording]

Bartoncik Confirmed as People's Party Chairman

LD3007084790 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 0800 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] The Central Committee of the Czechoslovak People's Party noted at its Saturday session that no offence has been proven to have been committed by Dr. Josef Bartoncik. In this connection the committee refers to the documentation presented to the leadership of the Czechoslovak People's Party by the Presidium of the Chamber of People of the Federal Assembly. The Central Committee of the Czechoslovak People's Party has confirmed Josef Bartoncik in the post of party chairman, and deems it essential to thoroughly complete solving the legal recourse for all persons who contributed to violations of law in connection with the accusations raised against Josef Bartoncik.

Parties, Movements Assembly Meets 27 Jul

LD2707225890 Prague CTK in English 1736 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Prague July 27 (CTK)—The Presidium of the Assembly of Czechoslovak Political Parties, Movements and Associations discussed at its first session here today its new draft statutes which put emphasis on the assembly's independence and on an open democratic platform for constructive exchange and presentation of pluralist ideas and stands.

The discussions, which were marked by dynamism, proved the ability to find solutions with certain political culture amid the necessary suppression of one's particular interests.

The outcome of the session testifies that the assembly is a positive political reality which can become a constructive addition to the present political map of Czechoslovakia.

Socialist Party Discusses 'Revival'

LD2807213690 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1930 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] Participants of the second session of the National Socialist Assembly discussed today in Prague the political statement and aims of the revival of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party. They emphasized the demand for a change in the name of the party that would establish a clear political profile. It is necessary to appropriately evaluate the activity of the past 40 years. A comprehensive program of the revived party should be prepared by the September Congress. There were very critical points made in the discussion about the current leadership and apparatus of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party.

GERMAN UNIFICATION

Notice to Readers: *In order to provide information concerning German unification in one location for the benefit of our readers, materials on that topic from the FRG, GDR, and other media is now being published in the German Unification Attachment to the West Europe DAILY REPORT.*

Diestel Called on To Clarify Stasi Offices

AU2907200890 East Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German 26 Jul 90 p 1

["M.S."-signed report: "Stasi Offices in City Hall To This Very Day?"]

[Text] East Berlin—Councillor Thomas Krueger, who is responsible for domestic politics, described the discovery of "secret offices" of the Stasi state security system in the city halls of Berlin districts as a "political scandal." With the exception of Hohenschoenhausen District, there used to be inaccessible, locked rooms equipped with machinery for the transmission of intelligence in all city halls, including the Red City Hall. Their existence was detected during a thorough examination ordered by the newly elected district mayors. Lothar Quant, head of the investigating committee installed by Mayor Tino Schwierzina and Thomas Krueger, announced at a news conference yesterday [25 July] that the fully functioning intelligence network was used and that coded information was exchanged, up until its discovery. It must soon be clarified who sent and who received messages, and what kind of messages were transmitted, Krueger stressed. There are clues that the information reached the Interior Ministry. The Interior Ministry has not commented on the affair so far, but neither did it reject an inquiry by the city councillor responsible for domestic politics. Krueger called on the Interior Ministry to adopt a constructive attitude and to clarify the matter. Should the maintenance of the intelligence network be confirmed, this would constitute a gross breach of confidence and an infringement of legal principles, he pointed out. Krueger accused Interior Minister Diestel of deliberately delaying the slashing of the structures of the Ministry for State Security, thus helping to "catapult former SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] officials and senior security officers into high positions in the German economy via the Trust Authority."

Neo-Nazis Claim To Have Entered GDR Illegally

AU2707175790 East Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German 25 Jul 90 p 2

[NZ/ADN report: "Neo-Nazis Entered GDR Illegally"]

[Text] Frankfurt/Main—Michael Kuehnen, who was sentenced in the FRG for ultrarightist activities, and Gerhard Lauck, for whom an arrest warrant has been issued, have sent a letter to FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU admitting their illegal entry to East Berlin at the beginning of July. Lauck allegedly lives in Denmark and is responsible for the foreign organization of the National Socialist German Workers Party, which is banned in the FRG. The letter, which was published yesterday, says that "the extraordinary historical situation in Germany" made it possible, for the first time since 1979, for "leading national socialist underground fighters" to enter "Germany."

According to this letter, on 5 July, Lauck, coming from Copenhagen, went to East Berlin and from there to the western part of the city. Together with Kuehnen, he spoke before a dozen ultrarightists, demanding the "winning back of the eastern territories" and the founding of a "Fourth Reich."

Neo-Nazi Wanted by FRG Thought Hidden by Stasi

AU2707103190 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 27 Jul 90 p 8

[Unattributed report: "Neo-Nazi Hidden by Stasi in the GDR?"]

[Text] Karlsruhe—Terrorist Udo Albrecht, who is wanted by the Nuremberg and Dortmund Public Prosecutor's Offices, may be living in the GDR with a new identity provided by the State Security Service. The ultrarightist, who is suspected of also having robbed banks in the FRG, escaped to the GDR in 1981 when he took FRG investigators to an arms depot near the intra-German border. At that time the GDR border guards prevented the West German security officers at gunpoint from following Udo Albrecht.

Neo-Nazi Albrecht, who had several previous convictions, had even maintained close relations with the security office of Fatah since the end of the 1960's. He established contacts between Fatah and the ultrarightist Hoffmann Defense Sports Group in the FRG. He repeatedly tried to have German ultrarightists trained in the Middle East.

The arrest warrants against Albrecht still exist, the Dortmund Public Prosecutor's Office stated upon inquiry.

East Berlin Court Releases Alleged RAF Member

LD2707153690 Hamburg DPA in German 1303 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Karlsruhe (DPA)—Ekkehard Freiherr von Seckendorff-Gudent, arrested as an alleged RAF [Red Army Faction] member in June, was set free by the responsible court in East Berlin today. This was confirmed by the spokesman for the FRG Prosecutor's Office, Senior State Prosecutor Hans-Juergen Forester, when questioned.

After an identity parade with witnesses to a bank robbery in Wuerzburg in 1984, which von Seckendorff is accused of being involved in, the allegations against the 50 year old were dropped and he was released with the agreement of the prosecutor-general. The charges of RAF membership had lapsed under the statute of limitations. Von Seckendorff has been a GDR citizen since 1980.

Potsdam Firebombing; Republicans Believed Culprits

LD2707215290 Hamburg DPA in German 1543 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Excerpts] Potsdam (DPA)—Potsdam's historic Cecilienhof was severely damaged by a firebomb attack early this morning and will remain closed until at least Tuesday. [passage omitted]

An organization has claimed responsibility for the attack in a letter with the Republicans' logo. Gert Piorkowski, spokesman for the Potsdam People's Police, did not want to give any details on this. The organization threatens to carry out further attacks if its content are not published. The sealed envelope was found about 100 hundred meters from the scene of the crime. The Republicans' logo is stuck on one of several pages. It still cannot be said whether the letter actually originates from the Republicans. However, there was an affinity with certain of the party's aims on certain points. The content is "to be taken very seriously." It is not intended to publish it, because they are not going to be blackmailed. [passage omitted]

The extreme right-wing Republicans, however, described the attack in a press statement as disgraceful. By the "alleged letter claiming responsibility, which abused a Republican logo, the perpetrators might want to provide an excuse for maintaining the ban on the Republicans in the GDR," it was stressed.

Soviets Claim 122,671 Interned in Camps

AU2907203390 East Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German 26 Jul 90 p 6

[ADN report: "No Purposeful Mass Liquidations"]

[Text] East Berlin/Moscow—A total of 122,671 Germans were detained in internment camps on the territory of the Soviet occupation zone in Germany in the period between 1945-50; 45,262 were released again, and 212 managed to escape. According to documents that still exist, 42,889 persons died during that period from various diseases (particularly tuberculosis), especially in the years between 1945-47. A total of 756 persons were sentenced to death by military courts. This information was given to Interior Minister Peter-Michael Diestel by the Soviet Government during his most recent visit.

The deputy head of the Main Department History of Diplomacy of the USSR Foreign Ministry, Georgiy Kynin, rejected allegations in Moscow that the USSR purposefully liquidated masses of prisoners in the camps. The establishment of internment camps was part of a scheme of radical measures aimed at the extermination of fascism and militarism. Persons who posed a danger to the goals of the Allies were also detained in these camps.

Only 0.6 percent of all inmates were sentenced to death by military courts. No indications concerning the places where those who died in the camps were buried have been discovered in the archives.

Kynin pointed out that all actions carried out in the camps conformed to the law that existed at the time.

Documents on Soviet Internment Camps Released

AU2707140790 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 27 Jul 90 p 4

[Peter Jochen Winters report: "Diestel Presents Documents on Soviet Internment Camps"]

[Text] East Berlin, 26 July—On Thursday [26 July], Interior Minister Diestel presented to the public some of the documents about the special Soviet camps that existed in the former Soviet occupation zone between 1945 and 1950. The documents had been handed over to him by the Soviet Interior Ministry in Moscow last weekend [21-22 July] after the obligation to secrecy, which existed in the Soviet Union until then, was rescinded on 13 July. For the first time in more than 40 years official Soviet bodies have commented on this dark chapter.

In East Berlin Diestel praised the new quality of cooperation with the Soviet Union, which now makes it possible to clear up the fate of individuals in cooperation with the associations of the Red Cross in the GDR and in the FRG. He is convinced that the Soviet Union will hand over to the GDR all existing material about the "special camps" of the Soviet NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] in the Soviet occupation zone, including the "prisoners' journals" that were kept by the heads of the Soviet camps. These registers, which were kept in Russian, give the names of the prisoners and their fate—when they were discharged, transported to other places, or died. However, at the moment the East Berlin Interior Ministry does not yet know how many prisoners' journals still exist and whether they were really kept, as assumed, with "Prussian accuracy."

The Red Cross of the GDR and the FRG have asked all citizens with relatives who were imprisoned in 1945-50 and whose fate has so far remained completely or partly unknown to report to them. The Red Cross missing persons' bureau, which is still looking for 1 million people at present, will evaluate the lists that are handed over by the Soviet Union and compare them with its own files. The goal is a "statement of fate"—that is, a statement of the place and time of death.

Immediately after the conquest of eastern and central Germany by the Red Army in 1945, special camps of the NKVD/MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] were established, which were called "special camps" in Russian. The first, partly improvised camps, which were soon disbanded again, existed in the Warthe region (Posen)—from April to December 1945—and in Upper Silesia (Tost near Gross- Strelitz)—from April to November 1945. There were also special Soviet camps in Landsberg/Warthe (in a former barracks) from June 1945 to January 1946 and in Graudenz/Weichsel (in the former fortress prison) from November 1945 to February 1946.

The Soviet occupation power established 11 internment camps in the Soviet occupation zone, not all of which are named in the memorandum by the Soviet Interior Ministry or are named incorrectly. They existed between 1945 and 1950 for differing periods. According to Western information, these were the camps:

1. Bautzen (in the former prison) from May 1945 to February 1950;
2. Berlin-Hohenschoenhausen (camp I in a former dairy and camp II in a former meat machinery factory) from May 1945 to October 1946. Camp I was a central prison for investigations pending trial of the Soviet security organs from 1946 to 1951 and a prison for investigations pending trial of the GDR Ministry of State Security as of 1951; camp II temporarily served the Ministry of State Security as a labor camp for prisoners.
3. Buchenwald near Weimar (in the former concentration camp) from August 1945 to February 1950;
4. Frankfurt/Oder (in a former settlement) from May to October 1945 and in a former barracks from May 1945 to September 1947;
5. Fuenfeichen near Neubrandenburg (in a former concentration camp) from April 1945 to October 1948;
6. Jamlitz near Lieberose (in a former penal camp of the SS) from September 1945 to April 1947;
7. Ketschendorf near Fuerstenwalde (in a former workers settlement) from April 1945 to February 1947;
8. Muehlberg/Elbe, Liebenwerda Kreis (in a former camp for prisoners of war) from September 1945 to October 1948;
9. Sachsenhausen near Oranienburg (in the former concentration camp) from August 1945 to March 1950;
10. Torgau (in a former military prison and in Fort Zinna) from September 1945 to May/June 1946, then in a former barracks until March 1947;
11. Weesow near Werneuchen (former farm houses) from May to August 1945.

A memorandum of the Soviet Interior Ministry of July 1990, which was handed to the GDR Interior Minister in Moscow, says that Soviet documents in the archives prove that a total of 122,671 Germans were imprisoned in the special Soviet camps in the Soviet occupation zone from 1945 to 1950; 45,262 of them were released again. It was not said how many years these people were imprisoned without any proceedings and without sentences. A total of 14,202 prisoners were handed over by the Soviets to the GDR Interior Ministry. Interior Minister Diestel was not yet able to provide information on their fate, but he promised thorough investigations. From the camps 12,770 persons were taken to the Soviet Union and 6,680 were transferred to prisoner-of-war camps. According to the documents, 212 prisoners were able to flee. In addition, the Soviet memorandum says: "According to available information, over the entire period (1945 to 1950) 42,889 persons died of diseases, in particular during the years of 1945-47. Military courts sentenced 756 persons to death. Indications about their graves have not been found in the archives."

Furthermore, the memorandum of the Soviet Interior Ministry says that the available documents show that "conditions of imprisonment that were acceptable at that time" were established in the camps of the Soviet occupation zone and the prisoners were treated on the basis of the law. The high mortality among the imprisoned Germans was mainly due to diseases, in particular to tuberculosis. The accusation leveled against the Soviet occupation power—namely, that of purposeful physical mass annihilation of prisoners, is not confirmed by the documents in the archives. The number of Germans who were sentenced to death because of their crimes amounted to 0.6 percent of the total number of prisoners in the special camps.

This allows the conclusion that the overwhelming majority of the prisoners were innocent. The Soviet memorandum implies this by saying that thorough investigations were made of all persons who were sent to the camps, as a result of which many were released again. "However, it cannot be ruled out that among those interned there were also persons who were arrested only because of complaints against them or because of a tragic combination of circumstances."

Referendum Fails Due to Low Voter Turnout

Background Given

LD2707154290 Budapest MTI in English 1038 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 27 (MTI)—The referendum which will decide whether the president of the Republic should be elected directly by the people or by parliament will be held in Hungary from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday, July 29. The president will be elected by the people if over half of the 7.8 million electors go to the polls and vote in favour of a direct general election.

Preliminary public opinion polls revealed that 60 per cent of the respondents supported a general election. In view of the fact, that the referendum is taking place at the height of the holiday season, however, it remains to be seen whether a sufficient number of voters will turn out for it. The general presidential election would be held in November.

Arpad Goncz, the interim president of the Republic, was elected by the new parliament in May, after the largest two parties, the ruling Hungarian Democratic Forum [HDF—MDF] and the oppositionist Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD), agreed on his presidency for the forthcoming five-year term. The parliamentary decision, however, was challenged by various popular initiatives.

According to a June decision of the new National Assembly, the president of the Republic will be elected by parliament. On the initiative of Independent MP Zoltan Kiraly and with the support of the oppositionist Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP), the fourth largest party in parliament, within a week over 170,000 signatures had been collected, calling for a direct general election. (The Constitution stipulates a minimum of a 100,000 signatures for a referendum to be called.) The referendum was also supported by the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, which collected the seventh largest number of votes in the elections but failed to win a seat in parliament.

Several senior politicians of the ruling HDF and the Independent Smallholders' Party, as well as the oppositionist AFD, evaluated the initiative as detrimental, in that it only served to slow down political reform and hinder the work of the government. The Christian Democrats, who form part of the governing coalition, were divided over the issue but decided to stick to the coalition line.

The chief argument in support of indirect elections holds that according to constitutional law, Hungary unlike France or the United States of America, is not a presidential republic, its laws are passed by parliament, and executive power is exercised by the government. The president has the right to dissolve parliament and convene elections if the prime minister fails to win confidence within a specified period of time. He is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, is responsible for seeing to all the duties of protocol pertaining to a head of state and also has the right to return laws to parliament for reapraisal.

Kiraly and the HSP, referring to foreign examples, argue that only a referendum would really legitimise the president of a republic. In their view, the referendum would not hinder the government in passing their planned (primarily economic) measures.

So far none of the parties have nominated a candidate for the post. If the voters decide in favour of a general election, Arpad Goncz is expected to stand for election. The HSP, which was accused of seeking revenge for the defeat it suffered in the parliamentary elections, will only decide after the referendum whether it will field a candidate. Imre Pozsgay, who was the party's candidate last year and became the head of the HSP's parliamentary group, announced that he would not stand for the post. It is conceivable that former Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth, now an Independent MP, will enter the race. According to opinion polls, Nemeth is still one of the most popular politicians in Hungary. His candidacy has neither been announced or denied. Matyas Szuros, presidential candidate last year, as well as interim president, and now the deputy speaker of parliament, is also a potential candidate. Other candidates last year included Lajos Fur (HDF), now minister of defence, and Sandor Racz, president of the Workers' Council of Greater Budapest in 1956, now president of the Central Workers' Council. The Independent Smallholders' Party nominated Otto van Hapsburg but he did not accept the nomination, saying that he could represent the Hungarian interests more efficiently in the European Parliament.

Referendum Opens

LD2907085990 Budapest MTI in English 0510 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 29 (MTI)—The referendum commenced in Hungary at 6 AM. on Sunday to decide whether the president of the Republic should be elected directly by the people or by parliament.

The number of eligible voters is 7,850,000. The referendum will be valid if at least 50 per cent of the electors go to the polls. If not, the voting cannot be repeated under the Constitution. People can cast their ballots after producing their identity cards in the same premises as during the parliamentary elections in March and April.

The referendum will end at 6 PM., and the first partial results will be available at about 9-10 PM.

The official final result will probably be announced in the middle of next week.

The referendum was initiated by independent member of parliament Zoltan Kiraly and the Hungarian Socialist Party. The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party joined the appeal subsequently. A total of 170,000 signatures were collected in favour of the referendum (the minimum number stipulated in the constitution is 100,000).

According to a June decision of the new National Assembly, the president of the Republic will be elected by parliament. (under an agreement between the ruling Hungarian Democratic Forum and the leading oppositionist Alliance of Free Democrats, Arpad Goncz, currently interim president of the Republic, would be nominated for the post, and parliament would probably elect him.)

Preliminary surveys show that 60 per cent of respondents support the direct presidential election, but it is uncertain whether the required number of votes will be collected at this time in late July.

Low Turnout Expected

AU2907152390 Paris AFP in English 1504 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 29 (AFP)—A referendum proposing to elect the president of Hungary by universal suffrage will probably be invalidated due to insufficient voter participation, Electoral Commission President Zoltan Toth said Sunday.

Mr. Toth told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE that voter turnout would be around 30 per cent, well short of the 50 per cent needed for the referendum to be valid. He said that only about 15 per cent of registered voters had cast their ballots by 2:00 p.m. local time (1200 GMT). Electoral participation was weak throughout the country, noted Mr. Toth, who said that in a certain village, only one person had voted.

The former communist Socialist Party, which spearheaded the effort to put the proposal before Hungary's 7.8 million voters, has accused the conservative parties of sabotaging the referendum by holding it during the summer vacation period, and by neglecting to campaign against the proposed measure.

Polls published by the MTI news agency before the referendum showed 60 per cent support for direct election of the president, as opposed to the current system whereby he is elected by parliament.

"I'm opposed to this poll. It doesn't mean anything. The parliament must pick the president of the republic," a polling station official said, adding that "Hungarians are fed up with voting because important things must be fought—inflation, unemployment."

An elderly lady said she cast her vote "in the name of democracy" but stressed that many young people had "no time to vote because they are on holiday."

The proposal is opposed by Hungary's ruling conservative party, Democratic Forum, and a conservative opposition party, the Alliance of Free Democrats.

The two parties have agreed to nominate interim head of state Arpad Goncz, 68, a member of the Alliance of Free Democrats, for president.

Polls were to close at 6 p.m. (1600 GMT) and early returns were expected at 10:00 p.m. (0000 GMT Monday). Final results are to be announced in mid-week.

Referendum Turnout 10 Percent

LD2907170790

[Editorial Report] Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian at 1600 GMT on 29 July carries a two-minute announcer-read report on the referendum currently being carried out to decide whether the president of the Republic should be elected directly by the people or by the National Assembly.

The announcer reports that afternoon figures from various regions indicate that the number of those who have turned out to cast their votes in the referendum has been disappointingly low.

The announcer goes on to state that at the press conference of the National Election Commission at 1300 GMT, it was revealed that 10 percent of those entitled to vote actually participated. The referendum will be valid only if at least 50 percent of the electors go to the polls; therefore, the probability of the referendum being valid is very slight, even if some districts keep the polling stations open until 1800 GMT, two hours longer than normal.

It is possible that by midnight, 2200 GMT, it will be clear whether the necessary 50 percent turnout was achieved, the announcer concludes.

MSZMP Spokesman Comments on Turnout

LD2907202690 Budapest MTI in English 1909 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 29 (MTI)—The so-called "Pact parties" (the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats) seem to have forgotten their earlier slogan: "Let the people decide", said Ferenc Viras, spokesman for the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) [MSZMP], to a question by MTI's correspondent about the low turnout at the referendum. (The HSWP also supported the idea of the referendum.)

According to the spokesman, the timing of the referendum for the middle of the summer season reflects the political intentions of the governing parties. The low turnout can also be explained by the general surfeit of the population and its aversion to politics. The people today are slightly disappointed because of the unmet promises of the Antall government and the latest price rises, Ferenc Virag said.

MSP Leader Assesses Low Turnout

LD2907203290 Budapest MTI in English 1928 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 29 (MTI)—We would have liked to see the referendum being valid with a majority of "yes" votes, Gyorgy Janosi, vice-President of the Hungarian Socialist Party, [HSP—MSP] told MTI'S correspondent.

On assessing the low turnout, a few disturbing factors also have to be taken into consideration, the politician continued. The mid-summer date set for the referendum is quite unusual in international practice, and the electors did not receive preliminary notification as prior to the previous elections.

With the exception of the Hungarian Socialist Party, the parliamentary parties kept silent during the campaign and the Smallholders even called for a boycott in the last minute. In this way, the expected turnout of little over 10 per cent was unfortunately realistic.

The HSP leadership has not yet decided what attitude the socialist faction should adopt in parliament when it comes to electing the president of the Republic, Gyorgy Janosi said. Should the candidate turn out to be a creditworthy person able to represent the interests of the entire nation, our MPs will support him, he said.

Referendum Declared Invalid

LD2907211990 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2000 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] [Announcer] We have connected the Election Office of the Ministry of the Interior and I ask Andras Kerekes: Are there any new results?

[Kerekes] We are not any better informed than half an hour ago, but no one really regrets this here in the Election Office. The most important thing we have known for some hours now: The referendum is not valid because less than half of the electors turned out to vote. How much less? Altogether 13.8 percent of the electors exercised their rights to vote.

In the past half hour, we have learned a few detailed results: So far, 862,312 votes had been counted, 740,404 voters voted yes, 121,808 voted no. This means an approximately 85-15 proportion in favor of the yes voters; from this nobody wishes to draw very far-reaching conclusions. Approximately 20 percent of the vote is still to be counted.

The National Election Committee will hold a news conference tomorrow at 1800 [1600 GMT], but results will be given out during the next few hours as well, for the complete processing of the electoral records of all the 16 data groups which become apparent from the records will start soon.

Most important, however, and I wish to emphasize this once more: Now parliament will have to elect the president of the Hungarian Republic, from the interim president, for the next five years.

MSP Reacts to Referendum Results

LD2907224490 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungaian 2000 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Excerpt] [Announcer] We spoke with Zoltan Kiraly, one of the initiators of the referendum, and the spokesman of the Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP—MSP] which joined the appeal. First I am asking Viktor Polgar, spokesman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, what they think about this result or, if you like, lack of result, the low turnout.

[Polgar] I believe no one within the Socialist Party expected such low participation, as we consider this a very important question. It was most amazing that an increasing apathy could exist among the Hungarian electorate. Apathy toward policy, toward the fact that in our political life politics is not dealing with the economic and social difficulites depressing people, or at least not to the extent this issue would deserve. Thus important conclusions will have to be drawn from this. For instance, we will have to deal much more with real and essential questions of economy; our parliamentary group will obviously have to perform more actively.

[Announcer] Did you not know this when you joined the call for a referendum?

[Polgar] Of course we did. What we did not know was that there was a kind of disillusion about dealing with genuine, large-scale, theoretical political questions. We were hoping that the vast majority of voters, while their concern with their daily troubles was justified, would not ignore these big issues, political issues such as the method of electing the president of the Republic, which seem to be theoretical but are important in the long term.

[Announcer] How much did this referendum cost the HSP? I mean the ads which could be seen on television or heard on the radio, for instance.

[Polgar] The accounting has not been finished yet, but I think the final sum would be within 3 million forints.

[Announcer] However, it cost the country 400 million.

[Polgar] Let us first wait for the final account. There are certain doubts whether it really cost 400 million or not. Well, parliament approved 400 million for this purpose. I can only say that the spending of the majority of this 400 million could have been avoided if it was held simultaneously with, let's say, the self-government election.

[Announcer] A lot of people, however, question whether it could have been done. Remaining with the referendum, do you think it is a failure for the HSP or not?

[Polgar] I do not think it is a failure, as it is part of democratic politicizing that if one supports a referendum on some issue, it still may not turn out to be successful.

[Announcer] We also spoke with the initiator of the referendum, Zoltan Kiraly, National Assembly deputy. Enro Kardos reports.

[Begin recording] [Kiraly] [passage omitted: Kiraly acknowledges result; quotes American friends' incomprehension on main Hungarian parties objecting to referendum] They said that in a competitive multiparty system, there must also be competition for the high positions. Now, this is precisely what is not happening here, because for direct elections, the candidates must present their programs and personalities before the people of the country, before the electorate, who can thus choose. Now, in the case of an unsuccessful referendum, on the basis of the two-party pact [Hungarian Democratic Forum-Alliance of Free Democrats], not only will there be no election, but quite simply the deputies will only have the chance to vote for the candidate of the two-party pact.

I feel that it is democracy itself which is the loser here.

[Kardos] It was not the fault of the parties that the required votes did not come together; the voting citizens did not turn up in suitable numbers.

[Kiraly] I, too, was phoned this afternoon from various parts of the country. What finally transpired was that people are partly saying that politics here is still the mischief-making of gentlemen, just as it used to be earlier, and as it is in general. They do not see change, only that their living standards are deteriorating, that the government decides on price increases, that their livelihood is ever worse, and that, in practice, pacts are directing parliamentary work, that the parliament has discredited itself, the deputies are quarreling, they are not present at their workplace, and so on. So, the euphoric atmosphere which really characterized the post-election period, as far as feelings go, has gone. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Opposition Official on Local Government Plan

LD2807030190 Budapest MTI in English 1802 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 27 (MTI)—"In the wake of the agreement reached by the parliamentary parties, parliament can enact laws which offer a possibility to set up and operate genuine local governments, instead of the considerably centralized system directed from above that was included in the original proposal," said Peter Tolgyessy, head of the parliamentary group of the largest opposition party, the Alliance of Free Democrats, in an interview with MTI.

"The parties also agreed that the laws on local governments should be passed with a two-third majority."

Under the conception approved at the six-party talks, bodies of local government representatives will operate in all settlements. The role of the county representatives bodies will be very restricted, they shall not be able to pass decisions that are binding for the locals. The six-party draft proposes the institute of commissioner of the Republic, who would have a far more limited scope of authority than the originally proposed institute of lord lieutenant.

Commissioners of the Republic would be appointed by the president of the Republic, after parliamentary hearings, on proposal of the prime minister. The commissioners can exercise supervision only of legality with respect to the local decisions, and, in case of unlawfulness, will call on the local body concerned to re-examine its decision. However, only the settlement has the right to decide. Inasmuch as the commissioner of the Republic continues to hold the decision unlawful, he will be able to turn to the courts.

Mayors would be elected for four years. The law would set down the cases when the mayor would lose his mandate, but mayors cannot be recalled.

According to Mr. Tolgyessy, this six-party agreement can be considered as a major victory of the liberal forces, but it does not imply a defeat of the governing parties.

Electricity, Fuel Prices To Increase 1 Aug

LD2707133490 Budapest MTI in English 1112 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 27, 1990 (MTI-Econews)—Household energy prices will go up by an average of 29.7 per cent as from August 1, officials of the Ministry of Trade and Industry told the press today.

Coal prices will increase by an average of 45 per cent, gas for heating by 26.9 per cent and electricity by 44.1 per cent in Budapest and other cities where the price of electricity has until now been kept artificially low. The price of electricity will go up by 19.5 per cent in smaller towns, and remain unchanged in rural areas.

The price of fuel oil will rise from 9.20 forints to 11 forints a litre.

The energy price increases are part of the government's economic package, designed to keep to the targeted budget deficit of 10 billion forints as stipulated in an agreement with the IMF.

'Massive Increase' Reported in National Debt

LD2907215490 Budapest MTI in English 1831 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 29 (MTI)—Hungary's net national debt has increased to 1,244,000 million forints from 1,188,700 million at the end of last year.

A Finance Ministry official told MTI's correspondent that the net national debt had risen 2.5 times over since 1985, when it came to 498,000 million forints.

Such a massive increase can be traced back to two basic factors. In this period the external debt increased rapidly, while the budget deficit also showed a steady rise.

In 1985 the national debt ran to 13,900 million dollars gross, and to 8,000 million net. The net debt burdened the state budget by 43,200 million forints.

In the meantime, the burden on the state budget rose to 517,600 million forints because of growing internal and external debts, as well as the repeated devaluation of the forint. (At the end of last year the national debt stood at 20,600 million dollars gross, and around 15,100 million dollars net.)

The budget deficit went up from 15,800 million forints in 1985 to 46,900 million in 1986. A year later it was 34,900 million, to drop to 19,700 million in 1988, while last year it hit a record 54,000 million forints.

To keep the budget deficit below 10,000 million forints by the end of this year is important partly to slow down the steady increase in national debt. As the half-year deficit amounts to 13,000 million forints, the government was compelled to raise consumer prices, reduce budget expenditures and boost its revenues above plan.

Implementation of the programme is important for improving the financial balance, although it imposes a major burden on the population. However, its inflation-generating effect is considered unfavourable. Consumer prices have gone up by 22 per cent in six months.

Foreign Minister Envisages Diplomatic 'New Era'

Report on News Briefing

LD2807082790 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1500 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] The leadership of the Foreign Ministry has decided that it will not after all appoint Professor (Imre Lontay) to the post of Luxembourg ambassador. Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky has justified this by saying that the opinion of the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee was very divided in connection with the candidate. The reason why Janos Toth, who was proposed for diplomatic leader in Mexico, is not being supported by the ministry is not because of his earlier function of party secretary, but because the candidate has already been ambassador to Mexico.

After a two-day ambassador's conference, the foreign minister stressed at his news briefing that the new government also wants to open a new era in diplomatic life.

Interview on Diplomatic Policy

LD2807084290 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1630 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Interview with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by correspondent Erno Kardos following news conference in Budapest on 27 July—recorded]

[Text] [Kardos] Before the change of government a certain unease was felt at the embassies. Now that the ambassadors have been recalled, has this unease further intensified? Has it been possible to reassure the ambassadors? I ask this because I suppose it is connected with Hungary's foreign policy, that the ambassadors should be able to conduct, or represent, foreign policy securely, calmly.

[Jeszensky] This came up not only in connection with the ambassadors but in the case of embassy staff, the staff of the Foreign Ministry, of the ministries in general. I think that in certain cases here (?apprehension) was justified, knowing that indeed not everyone's past is spotless. At the same time the press, or the election campaign itself, enjoyed accentuating this and arousing a bit of fear. So, what the Democratic Forum [MDF] has considered the most important is professional expertise and loyalty to the government of the time.

[Kardos] I think I can distinguish a small difference here between your statement and that of the premier—namely that the premier said it does not matter if someone does not know much about foreign politics; what is important first and foremost is his loyalty to the government. You, on the other hand, have said that what is important is a person's knowledge of his profession; his past is not so crucial.

[Jeszenszky] Both could be explained in greater detail here. On the one hand it is important that a person not offended against simple honor. And I think this can be said for the good part of [word indistinct], so I would not say that his past does not count, merely his competence. On the other hand, with regard to the new people, there is complete harmony between myself and the premier, because what we consider important is that diplomacy is not some devilish art that cannot be learned. To begin with, a person who is well educated, politically informed, who today may still not be quite conversant with the current affairs of the time—and certainly great experience does count—nevertheless, even a person new to the job can be a good diplomat, a good ambassador.

Incidentally, from this point of view, in many countries practice has made customary much greater changes than our own. A whole series of countries, including the United States and Latin American countries, carry out much bigger personnel changes when there is a change of governemnt. Frequently the media have also ascribed a greater significance to the hearing of ambassadors than to the bigger or smaller storms.

The work under way now is—if I may so put it—much more difficult, namely the composition of the embassy staffs. There, too, a natural change is taking place, or rather it stopped a while ago so the new ambasadors could have a free hand, or at least so that within certain limits they, too, could choose the people with whom they would work. Here, too, I think a good solution is being found: that in every case those people should stay who know the country, the experts who can assure continuity. Anyway, where there is a need, changes will occur. I would note that Hungary's foreign policy is much more important than that, or at least as important.

[Kardos] At the news conference you asserted that it is at least as important for us to look to the West as to the East.

[Jeszenszky] First of all we hope that the East-West (?angle) will increasingly disappear in Europe, or that it will become an exclusively geograhical concept. So, we want to pursue a united Euro-policy. Here, in the reorganization of the ministries' internal affairs, in contrast to the earlier approaches built on the territorial principle—here, too, in fact, we think in terms of a united Europe, and we have grouped the individual countries mostly according to certain practical viewpoints. And everywhere we stress that while the West, Western Europe, has been a neglected and insufficiently fostered area, it is now being given an important role in our foriegn policy. But we have also always emphasized—and this also figures in the government program—that in no respect do we want to weaken those relations, be they economic or cultural or political, whose maintenance lies in our interest. And this also applies in every respect to the Soviet Union.

[Kardos] It came up several times among Hungarian foreign political experts that it is unacceptable for Hungary that East Europe should be treated en bloc, and that it should be advantageous for us, too, if the West Europeans negotiated with us in a differentiated manner. What would this differentiated manner be? And is there any chance of this today?

[Jeszenszky] Well, I would not even say that we demand that we should be peremanently granted favored treatment; there are no grounds for this. What we wish is that a country that satisfies the legal or economic criteria and demands, those which various European institutions impose on the candidate-members—if a country satisfies these, then there should be no obstacle to admission, and it should not have to wait until the others also catch up. So, it is in this sense that we expect, if you like, differentiated treatement: that in Hungary the change of system in every respect—in other words, politically, economically—is so advanced that in fact I believe we have every chance of becoming a member of the European Council, for example.

[Kardos] Mr. Minister, is there a chance that they will negotiate with us in a different manner, with different conditions, and (?how far does) this determine Hungary's domestic, political, and economic life?

[Jeszenszky] Well, let's say that it would have a symbolic value, first and foremost, whether Hungary gets into the Council of Europe this year or not. We ascribe great significance to this. This has certain economic advantages as well; participation in committees, in institutions, which definitely also has economic advantages. So, I have to say that it would somewhat [words indistinct] development and economic progress. By itself, of course, what kind of relations develop in daily life, in daily economic life, between Hungary and the developed countries is decisive.

[Kardos] You deemed it very important that Hungary wants to change its relations with Hungarians living abroad. I think that one could divide this into two parts: the policy conducted with Hungarians living in the West, and the policy conducted with those living here in Europe, in the neighboring countries.

[Jeszenszky] On the one hand, this distinction is naturally justified, because they live differently, their situation is different, they became minorities under different conditions. There is a huge difference in their sizes. In economic strength, also, unfortunately, the Hungarians living in the neighboring states do not represent a source of support for us; we cannot build on their capital investments....

[Kardos, interrupting] And we can count on those living in the West?

[Jeszenszky] We can definitely count on those in the West. It would be difficult to assess here what they mean in terms of assets, but the fact that many come home as pensioners does not play a neglibible role; it can be significant in the balance of payments, even. Incidentally, before World War I the money transferred to Hungary by Hungarians working in the United States, according to economic historical research, to a very serious extent improved Hungary's balance of payments at the time. So, it has this kind of significance as well. And apart from this, I see a kind of contradiction and encouragement in the fact that there are so many Hungarians who have made careers abroad, who have become successful, who have become people of property, of prestige. I think it is time, and it is possible, to create the conditions for people to make careers at home, so that Hungarian talent can prosper here.

[Kardos] But the Romanian state secretary said he does not consider it important that Hungary should open a consulate, that we should open consulates in each other's countries. What is your opinion on this?

[Jeszenszky] I do not think I even have to say that I do not regard this as a serious reasoning at all, and I do not even want to use stronger language. It is the same strange reasoning to say that the agreements made during the two hateful dictatorships are not valid, that they must not be taken into account. I did emphasize that this is not comparable to the agreements made in the recent past, or even earlier, between the Hungarian systems and the Ceausescu dictatorship. In any case international treaties are valid. Sometimes we do not like existing treaties, but after every change of systems one of the first acts of new governments is to stress that they will fulfill their international obligations. This, I think, must also apply to Romania.

But quite independently from this, that consulates are needed is quite obvious. Because a consulate first of all represents citizens of its own country abroad, the more frequent the contact between countries, the greater the touristic or economic traffic between them, the more is required. The situation at present is that if a Hungarian citizen gets his wallet stolen, or loses his passport in Romania he has to go to Bucharest, where there is a consulate, but often this might happen in Oradea. Just consider what nonsense this situation is. There is need for several Hungarian representations in Romania, a need for several consulates, and naturally we welcome more Romanian consulates in Hungary as well.

There is, of course a certain disproportion, because there are about 30,000 Romanians living in Hungary, perhaps a few more, and in Romania there are at least 10 million [as heard] or even more Hungarians and in addition how many Hungarians have family connections, how many have their origins from that country. It is obvious that the consular presence is very important there.

[Kardos] One more, final, question. At your news conference you said you would like to change the relations between embassies and Hungarians living abroad or visiting aborad. So if we are going abroad, a different kind of relationship could be established with the embassies. What do you have in mind?

[Jeszenszky] I did elaborate on this, saying that even in a store you can behave in different ways, you can smile and provide willing service to the client, or you can do so reluctantly and unpleasantly. I think that in the past—and this perhaps had its origin in the nature of the system— overseas representations were not particularly friendly even with Hungarian citizens who wanted to get in or out of the country. And with possible emigrants, the relations were very unfriendly, and this was mutual. But there were reasons for the emigration; they were driven out of the country. There is a need for change in both respects, partly because today Hungarians living abroad are emigrants and this how they think of themselves. It is natural that we will show maximum friendship toward them as well. But I also emphasized that I would not like it if the Hungarian citizen abroad did not feel that the representatives of the Hungarian Republic are there, among other reasons, to assist him, and to have a kind of home there if he needs it.

[Kardos] We trust that, in the future, overseas Hungarian representations will realize that they are living abroad on the funds provided by the taxpayers, and will serve the interests of tourists and Hungarians living abroad in this spirit.

Minister Announces Convertible Trade Surplus

LD2707131190 Budapest MTI in English 1155 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 27, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—Hungary's convertible trade showed a surplus of U.S. $553 million at the end of June, as a result of a 17-per-cent increse in exports, and a moderate, 1-per-cent growth in imports, Mr Bela Kadar, minister of international economic relations, told the press on Friday.

The minister said that convertible trade made up 71 per cent of the total, and the structure of exports improved slightly as the share of materials and components decreased, and that of machinery increased.

Mr Kadar said export orders for the second half promise a trade surplus of between U.S. $700 million and a U.S. $1 billion this year.

According to preliminary figures, the hard currency trade surplus rose by a further U.S. $150 million by June 26, and reached U.S. $703 million.

Shrinking Eastern and domestic markets have forced Hungarian companies into finding alternative outlets in the West.

As a result, 71 per cent of all trade was destined for Western, and 29 per cent for Eastern, markets in the first half of the year, Mr Bela Kadar, Hungarian minister of international economic relations, told a press conference today.

The shift in proportions is rather remarkable, he said, because last year, Western markets accounted for 58 and Eastern for 42 per cent of total trade.

'We have to keep up the standard of cooperation with the Eastern countries,' Mr Kadar said, adding that he trusted cooperation in a new form based on mutual advantages would strengthen in the future.

The heavy drop in trade with the Eastern countries was to be attributed to the economic difficulties the countries concerned were going through, and a further decline was very likely towards the end of the year.

Direct trade showed a deficit of 58 million roubles in the first half of the year, as compared to a surplus of 350 million roubles in the same period of 1989.

The fact that Soviet energy supplies have decreased lately because of the Soviet Union's own domestic problems gives some cause for concern, but over the last few weeks, the Soviet Union has again increased daily deliveries, and promises not to impose unexpected restrictions on energy exports in the future, Mr Kadar said.

Szokai Interviewed on Talks With Romania

LD2907143290 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0630 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Report on interview with Deputy State Secretary Imre Szokai by reporter Jozsef P. Szabo on the "World Clock" program; place and date not given]

[Text] At his news conference on Friday [27 July], Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky said that not one but at least three or four Hungarian consulates ought to be opened in Romania. According to the signs, this can at most be a long-term program, perhaps no more than a wish, because the foreign ministerial discussions held this week were a long way from bringing this about. The Hungarian participant, Imre Szokai, deputy state secretary, was interviewed by Jozsef P. Szabo.

[Begin recording] [Szabo] What do you consider the biggest achievement at these discussions, and what has caused you the biggest disappointment?

[Szokai] I would begin by saying that I have not been caused any disappointment. I will say honestly, I expected something worse. So, that in itself was a somewhat pleasant surprise. Anyway, I consider it an achievement that we did not leave off the agenda a single issue which we consider important from the viewpoint of our bilateral relations. All the issues are on the negotiating table, even all those issues which my partner did not have a mandate to discuss.

[Sabo] What was the issue which he had no mandate to discuss?

[Szokai] For example, he did not have a mandate to talk about the opening of the consulate general in Cluj. He said this clearly and unequivocally. I emphasized to my partner that they should not be thinking in the category of a political gesture. By reopening the consulate general Romania would be remedying a former grievance, because the Romanian dictatorship, Ceausescu's dictatorship, had simply committed an offense when it ordered out the Hungarian consulate general.

[Szabo] Am I right in saying that the Romanians are in fact willing to discuss relations between the two countries, but they would like the problem of Romania's Hungarian minority removed from the topics of the talks?

[Szokai] For us the development of the situation of Romanian Magyardom is a principled issue. Good, balanced relations are inconceivable if Romanian Magyardom suffers any negative discrmination or grievance. If I pair these two things and if I observe Romanian behavior in the light of this, then I think that our negotiating positions and the result which we have attained in this issue are not slight.

[Szabo] And what was his position?

[Szokai] He consistently emphasized that this issue has to be settled at an all-European level, or rather that the way of settlement has to be found at the all-European level. To which I said that this is one possible level of solution. Obviously those countries which are particularly concerned in these issues, and these are chiefly the Central and East European countries, must also find solutions at bilateral or regional levels. On such a basis these countries could also set an example for Europe and they could considerably facilitate their integration into Europe. Formerly in these issues the deciding judge, so to speak, was Moscow. A very peculiar situation would arise if now, let us say, the European Parliament were to be some kind of deciding judge in these kinds of disputes in the Central and East European countries.

[Szabo] Perhaps one of the many problems which disturb Hungarian-Romanian relations is what should be the fate of the refugees who arrived in Hungary in the past months, even in the past years.

[Szokai] There is no drop in the number of refugees. So, on the one hand, a further flow of refugees should certainly be stopped. This definitely necessitates domestic political stability in Romania, which, as I pointed out, does not exist at present. At the same time a means ought to be found for those who have already fled, to go home and resettle. I proposed that Romanian-Hungarian experts, with the participation of the professional councils of the UN High Commission for Refugee Affairs, should conduct trilateral discussions about how, with what means, these people could be helped to resettle in Romania.

[Szabo] Did they show any willingness to have them back?

[Szokai] (?Neagu likewise) stated that according to Romanian laws, after all, anyone can freely leave and return to the country. I repeat that I emphasized to him that the conditions have to be created for people to resettle, or so that they will not flee the country.

[Szabo] Obviously a lot was said about relations between Hungary, as the mother nation, and the Romanian minority. One thing I am thinking, for example, is that sending products of the Hungarian press to Romania has so far not been without hitches. But there are also other things of interest.

[Szokai] I repeatedly asked emphatically that they make it possible for us to set up, or install, a television booster in Hargita, which would permit the reception of Hungarian television's Channel One in Szeklerland, in Translyvania. He promised this, saying there was no obstacle to this. He mentioned some technical problems, to which I naturally reacted by saying that we are ready to give Romania help of a technical nature if they have any problem with this. That is what we agreed. But mention was also made of the free, unlimited, import of Hungarian press imports, books, into Romania, as well as subscriptions for Hungarian press products. I was given a promise that there will be no obstacle to this in the future.

There were a lot of other questions. I mentioned as an example the development of the cross-bar telephone system, that it is a simply intolerable situation to wait six to eight hours even when telephoning with state priority the Hungarian Embassy in Budapest. Then let us just imagine what happens if, for instance, somebody from a village in Szeklerland wants to phone a relative in Budapest. Here, too, I was promised that they would examine the cross-bar system, and not only would they examine it, they would bring it into being as soon as possible.

Another thing that came up was possibilities such as the introduction of direct bus services, again, for the umpteenth time. Because certain services were started up in February, afterward other transportation services might be considered, such as the development of rail services, perhaps the construction of a new railway line, the launching of a direct flight, if necessary, or perhaps a direct boat link between Arad and Szeged on the River Maros.

[Szabo] What is the significance in setting up these culture houses, or culture centers?

[Szokai] I consider this as well to be a yardstick of Romanian willingness. However, it struck me as rather odd that on the Romanian side they made the opening dependent upon exactly the same conditions as those I last heard in Arad from Ceausescu. I frankly told my colleague this. He hastened to stress that naturally the argument is not the same because of that. This, of course, changes nothing in essence. Essentially one of their decisive objections is that according to the original plans this culture house would also engage in selling. For example, one could buy records there, one could buy newspapers, one could buy books. I do not really see why they are averse to this. After all, if I think of the Helsinki agreement, these things can be taken freely into Romania. So, although we agreed that it would be good to open this culture house as soon as possible, unfortunatly we did not really reach an agreement.

[Szabo] When will you next go to Romania, Imre Szokai? For I think it is our turn now.

[Szokai] I am willing to go to Romania within a week if the consulate general opens in Cluj in August. [end recording]

Refugee Status Not Accorded to Albanian Group

LD3007095990 Budapest MTI in English 0924 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 30, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—The Albanian citizens who took refuge in the Hungarian Embassy in Tirana and subsequently flew here on July 14 will not be treated as refugees in Hungary, Dr Jozsef Szilvasi, an official from the refugee office of the Hungarian Interior Ministry, told the Budapest daily the 'MAGYAR HIRLAP'.

Dr Szilvasi said that since an interview with the 39 Albanians revealed that they were fleeing their country for economic, and not for political, reasons, they cannot be regarded as political refugees under the Geneva Convention.

In any case, most of them want to go on to other countries, such as the United States, New Zealand or Australia.

Those who do stay will be given temporary residence and work permits for a year, and be put up at a refugee camp at Csilleberc, Budapest.

Dr Szilvasi says that since the first group arrived, another 16 Albanians have applied for temporary residence in Hungary, and it is expected that even more people will choose the same route to emigrate from their country.

No Austrian 'Ultimatum' on Nagymaros Issue

LD2707230690 Budapest MTI in English 1652 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 27 (MTI)—The Austrian side has said there is no talk of an ultimatum with a deadline of July 31 in the compensation matter of the Nagymaros work, said Gyorgy Samsondi-Kiss, government commissioner of the Danube barrage, in an interview with MTI.

The government commissioner has received the telegram from the professional delegation of the European Communities, currently visiting Czechoslovakia, asking the Hungarian side to create the preconditions for independent expert analyses. The committee would begin work in case the two countries jointly request it. Mr Samsondi-Kiss will propose his Czechoslovak partner to discuss the matter and to draft the common request at the earliest posisble date.

Skubiszewski on Paris Talks, German Unification

PM2707150690 Gdansk DZIENNIK BALTYCKI in Polish 21-22 Jul 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Foreign Affairs Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski by DZIENNIK BALTYCKI correspondent Adam Grzybowski on board aircraft during the minister's Paris-Warsaw return flight on 19 July]

[Text] [Grzybowski] We are talking immediately after the conclusion of an extremely important international conference, which has historic implications for Poland, too. This is why I would like to ask you, Mr. Minister, whether we can now feel secure.

[Skubiszewski] Absolutely, as far as our western borders are concerned, although we still have the Polish-German treaty to sign. Its negotiation remains beyond all doubt and is only a matter of time. In any case it must take place after the unification between the GDR and the FRG—and we are not interested in any other treaty.

[GRZYBOWSKI] So how do you explain the extensive speculation taking place prior to the "two-plus-four" meeting—speculation in which our wishes were described as maximalist and unrealistic?

[Skubiszewski] I do not know. But I think that things are not as bad as all that. In any case.... It is a virtually universal phenomenon: the appearance in the media of a great number of incorrect, erroneous, and at times simply false items of information. But we should not worry about them, since they constitute a natural phenomenon that accompanies the present flood of information and the large amount of shoddy work done by some reporters. It was only today that a certain French politician told me how his remarks made the day before were subsequently published in a twisted form... and, to tell you the truth, there is nothing that we can do about it.

[Grzybowski] Everybody keeps talking about Poland's western border, whereas we are now beginning to hear about the concept of a Soviet German republic, which is to be situated to our northeast and populated with Soviet citizens of German extraction dispersed by Stalin after 21 June 1941. Could this situation not give rise to considerable apprehension?

[Skubiszewski] Not at all, since this is not reliable information. According to my sources—that is, both Soviet Union's official representatives and spokesmen for the German Government—at the moment this information is incorrect.

[Grzybowski] What about the chances of sharing peaceful borders with other neighbors? History records our conflicts with the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians. Could it not repeat itself?

[Skubiszewski] In what respect?

[Grzybowski] To begin with, the fea[illegible]elt by our Lithuanian neighbors who are apprehensi[illegible]out our possible domination over them and the [illegible]ainian claims to certain Polish territories.

[Skubiszewski] The Lithuanians have no reason to fear Polish domination. We recognize the present borders of the state of Lithuania (I am thinking of the border between Lithuania and Poland) and I believe that, as Lithuania gradually becomes truly independent, we will eventually establish really good neighborly relations between our states. These relations are already good today: We maintain many contacts already, and this tendency will increase.

The Ukraine is a different proposition altogether. It is a state on a different scale, but even here I do not perceive any territorial difficulty.

[Grzybowski] In the course of the "two-plus-four" conference, the spokesman for the German delegation, speaking to reporters, expressed his conviction that you would leave Paris with a smile on your face, Mr. Minister. Is that how you would describe your mood today?

[Skubiszewski] Let us leave speculation about other participants' impressions to others. I am certainly returning home pleased. As for the Paris "two-plus-four" talks, we managed to settle a very important point—namely, the abolition of the provisional clause that had remained in force ever since the Potsdam Treaty and stipulated that the final decision on our border should be conditional upon the regulations of a peace agreement. This clause has now been dropped and the decision of the "two-plus-four" conference has been recognized as the definitive regulation of the border question. This is also guaranteed in another declaration—one which will be endorsed in the Polish-German treaty, which will be signed as soon as possible after German unification. This last statement is one of great significance.

[Grzybowski] Another contentious point is what we would like to see in a future German Constitution—or, rather, what we would not like to see there...

[Skubiszewski] Regarding our valid complaints about the fact that FRG legislation still treats the territories beyond the Odra and Nysa [Oder-Neisse] as a part of German territory, the problem will cease to exist as soon as the existing border becomes confirmed as legal by the regulations of the "two-plus-four" conference and by our own future treaty with united Germany. Doubtless the whole thing will still require many difficult talks and negotiations, but the regulation approved by the participants of the "two-plus-four" talks contains a resolution which clearly spells out that united Germany's eventual new constitution must be coordinated with all future territorial decisions. Consequently, I rested my case on that resolution when I issued a statement in which I said that we understood that such coordination between internal state legislation and the state's international obligations extended, via that country's constitution, also to the whole field of state legislation...

As a result, I see no reason to feel displeased.

[Grzybowski] The next stage of your stay in Paris was your official visit to France as the foreign affairs minister of the Polish Republic. What can you tell us about the results of that visit?

[Skubiszewski] It went very well, and, as a result of that, our relations with France have become closer and should continue to grow even closer still. There is much scope there for galvanizing Polish-French economic cooperation. An especially large area is envisaged here for French capital investment in telecommunications, the railroad sector, light industry, electronics, and the development of installations involving economical use of energy.

Cultural ties between our countries are flourishing. We were given certain assurances concerning the easing of visa requirements, though for the time being entry visas for Polish citizens will not be abolished, despite the fact that both my French colleague Minister Roland Dumas and myself are generally in favor of having them abolished. However, Poland is viewed by the West as an "emigration state," which is true. Large numbers of our compatriots have been leaving the country and settling permanently abroad, while Western countries do not want this irregular immigration on their hands and consequently prefer to retain the visa requirement for Polish visitors.

[Grzybowski] But are they not afraid of Czechoslovak or Hungarian visitors?

[Skubiszewski] Well, the essential difference between Poland and such countries as Hungary or Czechoslovakia is, of course, that citizens of those countries do not emigrate to the West: They go there for a time but then they return home. This is why the visa requirement could be abolished for them. Nevertheless, I continue to press for an abolition of entry visas, and the easing of the visa requirement, which I just mentioned is a step in that direction.

[Grzybowski] At the news conference attended by foreign ministers of the four superpowers and both German states, I asked you about Poland's chances of entering a future united Europe, which would be interpreted as an additional guarantee of our national interests.

[Skubiszewski] That question belongs to the realm of future concerns. For the time being we must concentrate our efforts on achieving an affiliation treaty with the EEC. If and when we sign that treaty successfully (and I am optimistic about this, since we prepared the ground very well back in Brussels), such an arrangement is bound to operate for long years to come, thus considerably reinforcing our cooperation with European communities. And then, perhaps after 10 years or so, we will investigate the possibility of joining the European Community. However, today Poland is not ready for such a move, either economically or politically.

[Grzybowski] I have the impression that one of the prerequisites for that development is that structures operating in our country should adjust to analogous structures in the West.

[Skubiszewski] There are other considerations involved here. We must prepare our entire economic system for such a move. The socioeconomic aspect of the whole operation is also not without significance here, either. Any state joining the EC must be prepared to accept that many foreigners will come and settle within its borders and work there, thereby creating competition for the local population in many areas, especially in the economic sector. This will generate a variety of social problems; therefore, it demands careful preparation and, above all, that respective standards of economic development and social provision be brought to a comparable level.

[Grzybowski] Are we, then, a nation riddled with inferiority complexes?

[Skubiszewski] No, I do not believe we are.

[Grzybowski] I share your view, Minister, and yet... We are surely not inferior to the Spanish or the Italians, and yet we are finding things more and more difficult as we proceed.

[Skubiszewski] It is not a matter of who is inferior or superior... And the fact that, as you say, we are finding things difficult is the result of a whole range of circumstances. In any case, I do not believe that national complexes come into it; it is rather a question of certain national characteristics and objective circumstances that surround our lives. We are making attempts to change these, but it must be an effort involving the whole nation—not just ourselves and the government. The whole of society must lend a hand.

[Grzybowski] Professor, thank you for these most interesting observations.

Reviews Two-Plus-Four Talks Process

LD2707202790 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1545 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Speech by Polish Foreign Minister Krzystof Skubiszewski at Sejm session in Warsaw—live]

[Text] On 7 December, I spoke in the Sejm about the Polish attitude toward German unification. There were also meetings of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission, with my participation, which were devoted to our German policy. In one case, it was a joint meeting with an appropriate Senate commission. I presented the government's expose on the foreign policy to the Sejm on 26 April; naturally, it could only briefly present the Polish interests that appear in connection with unification.

Today, I wish to highlight this part of our foreign policy in more detail. Only against the background of what has been happening since the beginning of the year, the course and agreements of the Paris meeting become clear.

In February, taking advantage of the Ottawa Open Skies conference, a meeting of foreign ministers of the FRG, the GDR, France, the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR took place on the issue of German unification. These six countries soon began to be commonly called two-plus-four, or sometimes four-plus-two. As a result of the talks, the Ottawa statement of 13 February was issued, and it announced the discussion—I quote—about various external aspects of the creation—in the French text: the implementation—of the German unity, together with the issues of security of the neighboring states. The last words—together with the issue of security of the neighboring states—were included in the Ottawa statement on the Polish initiative, which had been taken up immediately in Ottawa, in view of an unexpected inauguration of international talks on unification. The indication to the issue of security of the neighboring states was essential.

The Ottawa statement is a very brief one; it consists of three sentences. It also has a general nature; it does not specify the subject matter of the talks. Then it could only be supplemented very briefly, but at the same time in a way that gives us a chance of participation. Because there is to be a discussion concerning the security of German neighbors, this cannot be done without their participation. The times of Yalta have passed. President Francois Mitterrand rightly observed toward the end of 1981 and at the beginning of 1982—I quote—that anything that will allow us to leave Yalta behind will be a good thing.

If Germany's western neighbors, and at the same time allies of the FRG, have interests connected with the unification, they could guard them through consultations within NATO or other groups. All that we had was direct communication with the states of the two-plus-four group.

Ensuring that our participation would be assured and our substantive proposals implemented was not easy. From Ottawa to Paris we traveled a long and difficut road. This is how it looked: I will set the facts before you in a much abridged form.

While decisions were being made in Ottawa, Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki was in London. In answer to the Ottawa declaration, the prime minister, immediately and with great determination, while he was still in London, submitted a proposal about the presence of Poland in the two-plus-four talks in the matters which were of interest to us. The prime minister also pointed out the need for the border to be confirmed by means of a treaty, a point which was given British support. Keeping up a good declaration to the leaders of the governments or the states of the four powers, the prime minister submitted two proposals: A substantive proposal: the confirmation, by means of a treaty, of the Polish-German border in order to erase all doubts and ambiguities relating to the border. The treaty will now be negotiated and signed with a united Germany immediately after the reunification. And a procedural proposal: participation in the two-plus-four talks, especially, though not excusively, in relation to the border and the proposed treaty.

In these talks we did not try to gain a status identical to the powers or the German states, but we strove for the defense of our vital interests.

Regarding the Polish stance, the prime minister informed German Premier Modrow on 16 February during a private conversation in Warsaw and FRG Chancellor Kohl on 23 February during a long telephone conversation.

In their public speeches, President Mikhail Gorbachev and Minister Eduard Shevardnadze spoke decidedly favorably about Polish demands. President Gorbachev and Premier Ryzhkov's answers on 30 March to our letter were in the same vein. The USSR's support was a significant one. In notes sent at the beginning of March, we presented our stance to all the German neighbors as, according to our view, those who were specially interested in the German unfication and its international consequences.

I will not present here all the details of our entire diplomatic activity. This activity was wide-ranging and intensive. It gave certain results. On 2 March, 34 U.S. senators requested that Chancellor Kohl and Premier Modrow begin negotiations without delay, in order to prepare a border treaty which would be initialled before unification and ratified after unification. On 8 March, the Bundestag confirmed the inviolability of the border with Poland and announced that a treaty on the border issue between the all-German Government and the Polish Government would be concluded. Later, after the GDR elections, on 12 April, the People's Chamber, elected in these free elections, passed a resolution confirming the Odra-Nysa [Oder-Neisse] Luzycka border.

On 9 March, President Wojciech Jaruzelski, Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and I went to Paris for talks with President Francois Mitterrand, Prime Minister Michel Rocard, and Minister Roland Dumas. The talks had great significance. We achieved wide-ranging French support. I will add that the friendly French attitude was, and still is, for us extremely essential in the whole period of the two-plus-four negotiations.

On 13 March, Prime Minister Mazowiecki received a reply from British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Mrs. Thatcher spoke in favor of the conclusion of the border treaty and strongly supported this demand to other governments. Also on the issue of our participation in two-plus-four discussions, the British stance was favorable. Earlier—namely, in the House of Commons debate on 22 February—a similar standpoint was taken by Minister Douglas Hurd.

On 14 March 1990, after a meeting of political directors of foreign ministries of the two-plus-four states, a decision was announced to invite Poland to participate in those debates when border issues especially were to be discussed. This decision was confirmed by the ministers of the two-plus-four talks holding debates in Bonn on 5 May. The following day I received from the hands of U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, who was then visiting Warsaw, a written invitation to take part, signed by FRG Foreign Minister Genscher in his capacity as chairman of the Bonn [word indistinct].

At the same time, a new period began in our diplomatic efforts. I will not enumerate here all the consultations we have held at various levels. There were very many of them. I will just restrict myself to pointing out that in the period between the invitation and the meeting in Paris, the prime minister broached the matter of the border during every one of his trips abroad, especially those to the United States and to France, and also with politicians of, in particular, the two German states and the four powers.

On my part, I had numerous conversations and exchanged a large number of letters. I will just say that after the aforementioned contact with Minister Roland Dumas, I presented the Polish viewpoint regarding the reunification of Germany at a meeting of the committee of foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact in Prague, where I held a private talk with Minister Shevardnadze about the direction of our policy in this matter. I spoke several times with Minister Douglas Hurd, here in Warsaw and in London. I spoke three times to Minister Genscher; with Secretary of State James Baker; twice with the new GDR Foreign Minister Markus Meckel. I will not enumerate the talks held with ministers of states other than the two-plus-four groups, who showed a lively interest in the whole matter, nor the talks and consultations which higher-ranking officials from our ministry held virtually without a break. At this level I, too, was sometimes present, because I had to see how things were going.

Our diplomatic efforts ran along two parallel paths. The first concerned endeavors toward a treaty which would confirm the border, talks with the two German states which, in time, were to proceed to the second stage when a united state would exist with which this treaty would be signed and then ratified. The second path of our efforts was to ensure the agreement of the powers to the finality of the border. This was essential, because of the jurisdication of the powers. Both these two paths had the same goal in view: the stabilization of the border. That is why in the numerous talks and actions the matter of the Polish-German treaty was linked to the elaboration of such a stance by the powers, as we wished.

Now a few words about the treaty between Poland and the united Germany. We handed over the draft treaty to the two German Governments on 27 April, a few days later to the four powers, proposing immediate talks with the FRG and the GDR. Well they started without delay—as early as 3 May. This is something I will return to.

Now I would like to say a few words about the content of our draft. We have not restricted it to the confirmation of the border, it is devoted to the basis of the relations between the two countries. Of course, the norms concerning the border come first, but immediately following them in the draft are norms relating to law observance, the direction of cooperation, the succession in the matter of treaties, and political consultations.

Decisions within our draft regarding the border were discussed at the level of department heads of Polish, and West and East German [ministries] on 3, 18, and 29 May. These were extremely useful talks. We agreed, at that point, to a break in these talks, because of the debate which was to take place in both German parliaments concerning relations relating to the Polish-German border. We believe, however, that now these talks should be resumed. Talks will make it possible to prepare a jointly agreed text, or at least to decide where we stand. Then, in the shortest possible time after the reunification of Germany, both sides will be able to sign the treaty and put it forward for ratification. It is in the interest of European stability—so important at the moment of reunification—that the matter of the border be closed through a treaty. There are, or there will be, various acts and decisions relating to the external aspects of the German unity. The temporary divisions between them must be made as small as possible, or various doubts might arise. Trust in Polish-German relations is a fundamental element.

But let us return now to the content of the treaty. Our viewpoint in this matter has undergone a certain change. We put forward—as I have already said—a draft which regulated not just the border issue, but a draft with a wider aspect. However, directly before the Paris two-plus-four meeting, we came to the conclusion, also after consultations with some of our partners, that at the moment it would be better to confine ourselves to treaties exclusively affirming the border. A broader treaty, covering the entirety of future Polish-German relations, would be concluded later, also without delay. FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl pointed out the need for such a treaty in his great political speech of 21 June in the Bundestag. The chancellor's proposal fully coincides with our attitude and our strivings.

On 21 June, the GDR People's Chamber and the German FRG parliament in Bonn adopted, each separately, resolutions identical in content, announcing the conclusion of a treaty affirming the border between a united Germany and Poland. The same resolution was adopted on 22 June by the federal council, the Bundesrat. The resolutions define the border in a future treaty in accordance with the existing agreements, particularly delimitation, and demarcation [agreements]. This—may it please the House—has never been so before in any FRG official document. The resolutions affirm the inviolability of the existing border and the obligation to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity and also rule out territorial claims. Each of the two German governments made the resolution of its parliament, in its whole extent its own document, and notified the Polish Government of it. The notification gave us the opportunity to take up a position, which we did on 3 July.

Our assessment of the two identical resolutions is decidedly favorable. We are dealing in them with recognition of the border by the German people, speaking with the voice of its freely elected parliament and government bodies. The resolutions are documents of outright historic significance for Poles and Germans and for the future relations of the Polish state with a united German state. The resolutions were a harmonious prelude to the two-plus-four meeting in Paris. The good effect of the resolution on closing the issues of the past could not be spoiled by the press campaign in West Germany and the various mistaken intentions attributed to us concerning a delay in lifting from Germany the limitations resulting from the responsibilities and rights of the powers.

Poland has never interfered in the issue of the great powers' authority toward Germany and will never interfere. Against this background, I will now answer the question: What was the significance of the Paris two-plus-four meeting for Poland, and what did we achieve there?

First, I will recall what is already known to the public: that the two-plus-four conference will end by adopting a document, which is now called the final international legal settlement. The six countries will give this settlement a character of a treaty. It ensues from the quoted name that it is important. We deal here with legal international commitments and not just political commitments. In this settlement, there is a separate part which deals with the German borders. It consists of a number of points which formulate the principles of the settlement of the borders issue. This is what it is called.

These principles define today's borders with foreign countries, the neighboring countries, of both German states as definitive borders of the united Germany. Such formulation is very favorable for us. On the other hand, in our view, one issue should be explained: the role of peace settlement or the peace treaty. This is the first matter from the Paris talks which I would like to mention to the esteemed chamber.

The Potsdam Treaty postponed the final delimitation, or the final settlement—these two terms appear—of the western border of Poland to the peace settlement. The FRG and some other states have reminded us of this condition from time to time. In the convention in 1952 and 1954, three Western powers and the FRG agreed that the final settlement of the German borders should wait—I qoute—until the peace settlement is reached for the whole Germany, the settlement freely negotiated by the Germanys and their former enemies—end of quotation.

Poland viewed this differently. We believed that such a peace regulation, after so many years, after so many acts, after so many treaties, was not necessary. Yet wishing to be absolutely certain in the face of such viewpoints of various responsible states, it was now necessary to eliminate the possibility of being referred back to some unspecified peace regulation. In Paris, this goal was achieved. This is important for Poland because, after the reunification of Germany, we must be able to walk on absolutely firm ground. And history has its twists and turns and suprises. Once the Paris formulas have been accepted, no one is going to be able to oppose the requirements of the peace regulation or the peace treaty and put the borders in question. This requirement has ceased to exist. [sentence as heard]

I now move on to the next question: In Paris everybody was in agreement—and they declared so in a binding fashion—that the unified Germany and Poland will confirm the existing border in the treaty. We have been demanding such a treaty since the Ottawa conference. We also have a promise regarding the swift pace at which the treaty will be implemented. I firmly stressed in Paris that we must talk at the present stage of the reunification in order to strive to establish a joint text before unification, even though—as it happens—the signing may take place after reunification. The responsibility and the rights of the four powers regarding Germany as a whole should also cease. From the beginning of the whole affair, what was important to us—and what remains important—is a treaty with a united Germany which has no restrictions weighing on it, so that no one is able to say that—it is true—Germany signed a treaty, but because of such or other restrictions they are not able to confirm the border definitely.

The house will be kind enough to note the fact that the assurance of a swift signing of the Polish-German treaty after reunification was in a document discussed in Paris with the participation of the four powers.

The issue is a bilateral one: a Polish-German treaty. However, it acquires a broader dimension. Poland does trust the new Germany; however, the whole operation is taking place with the participation of the powers. There is, therefore, no situation consisting of Poland's isolation at any stage of the entire process.

At the same time, the involvement of the powers in the final nautre of the existing German borders is not equivalent to a guarantee in the international legal sense. The Polish-German border in particular is not the subject of guarantees of this kind. The Polish Government has been of the opinion from the outset that there is a need for the powers assurance on the permanence of the border and the removal of all doubts put forward against us. The participation of the powers is necessary; however, a guarantee is something else. After the experiences of Yalta, we prefer not to have anybody's guarantee. It often has the opposite effect from certainty or calm, which the word guarantee otherwise implies. The Polish-German border, in its present course, will be a normal border, like others, without the creation of a special situation and a special position of the powers regarding this territorial settlement, because this may entail an undesirable [word indistinct]. One sometimes owes something to a guarantor, who sometimes takes advantage of his special status. Polish experiences were not good in this respect. In Paris, we achieved—I think—the correct balance between essential assurances and other independence.

Now, about a third matter broached at the conference on our initative. In accordance with what has already been announced publicly, the two-plus-four final document will embody the important norm of concordance of the constitution of a united Germany with the territorial clauses of two-plus-four. This is particularly important for Poland, because FRG law, in some material, was based on the 1937 borders. These prewar borders are now definitely canceled as a legal category. They will remain only as an historical category. As the two-plus-four document speaks about a constitution, so I stated in Paris that Poland understands the reference to the constitution as referring to all the legislation subjugated to the constitution. Each state must conform its law to international obligations that it has taken upon itself. This is an elementary principle of the international law, which binds all the countries without exception. The reference to sovereign rights of a state, its legislative sovereignty, will not help here. Whoever validly concluded an international treaty, he removed matters settled in the treaty from his own exclusive and sole jurisdiction. Such is the law, such is the rule of law and order, and such is the logic of coexistence and cooperation of civilized states.

All in all, the document on the borders, having been discussed, supplemented and agreed in Paris, is a text which fully meets Poland's vital interests. For the first time in the history of a long—I would say too long—discussion and argument concerning our western borders, we deal with legal-international norms, which at the threshhold of the reunification create beneficial commitments of the four powers, two German states, and then unified Germany, commitments without any ommissions and ambiguities.

I will also add that during the Paris talks, the Polish delegation did not limit its activities to a territorial issue, although participants of the talks concentrated their attention on this issue.

I also tackled three issues: The first one: the succession of a united Germany toward international agreements signed by Poland and the GDR. The second: the consequences of the reunification in the area of the economic interests of Poland. In this matter we have received an invitation from the FRG to come to talks in Bonn on this subject. These talks will begin as early as 30 July. And the third matter, apart from the border, which I touched upon in Paris: the political and military status of a united Germany and Polish-German cooperation.

In Paris I expressed our interest in negotiating with a united Germany a treaty about good neighborliness and friendly cooperation. This treaty will be signed after the treaty concerning the border. All that has been proper and right in the relations to date between Poland and the two German states is worthy not only of being kept but should be expanded. The program comprised in last year's joint declaration by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl has kept it topical in the new German situation, and some proposals included in the declaration can be turned into treaty obligations. Common Polish-German interests and their harmonious implementation have a bilateral importance, but they also have a European role. A vision of an indivisible and peaceful Europe should be dominant in our thinking and in our actions toward our western neighbor. For its part, we are counting on a similar attitude. Without Polish-German concord there will be no European concord.

Calls for Polish-German Reconciliation

LD2707182990 Warsaw PAP in English
1711 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 27—"Without Polish-German conciliation, all-European conciliation will be impossible," Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski concluded his address to the Sejm (lower house) here today presenting the results of the two-plus-four meeting in Paris of July 17.

Skubiszewski recalled active contacts of the Polish Government and diplomacy with representatives of the Four Powers and two German states which led to Poland's participation in the Paris negotiations and brought about results favourable for Poland, especially as regards legal recognition of the durability of the Polish-German border in a treaty-form.

Skubiszewski pointed to the need to resume trilateral talks between Poland, the FRG, and the GDR concerning a draft for a border treaty whose contents should be signed and ratified immediately after both Germanys unite.

A broader treaty covering the whole of future Polish-German relations should be signed later on, but without much delay either.

The Polish side is interested in signing a treaty on good neighbourhood and friendly cooperation. In the new situation of Germany, the programme included in the joint statement of Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Chancellor Helmut Kohl made last year maintains its topicality.

Skubiszewski announced that Polish-West German talks on consequences of Germany unification for Poland's economic interests will start in Bonn on July 30.

Council of Ministers Views Paris Talks, Economy

AU2707131690 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 Jul 90 p 1

[Piotr Aleksandrowicz report: "Forecasts Instead of Plans"]

[Text] The government meeting on 23 July began with a report by Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski on the two-plus-four talks in Paris. He reported at length on the course and outcome of these talks, and provided an assessment from Poland's angle of the principles meant to be in force in the final phase of the work of this conference. His speech caused many questions from the other members of the government. Generally, they concluded that the results of the Paris conference were favorable for Poland, especially as far as the Polish-German border is concerned.

Because it is not possible to report on the contents of Minister Skubiszewski's speech (that part of the session was confidential), I will at least present one thought. The material on German unification, the border, and Polish-German relations is enormously complex, full of pitfalls, and pregnant with innuendoes. The foreign minister gives the impression of being a very able diplomat, flexible wherever possible and hard whenever necessary.

The next item on the agenda was a government report on the economic situation in the first half of the year. The text of this report coincides largely with what Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz said in the Sejm on 6 June. It reiterates that the two chief goals of the government's economic program are to stabilize the economy and stifle the hyperinflation, and to undertake institutional changes to transform the command-directive system into a market system.

A reduction in inflation, the elimination of shortages, and a budget and trade surplus are some of the results of implementing the government's economic program listed in the report. But a few negative phenomena are also listed—a greater fall in output than expected, a profound drop in real wages, and rising unemployment. The authors of the report attempt to make it clear that each of these phenomena, whether positive or negative, should be assessed with care and attention. For example, although inflation has fallen considerably, it is still too high and needs further reduction; therefore the harsh monetary policy must be continued. Unemployment has actually fallen because most of the registered unemployed are people who have never worked before or not worked for a long time. In turn, the very considerable fall in output only applies to the state sector and not the private sector, where output has risen.

The most controversial feature of this part of the government session was a short statement by Deputy Prime Minister Janowski, who said that many enterprises are refusing to increase outlay on research and development. That means that out-dated products will continue to be manufactured. There is no point in dwelling on the absurdity of this situation, because in today's world, the greatest producers in key industries alter their entire range of products every few years.

There was a lively discussion on the subject of the bill to abolish the law on socioeconomic planning. This law was closely connected to the old system, and can play no useful purpose in a market economy. Everyone agreed with that. Nevertheless, someone asked what will happen to planning. Minister Jerzy Osiatynski observed that every highly developed country has government bodies that produce economic forecasts, plans, and programs. Several ministers expressed doubts about the suggestion of the central Planning Office, contained in the bill, that the Council of Ministers should place long-term state socioeconomic programs before the Sejm. It was finally agreed that the Council of Ministers would place economic forecasts, even long-term ones, before the Sejm, either at the Sejm's request, or on the Council's own initiative.

Important remarks were made by Minister Aleksander Paszynski, who indicated the need to review the entire central administration to decide whether or not a single economic ministry ought to exist, and whether an office like the Central Planning Office fits into the new economic system at all. Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz said that the Secretariat of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers is examining this topic.

In addition, the government discussed a draft amendment to the law on foundations (the draft foresees relaxations in the rules on registering foundations), and discussed whether a system of protection for modern technology ought to be created. Such a system would protect the strategic interests of technology-exporting countries, so that the technology acquired by Poland may only be used by the clients it was destined for, and only in the way authorized by the authorities of the exporting country.

Murdered Polish Officers To Be Exhumed

AU2707132290 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 Jul p 1

[Danuta Frey report: "Exhumation in September"]

[Text] Deputy Prosecutor General Stefan Sniezko has returned from the Ukraine, where he visited in connection with the announced exhumation of bodies in the Kharkov region, presumably murdered Polish officers from the Starobelsk camp. As we know, First Deputy Prosecutor General Aleksander Herzog applied on behalf of Poland to USSR Procurator General Aleksandr Sukharev for permission for Polish prosecutors, members of the Chief Commission to Investigate Hitlerite and Stalinist Crimes, and experts in forensic medicine and crime to attend the exhumation and other investigative activities.

"I discussed this very subject in Kiev and Kharkov with Vladimir Sinyukov, first deputy procurator general of the Ukraine; with Gennadiy Kozhevnikov, oblast procurator in Kharkov; and Procurator Grigoriy Kazheyev, chief of the group of investigators," Prosecutor Sniezko told RZECZPOSPOLITA. "I also spoke to the leadership of the republican and oblast KGB, including General Gibadulov, chief of the KGB Republic Administration. I was assured that the Polish prosecutors and the experts proposed by us would be allowed to attend all the activities connected with the case, especially the exhumation itself. All our conclusions, remarks, observations, and questions to experts will also be considered. The exhumation will be total, for all we have so far is a terse list containing the names of the 4,031 Polish officers who were imprisoned in Starobelsk. The reports say that the officers, who were brought over from Starobelsk, were shot in a prison in Kharkov, after which their bodies were transported along the so-called dark road to the northern outskirts of Kharkov, a recreational area today, and there secretly buried. Today there is no trace of this 'dark road,' but it persists in human memory, and its course has been confirmed."

The exhumation of the victims of this successive NKVD [People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs] massacre will take place in September. It will most probably commence in the first half of the month, by 20 September at the latest. This provides the necessary time to prepare for the exhumation, necessary for both sides. By then, Poland is to submit a list of its experts from all spheres, as well as any material which may be useful in the investigations.

Poles Forced To Unload at Hungary-CSFR Border

LD2907200990 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1700 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Report by correspondent Zdzislaw Uberman from Budapest]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] I would like to take this opportunity to inform you, ladies and gentlemen, that an incident has once again occurred at Somoskoujfalu on the Hungarian-Czechoslovak border. The Czechoslovak border service stopped the Polonia Express because it contained more passengers than seats. As we know, this rule was introduced by the Czechoslovaks a dozen or so days ago. Many Polish citizens were taken off the train. Desperate travelers blocked the railway lines, preventing the train from leaving. Following talks, the Czechoslovak border service allowed the Poles to continue their journey.

The MTI agency describes the behavior of our citizens as very aggressive. We have to state, however, that the situation at the railway border crossings between Hungary and Czechoslovakia is becoming increasingly abnormal. It requires urgent intervention. After all, the travelers are not responsible for the fact that they were sold rail tickets for seats that did not exist. They are all the more innocent since, after all, the Polonia Express is, in effect, treated by them as a transit train, and all the arguments about concern for their comfort and safety most often fall on the deaf ears of desperate people, who treat these instructions as open discrimination.

Sejm Restricts Land Sales to Foreigners

LD2807021690 Warsaw PAP in English 1516 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 27—Draft amendments to the law on grounds management and estate expropriation and a provision facilitating purchasing land by foreigners aroused greatest controversies in the parliamentary debate here today.

The Sejm (lower house) supported today a minority motion, convergent with the earlier suggestion of the government. In a voting by call 244 deputies were for the motion which ruled out the possibility to sell state or communal grounds to foreigners. A total of 136 deputies voted against the motion, and 7 abstained.

The house supported also the amendment, made yesterday, saying that consent from the minister of internal affairs is needed in order to give grounds to foreigners for heriditary tenure.

Speaking about the hitherto practice, Interior Minister Krzysztof Kozlowski said that while giving a foreigner permission to buy estate, the security of the state is taken into account, and in case of purchasing grounds, consultations with the Defense Ministry are held.

Considered are also the foreigner's links with Poland, his family ties and willingness to reside in Poland. 80 percent of the permissions issued so far have been granted to people of the Polish descent.

Until 1988 the rule was that permissions might have been granted only to foreigners with the resident's status. In the years 1986-1987, 52 permissions were issued, while over the past two years—550. In most cases they concerned purchases of flats, only 7 percent wanted to buy grounds.

Hence, only 32 permissions on land purchases, covering about 160 hectares, were given. Most often these were a few-hectare plots. Purchases of the area over one hectare were consulted with the Agriculture Ministry.

Taking several amendments into account, the Sejm amended the law on Grounds Management and Estate Expropriation with 272 votes for, 32 against and 28 abstentions.

Adopts Resolution on Ukraine

LD2807021990 Warsaw PAP in English 2136 GT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, June 27—Life brutally verified assumptions of the economic policy on which the 1989 state budget was based, said Deputy Antoni Pieniazek in the Sejm today during a several-hour Sejm debate on government reports on implementing the 1989 state budget and financial plans.

As regards the motion of acceptance for the government's implementation of last year's budget, no deputy was against and 26 abstained.

Next, Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski presented results of the Paris ministerial meeting that discussed particularly the border between Poland and united Germany.

The Sejm will resume debates at 9.00 a.m. tomorrow.

Ending its two-day debates today, the Senate adopted a resolution addressed to the Ukrainian people to mark the proclamation of the state sovereignty of the Ukraine.

Amends Law on Political Parties

LD2807174490 Warsaw PAP in English 1616 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 28—Accepting the opinion of the legislative committee to the effect that amendments made by the Senate to the Sejm (lower house) law on political parties offer more liberal conditions for setting up parties and gaining legal status by them, but rejecting the rules of their financing proposed by senators, the Sejm essentially modified today the law adopted on May 24, 1990.

In result of voting and adopting most of the Senate amendments of June 22, a virtually new text of the law has been formulated in the parts concerning, among other things, definition of a political party, membership in it, gaining a legal status and access to the state-owned radio and television.

Deputies sustained the Sejm version of the article which regulates the principles of financing political parties. They maintained the provision that financial means of political parties used for implementation of their goals are subject to taxation. In the Senate version, the means were exempted from taxation.

Political parties are not allowed to use financial assistance from abroad.

The law on political parties in the version adopted by the Sejm today has still to be signed by the president.

Passes Resolution on Soviet Neighbors

LD2807201790 Warsaw PAP in English 1903 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 28—The Sejm (lower house) adopted today a resolution in which recognizing the right of nations to self-determination, it welcomes the declarations of state sovereignty of the Ukraine and Belorussia which are a sign of aspirations of both neighbouring nations to freedom.

The earlier declaration on the sovereignty of Russia is also a sign of changes going on today.

We are fully aware of the significance of this landmark moment in the history of our neighbours with which we want to coexist as equal nations close to each other and to develop cooperation in all spheres, the resolution reads.

Earlier today Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski told the Sejm that such a resolution is not contrary to the Polish foreign policy which consists in maintaining very good relations with the eastern neighbour, the USSR, as the whole, as well as in extending, or starting to do so, relations with those of the states making the USSR which remain in the union.

Poland does not interfere with the USSR internal affairs and I do not think that this resolution may be considered such a line of conduct, Minister Skubiszewski stated.

Skubiszewski Supports Sejm on Soviet Republics

LD2807173690

[Editorial Report] Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish at 1539 GMT on 28 July broadcasts a live report from the Sejm meeting in Warsaw. An unidentified announcer says that the Sejm has moved to vote on a Sejm resolution on the declaration of state sovereignty proclaimed by the Ukraine and Belorussia. The announcer says this item had been added to the agenda and that deputies have a printed version of the text and that the text was not read out. Thus, no text is available to be processed, he says.

Deputy Waldemar Pawlak asks Minister of Foreign Affairs Skubiszewski whether this statement is contrary to the fundamental directions of Polish foreign policy. Pawlak also asks whether the Foreign Affairs Commission had discussed the text.

Professor Bronislaw Geremek, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission, explains that the commission had not discussed the draft of the declaration. He says a special commission representing all the parliamentary floor groups was created and that they drew up the declaration.

Skubiszewski says: "Mr. Speaker, Esteemed Chamber. Replying to the deputy's question, I consider that this kind of text is not at variance with our foreign policy, due to its generality. I would like to add that that policy, if it is a question of our eastern neighbors, is today based on the maintenance of very good relations with the entirety of our eastern neighbor—that is the USSR—with Moscow, and also on the developing, or the beginnings of the development, of relations with the component states of the USSR, which remain in it. "There is talk here, as we know, in the resolution on the republics about state sovereignty, which in the given context, in spite of terminological problems, is something other than independence in the sense of breaking off from the USSR, and a certain dualism in our relations in the eastern reaches—which is already starting in our policy and which is its important characteristic, as well as a vision for the future. I spoke about this in my expose at the end of April. It also finds such expression in the treatment of the neighboring republics.

"There is also a reference here to the declaration of Russian sovereignty—that is, a declaration which was made earlier and, as far as I know, has not found expression in a separate resolution in this or the other chamber of parliament. I would like to point out something, which naturally everyone knows: that Russia is our neighbor via the Kaliningrad oblast, which is of particular interest to us.

"In conclusion, I state that Poland does not intervene in the internal affairs of the USSR, and I do not think that this resolution could be regarded as being such an activity. Thank you."

Skubiszewski's speech is followed by applause. The resolution is then passed by 175 votes for, 9 against, and 53 abstentions.

Jaruzelski Letter to Sejm Speaker on Elections

LD2807173190 Warsaw PAP in English
1552 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 28—The Sejm today heard a letter President Wojciech Jaruzelski directed to the Sejm speaker. Here is the text:

Both politicians and parliamentarians are considering a possibility to intensify work on a new Constitution and on a political timetable envisaging earlier presidential and parliamentary elections. I, for my part, continue to believe that what is important while holding presidential office is to serve the nation and to be guided by the full understanding of the real interests of the state. This means that I recognize the presidential mandate as an element of the political timetable of elections which should be determined by the needs of concrete sociopolitical circumstances of Poland.

A parliamentary debate on the matter, scheduled for the coming September, will help political forces agree on indispensable legislative proceedings and fix convenient dates for them. The session would also make it possible to plan parliamentary constitutional work and work on the electoral law as concerns presidential and parliamentary elections.

I express my support for the initiative to hold such a debate.

Floor Group Heads React to Letter

LD2907195790 Warsaw PAP in English
1747 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 29—Below are opinions by heads of the Sejm floor groups on a letter by Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski on the early presidential and parliamentary elections:

The Citizens' Parliamentary Club, OKP—Bronislaw Geremek: "The letter is in tune with an intention of my floor group to start deputies' debate on the future of the Polish political alignment."

The Democratic Party—Anna Dynowska: "I do not know whether one should not interpret the letter as the president's answer to an appeal issued on Friday by some Sejm deputies and senators (members of the centre agreement) who said they would collect signatures in parliament under the appeal calling on the president to resign his office. I think that the president shows by his letter that he is attached to parliament that elected him."

The Deputies' Floor Group of the Democratic Left, PKLD—Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz: "I think that this is a kind of response to the campaign of collecting signatures from Sejm deputies and senators calling on the president to give up his office, developing to an even broader extent."

The Polish Peasant Party, PSL - Jozef Zych: "The president's letter is no surprise to me."

The Polish Social-Democratic Union, PUS—Wieslawa Ziolkowska: "The letter is an official declaration of the president that he will take steps to calm down these political moods that prevail today to ensure quiet and evolutionary process of political and economic changes in Poland."

Jaruzelski, OPZZ's Miodowicz Meet 27 Jul

LD2707221690 Warsaw PAP in English
1625 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 27—Poland's President Wojciech Jaruzelski received here today leader of the OPZZ All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions Alfred Miodowicz.

Jaruzelski and Miodowicz discussed problems connected with the financial situation of working people, the growing unemployment, including working conditions and environment.

The OPZZ leader presented unionists' opinions and fears aroused by envisaged social effects of the ownership transformations.

He also briefed the president on the work on a draft law on trade unions and on OPZZ activity under the new socioeconomic conditions.

Center Accord Appeals for Jaruzelski To Resign

LD2807013690 Warsaw PAP in English
2155 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 27—The parliamentary caucus of the Centre Agreement held a meeting in the evening today, adopting a decision to begin a campaign of collecting signatures under an appeal to Poland's president in office to resign.

The appeal reads:

"Mr. general, your election to the post of president took place in a special political situation and was the consequence of Round Table agreements. These agreements, which began the process of economic and political transformations of our country, today to history and are becoming an obstacle to the further development of the republic.

"In appreciating the role which you, Mr President have played since the moment of your election, we appeal to you to show understanding for the historic challenges of the new times and to make a decision on a resignation from your office."

Christian Democrats Support Center Accord

LD2807202290 Warsaw PAP in English
1917 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] Krakow, July 28—An all-Poland conference of Christian Democrats [ChD] discussed in Krakow today their place within the "centrum" agreement [Center Accord] and the movement's ideological declaration.

The meeting adopted a statement which said that the Christian Democrats accepted the political formula of the "centrum" agreement, and found their place within it.

In a special statement, the conference declared support for the candidacy of Lech Walesa for the presidential office and voiced appreciation of his political moves striving to build in Poland lasting foundations for democracy.

They also addressed Pope John Paul II and Polish Primate Cardinal Jozef Glemp with letters containing an appeal for moral and spiritual support for the Polish ChD movement.

The conference was attended by Senator Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of the Centrum agreement.

ROAD's Bujak Discusses Movement's Role

LD2807195290 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1700 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Report on interview with Zbigniew Bujak, cofounder of Citizens Movement "Democratic Action," by Andrzej Jelenski; place and date not given]

[Text] [Announcer] Meeting in the Warsaw Technical University, representatives of the Citizens Movement "Democratic Action" [ROAD] held their founding conference. Here is a report by Andrzej Jelenski:

[Jelenski] The identity of the movement and the outline of its program was debated. Speeches by Zbigniew Bujak, Cezary Jozefiak, and Andrzej Wielowieyski formed an introduction to the debate. Adam Michnik, taking the floor in the discussion, emphasized that ROAD is not an organization to break up Solidarity, but a political form of it, as was defined by the Solidarity movement. It favors freedom, but without chaos. Democratic Action is not going to be a confirmation of the roundtable arrangement, and will also not be a movement of hate, revenge, or retaliation. At today's forum a temporary set of regulations of this political grouping was accepted, and a founding council was also created, made up of national representatives, deputies, and senators, members of the Democratic Action, and also voivodship representatives. At present there are more than 4,000 members in ROAD. Its first congress is planned for the near future.

I interviewed Zbigniew Bujak, one of its creators, and asked if ROAD is supposed to be a citizens movement or a political party.

[Begin recording] [Bujak] Where it carries out various current tasks, where local government has to be dealt with, the creation of that which is to serve the creation of a middle class, small business—there we are a movement, because we are going to create that institution from below. I am also thinking about credit and deposit savings banks and [word indistinct]. We are also thinking about some kind of cooperative system in the peasant milieu, which has to find a new place on this scene. Those are tasks for the moment.

However, we also want to put forward our presidential candidate, to put forward our lists of candidates for the parliamentary elections. We want, through parliamentary commissions, to have an influence on the government's activity, and to even pressure for a change of this or another person. Then we are functioning like a classical political party.

[Jelenski] ROAD—what road will ROAD take?

[Bujak] I say a shortcut to the West, and according to the Western style, which means for us a very stubborn maintenance of law, a legislative path, a parliamentary path, even if it prolongs certain processes or procedures. We consider, however, that the principle itself of applying the law is more important.

[Jelenski] ROAD is addressed to whom? To which Poles?

[Bujak] To those who create the middle class, for whom the middle class is the place to which they can aspire. It is addressed to craftsmen, small-scale industry, services; to those who, by losing work in large industry, are going to have to take that path, find their place here; to the technological intelligentsia. That is because it is they who are going to create for us better, new, and more perfect workplaces. It is directed at young people, people who are very young, because really it is they, who—not encumbered by the past, not encumbered by a (?vision) that they have already done an awful lot, or that they have overthrown communism—quite simply, with fresh ideas, they are going to be able to run Poland, its political and economic life at a Western pace.

[Jelenski] When will ROAD have the chance to become a political party?

[Bujak] When it decides that it is going to be one [word indistinct] decisively transforms, that it is precisely concentrated on a parliamentary fight, on the creation of a government. (?That will be the moment) [end recording]

ROAD Leaders Meet With Poznan Residents

LD2807014590 Warsaw PAP in English
2225 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Poznan, July 27—Discussion at a meeting of leaders of the Citizen's Movement of Democratic Action ("ROAD"), Wladyslaw Frasyniuk and Aleksander Labuda, who met residents of Poznan today, aroused great interest and equally high temperature of a debate. The following are some issues discussed by them, answering numerous questions by the gathering.

Frasyniuk: The "ROAD" is a continuator of these values that are linked to August 1980. A wave of great demagogy spread together with setting up the Centre Agreement and speaking about the accelerated electoral campaign is part of destabilizing this country.

Aleksander Labuda: The "ROAD" chose an organizational formula that can still be hardly identified with a party but we will evolve in this direction. It seems to us that acceleration and going forward but with the support of entire society are feasible. The strong-arm rule, to which Lech Walesa is inclined, is not a solution in this respect. We think that the seeking of swift and easy solutions is a deceptive proposal.

Answering one of the questions: Is your movement on the right or on the left of the centre, Labuda said: We ourselves cannot answer this properly. Definitions of the "left" and the "right" function in countries where political life is defined by democratic principles. Today, none of the gorupings in Poland can pursue leftist policy and this is impossible. We want to be a pragmatically oriented grouping.

Frasyniuk: ROAD was set up in the wake of pressure which Lech Walesa exerted. He had a chance of becoming a supraparty president, unquestioned by all, but he made a mistake, he made a political false-start, which was caused by other people. This turned against Walesa. The Centre Agreement thinks that the present general assembly should elect the president and this is a serious mistake. Even if it elected the best one of us, the office of president would lose out on this as the president would be chosen by a nondemocratic structure which the present parliament is. What the centre deems acceleration is in fact putting on the brakes. We think that the president should be elected in general elections.

Mazowiecki Meets ROAD Delegates 28 Jul

LD2907221490 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1800 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] PAP has reported that yesterday Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki received a delegation of the Citizens Movement "Democratic Action" (ROAD), with Zbigniew Bujak and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk at its head. The representatives of the movement informed the prime minister about the principles and goals of the movement.

Walesa on ROAD Party, Presidential Plans

LD2907220890 Warsaw PAP in English
1822 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 29—The current political setup is bad, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa said at an impromptu press conference during a break in debates of the Citizens' Committee here today.

As regards the centre agreement, Walesa said that he supported the organization because of the presence of many of his close friends in its ranks but stressed that he did not belong to it. It is not my organ. I do not know if I ever join it. Some time ago I stated that I would even join the left if the right were to be too strong, he added.

Asked if he was going to turn to Wojciech Jaruzelski to resign from the office of president, Walesa answered that he had not intended and would not intend to do it.

Asked if he thought the Citizens' Movement-Democratic Action (ROAD) to be a Jewish party, the Solidarity leader replied that persons of Jewish origin should not conceal this (their origin).

I want to clear this up, anew, so that there would be no anti-Jewish grafitti. Jews are great patriots, have done a lot for culture but when they hide their nationality, they provoke attitudes of anti-Semitism. Why are Jews not proud of the fact that they are Jewish? I am proud of the fact that I am Polish and, similarly, I would have been proud of my origin if I had been Jewish. We extricated ourselves from communism which treated anti-Semitism as a tool. One should speak about this in order to eliminate this, Walesa stated.

"ROAD" founders should be rewarded: They are people experienced in struggle, who devoted much of their lives, Walesa said, asked to evaluate the real goals of the new grouping. The thing is, however, that sacrifice is necessary for Poland once again, he added.

Asked if the "ROAD" aims to prevent Walesa from becoming president, the soliarity leader replied: It is exactly like that.

Walesa Views Reform Process at Citizens Committee

LD2907124890 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1005 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Excerpts] An hour and half ago a meeting of the Citizens Committee, associated with the NSZZ [Independent Self-governing Trade Union] Solidarity chairman, began in the Frederick Chopin Academy of Music in Warsaw concert hall. Here, in the hall summer has arrived: The hall is almost empty. Some committee members have excused their absence, but not all of them. After the opening of the meeting by Zdzislaw Najder, who chairs the Citizens Committee, the floor was taken by Lech Walesa. Here are excerpts of the Solidarity leader's address:

[Begin Walesa recording] Time will verify our attitudes, and time will verify our plans and strivings. Sometimes, at first, people have an impression of a beautiful victory, (?by) demagogy, that they are right, that they very much defend democracy. However, time shows later who was right and why. Today we are witnessing such a moment in history which tells us, haunts us, and which says something big is happening here. Some people say we will be late. We will not be late. Correct and honest decisions will pay off. Poland faces huge tasks; I do not have to tell you that. The country is undergoing the process of reforms. No one knows precisely how to do this; no one before us took this road. At the same time, Poland faces terrible threats. We are, myself personally included, accused of demagogy and populism, even anti-Semitism. I would like to point out especially to that last charge. I state once again: Lech Walesa has not been anti-Semitic, and he will not be anti-Semitic. My convictions are different. Therefore, seeing all the threats we face, let us remember that we overcame communism, that we overcame a terrible system. [passage omitted elaborating on how people strove to fight and overcome communism]

No vehicle can be driven when there are 10 drivers. There must be one driver. Of course, this driver must be different in different times. When there was martial law, when the communists [words indistinct] this driver had different principles of driving, a different vehicle was needed. Today, the driver and the driving must operate on different principles. [end recording]

Committee Discusses ROAD, Politics

LD2907203490 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1700 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Report by unidentified reporter on the meeting of the Citizens Committee associated with Independent Self-Governing Trade Union (NSZZ) Chairman Walesa, held in the Frederick Chopin Academy of Music Concert Hall in Warsaw on 29 July—recorded]

[Excerpts] The Citizens Committee, attached to Lech Walesa, debated in the concert hall of the Academy of Music in Warsaw. Unfortunately the holidays were felt—about 100 of the 219 members were present. No binding decisions were able to be made, because there was no quorum. [passage omitted]

Several dozen people took part in the discussion which developed. Support for acceleration and democratic changes in Poland, which should also strive to be a fully independent state, was emphasized.

Jerzy Milewski, the Solidarity representative in Brussels, presented U.S. press clippings which contained an unfavorable picture of Lech Walesa and Poland. Milewski cheered up those gathered, however, by saying that in the mid-1980's Western press said that Solidarity had ceased to exist. Milewski also assured that those attacks, which did not serve Poland, ought to end within a month and by then Poland would be able to count on Western help.

Much time was taken up by political matters, particularly an assessment of the political group, the Citizens Movement "Democratic Action" [ROAD]. Lech Walesa, replying to accusations made by people taking part in the debate, emphasized in numerous rejoinders that there had been no fight with Prime Minister Mazowiecki. No one helps the prime minister like I do. I do it in a practical, not demagogic, way, said Walesa.

As a result of the discussion at the meeting of the Citizens Committee, the body, centered on the NSZZ [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union] Solidarity chairman, should be a pluralistic body. It was also stated that the present government, without the support of Lech Walesa and Solidarity, would not survive even two weeks. The creation of a daily of the Solidarity Union was announced, as had been demanded.

One more thing, the Committee, as was determined in the discussion, cannot be an electoral platform in the approaching parliamentary elections. It was proposed to appoint a body controlling the financial activity of the Committee.

In connection with the recent attempts made to (?use) accusations of chauvinism and anti-Semitism in the political struggle, a statement was accepted which is an expression of opposition to those kind of practices. A resolution was also accepted supporting the declaration of Ukrainian sovereignty.

The next meeting of the Committee attached to the NSZZ Solidarity chairman is planned for 16 September.

Committee Adopts Resolution on Ukraine

LD2907204590 Warsaw PAP in English 1758 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 29—The Citizen's Committee attached to Lech Walesa adopted a resolution which "welcomes the declaration issued on July 16, 1990, on the Ukraine's state sovereignty hoping that this fact will become an important step on the Ukraine's independence."

The resolution also said: "Let us create solidarity among people and nations, based on truth and justice, with an eye to the meeting of free nations in Europe and to good-neighbourly relations."

The gathering authorized the Committee's office to draw up a resolution addressed to Belorussia in a similar spirit.

Parties Call Meeting for 'Defence of Democracy'

LD2807213890 Warsaw PAP in English 1945 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 28—The Christian Democratic Labour Party, the Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN) and the Polish Peasant Party called a meeting for defence of democracy in the University of Warsaw here today.

Participants in the meeting included their joint stand in resolutions which stated, among other things, that still existing lack of possibilities to develop political life is an important obstacle in reaching full democracy in Poland.

Over the year since the latest parliament elections none of the political groupings in Poland gained possibilities for operation, except those that took part in signing a contract in Magdalenka, outside Warsaw.

In place of normal political life, its substitute is being consciously formed and a system of undefined formations which replace political parties is being sustained.

In view of envisaged early parliamentary elections, signatories of the documents demand that conditions which would facilitate democratic electoral campaign on the same principles as the groupings supported by the government enjoy should be ensured for political parties.

The meeting also considered it necessary to set with the nonparliamentary opposition such a date for the elections which would enable all to present their programmes and candidates.

As regards presidential election, the meeting opted for general, direct voting of all Poles.

Other postulates concerned providing institutional access for political parties to mass media and abolishing the monopoly on information.

We state with regret that the practices of informing society remind of the methods used by the communist authorities, one of the resolutions said.

Solidarity Miners, Government Hold Talks

LD2807042390 Warsaw PAP in English 2133 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Katowice, July 27—The National Mining Commission of Solidarity held talks with government representatives in Katowice today. The Mining Solidarity had for a long time tried to bring about such talks in connection with the very difficult economic-financial and social situation in this sector.

Minister of Labour and Social Policy Jacek Kuron recalled nine subjects for discussion submitted earlier by the trade unionists. They cover: a demand to reveal data on mining contained in the letter of intent to the World Bank, a presentation of the governmennt's information policy with regard to mining and a timetable of restructuring hard coal mining, and especially the process of liquidating mines in the Walbrzych region. Also at issue was the policy of the Ministry of Finance in the context of the introduction of market prices for coal, and a protest against the composition of the board of the State Hard Coal Agency.

Characterizing and explaining the economic policy of the government towards mining, industry Minister Tadeusz Syryjczyk said that the expectations of foreign partners, potential creditors, pinned on Poland were convergent with the government's program.

"We want to have profitable mining, one without subsidies which we want to earmark for social goals. The government is neither pro- nor anti-mining, it endorses productive operations. We have a bad philosophy of thinking that all coal must be exploited," stated Syryjczyk. He announced that a vision of mining was to be put to detail in the Autumn following expert analysis conducted by foreign specialists, adding: "We want mining to survive and be competitive."

In the further part of the talks, much attention was drawn to wages and free prices for coal. Experts are to examine the introduction of market prices for coal and the mechanisms associated with this.

The government side took issue with the Solidarity commission's accusation that the board of the State Hard Coal Agency was mostly made up of the "nomenklatura."

In the end, the commission stated that it would not bring down the composition of the board of the agency but would have an eye on its action and react immediately.

Historian Reviews Polish Parties, Movements

AU2707173990 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 Jul 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Professor Jerzy Szacki, historian and specialist on social thought, by Jan Rogala; place and date not given: "Parties or Social Movements"]

[Excerpts] [Rogala] Professor, we are seeing differences of opinion emerge about whether political parties or social movements are to be the dominant element in Polish democracy.

[Szacki] I do not see there being some particular difference between the one and the other. If, of course, we are not employing the model of the ideological party—that is, the party to which we are most accustomed. Yet, an analysis of examples of parties in different parts of the world shows that parties assume a great variety of forms. However, parties generally create structures that are fairly loose and do not impose any ideological requirements on their members, apart from voting for the candidates put forward by the party. It is also expected that members adopt a similar stance on fundamental issues. [passage omitted]

[Rogala] We are witnessing the emergence from the "Solidarity" camp of the Center Accord, on the one hand, and Democratic Action on the other hand....

[Szacki] Let us add that a peasant tendency has also emerged. It is still not that clearly defined because it is enmeshed in the postcommunist setup, but it undoubtedly already exists.

Parties of sorts are developing on the basis of "Solidarity," and whether we call them campaigns, movements, or accords is something that I would not attach too much importance to. If elections take place and these movements or campaigns enter then, then they will in effect be performing the function of parties. It does not matter if they describe themselves as movements or as parties. As soon as election campaigning starts up, it will almost be impossible to draw a distinction.

[Rogala] They will behave in the same way.

[Szacki] Precisely, and the one difference between a movement and a party is that when some result is arrived at—a victory or defeat—then a movement is far more likely to split, to become marked by internal disputes and splits than a party, which is much more uniform in terms of the composition of its membership.

[Rogala] So, both before and after elections, movements are in a more advantageous position. What about the small parties?

[Szacki] It is hard for me to say what will happen with all the rest. I assume that the greater part will simply cease to exist.

[Rogala] The elections will be a turning point.

[Szacki] Yes, they will be a turning point. It also is not true that these parties are so weak because they do not have money or facilities, which makes it difficult for them to pursue their activities. If they were all to have the same assets that would not alter the fact that they are in a weak position. Another interesting question is that of what will happen with the Social Democratic Party of the Polish Republic, or the Fiszbach union. I would not exaggerate the distance separating it from Miller's party. What will happen to the Democratic Party and to what is left of the United Peasant Party is also an interesting topic. I get the impression that as far as the peasant movement is concerned, everything points to the appearance of a formation in which the boundary between the former allies of the Communists and the anticommunist peasant movement will become erased. Convergent views, similarities, common sentiments, and immediate interests will become of first-rank importance.

[Rogala] Economic interests are also common interests....

[Szacki] Yes. There is a certain issue that we do not appreciate. Political parties still have a long way to go before they arrive at a common interest. Perhaps the peasant party is the only exception. It would appear to me that there can be many such interests. They are an important factor, although not the sole one, in the formation of political parties. In our case, a more important role is played by so-called principles, which may, of course, conceal the desire to win advantages . However, it would be going too far to subordinate this or that tendency to only some particular interest. At the moment, an advantageous linkage is not that evident, but I believe it will become increasingly important.

Although this may be rather lacking in imagination, I believe that the evolution of our political system will proceed in much the same way as in the rest of the world. I am not convinced by the arguments that were until recently advanced in certain "Solidarity" circles to the effect that Poland will become some kind of strange country, rather like Mexico, in which, instead of a party system, there will be some kind of uniform front system, one great organization, within which all contentious issues will be discussed and settled. That was the idea behind the conference on the "Solidarity" ethos, and some, such as Adam Michnik, even said that Poland has created a movement that will unite everyone.

[Rogala] There are three movements: the Center Accord, Democratic Action, and the peasant movement. They are organized according to different principles: organizations as well as persons belong to the Center Accord and the peasant movement. Democratic Action only includes persons.

[Szacki] But the Forum of the Democratic Right, which wants to cooperate with Democratic Action, has also appeared. Democratic Action is not a uniform grouping, and its program—for the time being—consists of such general points that the possibility that there are significant differences within it cannot be excluded. Despite assurances to the contrary, the Center Accord also employs general formulations. I was disappointed by their economic program. However, in both cases, there is too little information to make any kind of predictions.

[Rogala] Do you think that the emergence of these movements impacts negatively on the development of parties?

[Szacki] I think that it does with one exception. I think that in due course a Christian Democratic party will emerge out of the multitude of small parties. I also do not exclude the possibility that some kind of nationalist formation will also appear. However, I am sure that of the tens of parties that exist at present, only a few will remain after the elections. That will be true even if the level of votes needed to enter parliament is set very low—that is, at 3 or 5 percent. Most parties will fail to reach that level. Then these parties will cease to exist, and only some political dilettantes will remain who, regardless of what the circumstances are, will continue to keep their parties alive.

In my opinion, it will take a dozen or so years for the Polish political scene to become organized. At the moment, everything is still fluid. [Rogala] Thank you, professor.

* Iliescu on Pre-, Post-Revolutionary Events

90BA0222A Bucharest ROMANIA LITERARA in Romanian 5 Jul 90 pp 1, 12-15

[Interview with President Ion Iliescu by Nicolae Manolescu, director of ROMANIA LITERARA, on 30 June in Bucharest]

[Text] [Manolescu] Mr. President, allow me to begin with an anecdote. It has to do with the hopes that many intellectuals entertained, even during the Ceausescu time, concerning your potential political career. A writer friend of mine, who did not know you personally, saw you a little over one year ago in the corridors of the Technical Publishing House; he shook your hand (you didn't talk to each other), then told me a couple of days later, when we happened to meet: "This will be the Man." History proved him right. Forgive me for asking you so directly, but I have to do it because I represent a literary magazine, the main literary magazine in the country: Do you think that you still have the sympathy of the writers and intellectuals, which was the first and, if I may dare to say so, your most valuable political capital?

[Iliescu] Your question indeed touches on a very real issue. I wonder, though, whether it is correct to say that this was or is the most valuable political capital, although having the sympathy of writers and intellectuals is in itself an important element that does not leave me indifferent. However, the elections have revealed a very diversified structure of political support. Which does not prevent me from noting with regret that there are people who knew me, whose sympathy and respect I had (the feeling was mutual), and who now not only have distanced themselves from me, but also talk in a manner that is more than inelegant. This does sadden me, it's a personal regret. I don't want to look for explanations. Our life is so complex and involved that many things, including attitudes and relations among people, are shifting. Actually, we're not talking about all the intellectuals and all the writers. I still have very good relations with many intellectuals, including good writers, who have been and continue to be an important moral support to me. But there are such people, and my personal regret is all the greater because I used to know and value them. I hope that it is only a series of events at this specific stage that they will be overcome in time. Of course, as far as some people are concerned, the differences between us stem from basic options. But I think that this stage makes the supreme national interests the first priority—our interests, the interests of everyone—which, regardless of the differences of views and options, must become common interests uniting, rather than dividing the people.

As far as a I am concerned, I think I have remained the same man I always was, and I continue to believe that the people who at one time felt close to me and felt sympathy for me, do not now have and will not have any reason to change their feelings...

[Manolescu] In your inaugural speech you said that your mission was to be a factor of equilibrium and mediation among the political and social forces involved in the rebirth of the country. I want to ask you whether you believe that at the end of six months since the Revolution, there is any consensus in the present Romanian society concerning development strategies, or on the contrary, that it is torn apart by contradictory aspirations?

[Iliescu] There are two parts to this question. Concerning the role of the president, which under the provisions of the Electoral Law is conceived as a factor of national consensus, it should be separate from the party to which he belonged; the president is called upon to fulfill a unifying role and to facilitate cooperation among all the political forces, with a view to resolving the serious problems confronting the country.

From this viewpoint I think there are a series of key ideas concerning the radical transformations through which our country must go in the economic, social, political, and emotional areas. I also talked about these issues in my inaugural speech, and they feature in the government's program. However, aside from very diverse political orientations—which are only natural and necessary—there are other major needs and objectives of a national interest, which I think should offer a platform of joint action for all those interested in the progress of the Romanian society.

This does not mean that we should not have differences of opinion or a clash of ideas. On the contrary, such differences are necessary because they make each one of us clarify our viewpoints and better document our options or plans of action. This is in fact the positive role of the political opposition that I mentioned in my speech, a role that must assert itself primarily within the newly created parliamentary framework. The beginnings are promising from this viewpoint. I believe it is vital that the political opposition, inside or outside the parliament, fulfill this role of continuously correcting the authorities in power, in order to contribute to adjusting and adapting the political platforms and programs of action to the real requirements of the Romanian society. I hope that we will come to internalize these rules of genuine democracy and to overcome the tensions now existing in our society.

[Manolescu] Some of these contradictory tendencies or splits are undoubtedly inherited from the dictatorship, which carefully erecting many artificial barriers. Do you think that in these six months the new regime managed to add new, specific rifts to the old ones?

[Iliescu] First of all we must note that things came to the surface that before could not and were not voiced. In other words, in the past, the totalitarian regime prevented people from freely expressing their options and positions, something that has now finally become possible. And I don't need to dwell on how long we have all waited for this freedom of expression.

On the other hand, we also note a certain complex in some of the people who in the past did not have the courage to express their own views or independent attitudes, or to disassociate themselves from the old power. Now, all of a sudden, they are trying to compensate for this inferiority complex abruptly and violently by exaggerating their "bold" expressions. All the more so since now, why shouldn't we say it, there is no risk involved in doing so. In a way, this adds a false, exaggerated note to certain manifestations which are no longer constructive at all. On the contrary, they are deliberately destructive. These manifestations have become an opposition for its own sake, against whoever happens to be in power and regardless of the programs of the authorities.

Of course, as a rule, intellectuals in general and writers in particular by definition disassociate themselves from the power. But this is not an axiom valid in ebery circumstance. In our case, when the ruling factors are in full process of structuring themselves in the wake of a revolution, the writers—and here I come back to your first question—could have been and are expected to actively cooperate with the power born of the revolution and to contribute to consolidating it. Only at a later stage, when the authorities normally begin to evince conservative tendencies, does the disassociation become natural and necessary. But we are still far from such a stage, and a blind opposition against the authorities at this point risks playing a conservative and antirevolutionary role itself.

However, there is no doubt that the process of demolishing a totalitarian regime and beginning to build a democratic regime is a very complex process, even explosive in our case, more actively generating and creating additional new forms of confrontation and social contradictions than in other conditions, such as the conditions of a lengthier transition phase as was the case in other countries. I would say that from a certain viewpoint, we should perhaps not be surprised to see some people express themselves so harshly and violently.

[Manolescu] You may not be surprised, but some people have probably been very much surprised indeed. Some journalists, who in recent weeks expressed more or less unconventional views, experienced on their own skin the risks involved; I am referring to the 14th and 15th [of June], when mixed teams of miners and policemen were looking for them to punish them.

[Iliescu] There is probably still a lot to be discussed about what happened in those two days. There are unfortunately still many unknowns in that respect. Of course, violence in general is deplorable, and I want to express my regret for the way it escalated and for the abuses committed. But I must note that the events of 14-15 June cannot be separated from what happened on the 13th. In other words, the effect cannot be separated from the cause. Because what we are dealing with in this dramatic episode is a cause and effect relationship. The events of the 14th and 15th were the effect, while the causes must be sought on the 13th. This is what I also told some American journalists in a discussion about similarities with the plots of westerns, to which we have all been overexposed. When you had an American town attacked by bandits, the sheriff beaten and tied up, houses set on fire—including the police station—and there were victims and killings, immediately afterwards a posse of local men was organized, which tracked down the bandits in some farm taken by force. In the end the posse arrested the bandits, but inevitably it also caused damage and innocent victims. When it was all over, did anyone think of punishing the men who had punished the bandits for causing damage to the farmer?

[Manolescu] And do you think that the intervention of the miners and that of movie farmers was equally spontaneous?

[Iliescu] Of course it's not identical. But, remaining within the simplistic boundaries of a scenario of this genre, some similarities cannot be denied.

[Manolescu] I noticed that in your inaugural speech your description of the events of the 13th differed somewhat from your previous one. You no longer mentioned any Iron Guardist action or rebellion or any right-wing rebellion as you had before. I want to ask whether you in the meantime became persuaded that it was not an Iron Guardist rebellion, or whether it being an inaugural speech, a change of tone was necessary.

[Iliescu] There was no difference between my descriptions, because from the beginning I said that it was an Iron Guard-type action. In other words, its form, violence, and the fanaticism of its authors reminded my generation and older people of the 1941 rebellion. In point of fact, the events also featured the material presence of some specific elements: clothing, marks, and insignia of a fascist inspiration.

As for those who inspired and led those actions, I have no reason to change my opinion. We cannot be as naive as to believe that this was, as some claimed, a spontaneous action by discontent people. It is obvious that it was only one section of a chain of such actions clearly designed to destablize the political situation, as was also the case on 12 and 28 January, on 18 February, during the electoral campaign, and after the elections, i.e., after the people clearly expressed their wishes and the Parliament began its work. We had only just opened the sessions in the two Houses and, instead of being able to form the newly elected bodies—the parliament and the institution of the presidency—and elect the new government, we were confronted with another act of violence by forces interested in preventing the normalization of our life. What some are trying to say, that the government itself had staged the whole thing, is absurd! For what purpose? To make difficulties for itself? Where is the logic in such reasoning?... In the end everything will be clarified, because this is a far greater game, in which both domestic and foreign forces are involved. This was a well thought out professional scenario with long-term objectives and profound implications!

[Manolescu] The prime minister said in an interview for the Spanish radio and press agency that in his opinion, there were elements from the former dismantled securitate, who incited and staged provocations both on the 13th and in the following days. Do you share that view? Are there any specific indications along that line?

[Iliescu] There are some signs; it is possible that some old securitate members were used. It is clear that there were provocations—possibly from the same source—in some of the miners' actions on the 14th and 15th. But I know of no facts that can justify a definitive conclusion on such participation.

[Manolescu] Mr. President, in your inaugural speech you talked about a "break with the totalitarian system and its ideology." Are we to understand that you also meant a break with communism and the communist ideology? Allow me to ask what in fact is your attitude, as Romania's elected president, toward communism; do you think that it has been doomed by history, or do you hope for its reformation in a communism "with a human face," as it is called? What exactly is your political ideology at present?

[Iliescu] We have radically broken with the totalitarian practice and the communist ideology not only verbally, but in fact. In other words, it has not been merely a matter of phraseology and conjuncture, but a substantive break in our political practice. I lived through this disassociation a long time ago; the process clearly started in 1971 already, when the failure of communism as an ideology became clear to me. I do not believe that communism can be reformed and consequently, I do not believe in the version of "communism with a human face." For me this matter has long been an ideological issue definitively filed away. That's why the accusation "stuck" to me by some of my "well-wishers" about wanting to create a neocommunism, is almost ridiculous.

I think that what we need now is a total break with any ideology as an expression of preconceived ideas and preset models of social development. The entire historical practice, both ours and that of other countries shows that mental models designed to present certain ideal forms of social development inevitably turn out ineffective and bankrupt.

Consequently, I think it is important to rid ourselves of any kind of ideology representing dogmas or preestablished mental models. We need a pragmatic approach geared on the reality. We must develop our ability to objectively analyze reality in all its complexity and without any prejudices, taboos, or fetishes, and must work out realistic means of promoting social progress in keeping with the modern development of the society, adapted of course to the realities prevailing in our country. This is the only way to ensure a normal development and real economic progress based on the contemporary technological progress, which is leaving its imprint on all social developments everywhere nowadays. Along this line, we must recall that the basic guideline of the National Salvation Front [NSF], which has been at the basis of the government's program, is to combine economic progress with an extensive social program designed to protect the interests of the widest strata of the population. In other words, on the one hand, we want to secure the levers of economic development specific of a market economy, so as to ensure dynamism and a healthy future foundation for the national economy, and on the other hand, to ensure social protection for all the citizens. This is one of the basic elements of the concept and ideology of contemporary development.

But this is not possible without activating the main values of our society. First of all, this means capitalizing on the basic reserves of the modern society, the creative resources of the people, and primarily their capacity for intellectual creativity, which is the most dynamic factor of contemporary progress. From here the particular role of the inteligentsia of all categories and primarily of those with a technical education, because technical progress is the main source of the dynamicsof contemporary development. However, on a larger plane, the entire intelligentsia is important—in connection with all the processes of socioeconomic development, modern management of the industry and agriculture, and in the social life—at the micro and macrolevels for the processes of development of democracy and of a civic society, for enriching our cultural life, and for promoting humanistic values of perennial and fundamental importance. All these together are instrumental for the equilibrium of the entire social life. Consequently, the role of the intellectuals within our process of future development is very important.

And I must also mention the particular role of the youth, who must be shaped in the spirit of these new values and are called upon to ensure the continuity of the changeover of the Romanian society. I am convinced that the economic and administrative management of our country will be—and has already begun to be—taken over by the generation of the 30-40 year olds. We value and respect these young people for being innovative in every area and eager to to assert themselves and to courageously and competently assume the responsibility for our public affairs. The future belongs to them and to the youth in general!

[Manolescu] Allow me to ask whether in these conditions, although you as president no longer belong to the NSF, how do you see the organization or future reorganization of the Front. I know that several ideas wee proposed by certain political experts in the country along the line that the Front should become a political party with a firm structure and ideology. I assume, from what you said, that you don't see the issue of the Front's ideology in the same light as those who view it as a sine qua non condition for its existence as a political party.

[Iliescu] Already at the conference at which the Front was declared a political group, in April, several options were outlined for this group. I believe that these options have to crystalize more firmly and to be more clearly specified, and that its ideological platform and organizational structures, as well as its practical means of action must be better defined from a political standpoint. I believe that this political group should not be organized along strict party lines. In order to preserve what was in effect the element of attraction of this group for the masses, I think it should remain a group widely open to diverse social strata. So, I believe that from the viewpoint of an ideological platform and forms of activity, it must remain open and free of organizational rigidity and strictures. I hope that it will remain fresh through active communication with the people and by the means by which it will act to defend and promote the fundamental interests of the Romanian society and of the major strata and categories of citizens. And, in order to have the necessary strength—as I said at a fairly recent meeting with the NSF organizational nucleus—it is important that this movement become the most actively involved movement for the moral recovery of the Romanian society. Because, perhaps the most serious phenomenon we are now confronting is not so much problems of a material and economic nature—which are already very difficult and will task the new government with extremely difficult missions. The most serious phenomenon is above all the moral imbalance of our society from the viewpoint of the social psychology, interpersonal relations, thinking, mentalities, and behavior. These problems manifest themselves in various forms, the effect of which is increased corruption. In the past we had been accustomed especially with certain types of corruption linked to power and power arbitrariness, which assumed the harmful forms of toadying, opportunism, and violation of human dignity. New forms of corruption are now appearing, generated by the power of money, the attraction of wealth, and the desire to get rich; given the new conditions of a market economy and free initiative, these pursuits are increasingly expanding. Thus, the struggle against all the forms of corruption, alienation, and poisoning of social relations will become very tough.

This is why I believe that the NSF, or whatever name it will have in the future as a political movement, will have to become a group of people concerned with protecting the moral fiber of the Romanian society and with improving it. As I already said, if the Front wants to become a strong movement with deep roots among the masses, it must become the party of the incorruptible.

[Manolescu] This is a very attractive formula. In these conditions, perhaps the title of Front is inappropriate. All this war-like language that we inherited from the previous era—front, campaign, struggle—should perhaps be reconsidered, in view of the fact that the Front will become a political group in a civilian society par excellence. But what seems very significant to me so far is the fact that the ideology of the Front, like that of other parties and groups, is rather an emotional ideology. We mentioned the existing rifts and tensions, most of which are of an emotional order. You probably realized that political programs did not play a very important role in the 20 May elections. As a matter of fact, they resembled each other considerably; they had many points in common, only the tactical methods were different. What was extraordinarily important was precisely this emotional factor. Some people identified with the Front, which they viewed as the main group that toppled Ceausescu and rid the country of the dictatorship. Beyond that, the programs became almost irrelevant. My question along this line is, do you believe that at present there is any danger that either the Front or other political groups will be touched by extremism or by a religious-type fundamentalism sui generis?

[Iliescu] Your perception is correct and it mirrors a reality; and not coincidentally, because this stage has been rather compressed and has not permitted either the achievement of a rigorous organizational structure, nor sufficient work on programs. The common elements appearing in the platforms of many parties are also not a coincidence. They reflect a certain common option away from what existed in the past. First of all, the transition from a supercentralized economy to a market economy. In point of fact, the laws of the market economy have beenworking all along. That's something that could not have been prevented. Another objective reality is that we live at a historical time dominated by the consumer production; the commodities-money relationship isinescapable and thus, all the rules of the market economy work objectively, regardless of whether they are recognized as such or not. It is only when they are ignored and not taken into account that these laws hit us mercilessly and lead to situations like what happened here—the bankruptcy of the economic "experiment" that ignored them, the bankruptcy of the so-called real communism.

Consequently, the option to base the economy on a sound foundation and to take into consideration the requirements of a market economy featured in all the programs. Naturally, the means by which this option was to be promoted differed. Similarly, the social effects of this transitions were approached differently. The NSF program put special emphasis on the social program, stressing that the reforms required in the economy must be promoted in line with the fundamental interests of the major categories of citizens.

Many common options concerned the civic society, the promotion of democratic relations in the society, defending the interests of the citizens and of individuals in relationship with the state and its bodies, and observing the basic human rights, including those of the national minorities, of course. These common elements are a positive factor that promises a constructive cooperation among diverse political forces.

As for extremist tendencies, such tendencies always appear at times of acute social crisis. So far, right-wing tendencies have manifested themselves more violently and acutely. So far, left-wing extremism was not explicitly manifested because it has been so clearly discredited. I might say that at present there are no left-wing tendencies either within the Front or outside it.

As for the title of National Salvation Front, it did not originate with me. In several interviews it was misleadingly stated that the NSF, which came into being in December, had in fact existed before that. I later learned that the idea of the name came from a professor of philology whom I never met and who had sent a letter to Radio Free Europe last spring signed: the National Salvation Front. I found out that there was no organization behind that title. I liked the name, though, and in the evening of 22 December, when we drafted the call to the country, I thought it was the most appropriate for that time, a time of deep crisis in the Romanian society. At the time we indeed needed a broad platform to rally all those interested in toppling the old regime and reshaping the society on new bases, and the NSF title seemed to me to best express the essence of the new body that was being born and its objectives.

What will be the new name of the Front, as a party, or movement, or whatever, is less important; what seems to me more important is to define as clearly as possible its general orientations, political objectives, and organizational structures for the immediate future.

In view of the character of the movement, as I said, we should not count on a very strict structure. There may even be a broad margin in the definition of its ideological program. The option of a center-left, essentially social-democratic orientation will also leave room for a broad scope of definitions and specifications. This does not necessarily need to lead to the emergence of factions; the democratic nature of the movement or a party does not necessarily depend on the existence of factions. This strikes me as a false idea, as dogmatic as those that were opposed to factional tendencies within certain parties. The democratic character of the movement must indeed be expressed by shaping the framework necessary for a broad and free exchange of ideas, for a continuous confrontation of positions, and a broad participation in working out common positions. This is an objective necessity for any political or social movement, which must take into account the diversity of views of its members.

Diversity is a general human trait, and not only human. It is one of the most fascinating traits in nature and in general. But it applies particularly to us humans; no two people are identical physically, and even less mentally. So that each person is a completely different entity from any other. This is what makes us interesting, because if we were to think the same or know what the other person thought, talking would no longer be interesting and there would be no point in it. And the more we differ, the more interesting we are. This diversity not only must not frighten us, but it must always be a given in our actions. So, from this viewpoint, any political group must take into consideration this condition.

We need an institutional framework for dialogue, for ongoing discussion, and for the confrontation of ideas, even contradictory ideas. This will ensure real conditions for working out a broadly acceptable political platform. We will never have unanimous opinions on any viewpoint or plaform. But the value of a platform is all the greater the better it meets the most varied interests. Because, in the final analysis, social, economic, and political interest is what determines people's thinking and actions in a society. And, the more interests it can meet, the better will a platform be able to become a platform of efficient action.

But as we well know, such a thing takes time; the last six months have been both a very short and a very restless period; this can be said both of the Front and of the other political movements and parties. That's why I think that from this viewpoint, the coming two years will be years of intensive developments and restructuring in the area of political organization of the country, and I hope that these will be useful also from the viewpoint of political balance, too. Because for the time being we do lack the necessary balance, even in the confrontation of ideas and views among various groups. This is precisely one of the sources of instability, disequilibrium, and violence.

One positive fact is that in Parliament for example, we note a promising beginning for dialogue, confrontation, and decent parliamentary contest; I hope this is a good omen for our general political climate.

I also hope that the extremist tendencies we mentioned and the violence will fade in time, because they are alien to the nature and spiritual makeup of our people.

[Manolescu] There were rumors that, when the demonstration began in the University Square, your view was to treat it with understanding and tolerance, and to discuss its causes; but that certain, let us say, extremist elements in the NSF, in the government, or around you, persuaded you to take a rigid attitude and to charge the movement there with being a movement of hooligans, which actually provided them with their motto. Is there any truth in this? Have there been disputes about how to describe the demonstration and how to treat it?

[Iliescu] Unfortunately, a very trite expression was exploited too much and for ulterior motives; it was not prompted by either analysis or under anyone's pressure, but by the tense atmosphere which prevailed at PNUC [Provisional National Unity Council]; I expressed regret for my moment of weakness, although everyone could see from the televised meetings that during those lengthy and exhausting meetings, I showed enough patience and tolerance. Some say even that excessive tolerance may be my main weakness.

As for the University Square demonstration, it was a mixed bag from the very beginning, and later it degenerated into a source of tension and moral pollution.

Unfortunately, attempts were made to use and manipulate it for political purposes, which only complicated matters more.

[Manolescu] At the time I asked myself why it was not stressed that the demonstration in fact created a political problem and should have been handled as such, as a political problem. It was my impression that, in spite of all the attempts of the government and later of the City Hall to reestablish order in the area, the assumption was that it was not a political problem, but a problem concerning the traffic and hygiene in the area. In my opinion, that was a conceptual error. I think that the problem needed a political solution, not to be handled by the City Hall, the ICAB [Bucharest Canal Water Enterprise], or whatever the name of that City Hall department in charge of cleaning up the city. Am I wrong?

[Iliescu] The matter is somewhat more complex than that. In other words, if it had been a matter of a political action by well-meaning people who had something to say, it would have been easy to find common grounds for dialogue or a channel of communication. The matter, however, turned out to be completely different, because when attempts were made to establish contacts, it emerged that there was no one to talk to. Consequently, the point was to keep us in tension and to maintain a center of disorder in order to demonstrate the inability of the bodies of public order to ensure calm and a normal life in the city.

In point of fact, any form of dialogue was rejected. On the other hand, those who were asking for a dialogue turned out not to have any influence over those who were in the square. This became obvious from successive attempts to establish real contacts. Before the elections the motives had been clear, but after that, when the main electoral grounds disappeared, the action became even moe anachronistic and destructive.

[Manolescu] Nevertheless, at one point toward the end there were some negotiations with the demonstrators, which we actually watched on television, and some sort of agreement had been reached, even though two or three of the participating groups were still of another opinion. But 24 hours later the police intervened, in the morning of 13 June, and that in a way triggered a relaunch. Would it not have been better to have continued the negotiations, since they had already begun?

[Iliescu] The negotiations took place on 11 June, when the strikers declared that their only remaining objective was to obtain an independent television station. They were given all the theoretical arguments of the government regarding the possibilities of having private television, including considerations of technical implementation, after which they said the hunger strike would stop. However, the two groups represented in the square, which had previously stated that they were still around out of solidarity with the strikers, said that they had nothing to talk about with the government; on 12 June they even gave an ultimatum to the government demanding its resignation. In those conditions, it became possible and necessary to end the illegal action in the square and to resume normal traffic. In point of fact, in the morning of June 13th all the efforts to clear the square and reopen traffic were relatively peaceful.

[Manolescu] I was not in the square at the time, but from what I saw on television they did not seem entirely peaceful. I saw people who did nothing to defend themselves—nor could they have—being manhandled by men of order who were not even all in uniform. That struck me as odd. I saw a man, dressed in a checked shirt, hitting rather hard a group of demonstrators who were being shoved into a van without any police markings. That was shown on television.

[Iliescu] I did not see what the television showed. But I don't think that our policemen acted too zealously. We are still far from the efficiency shown by police in other countries in similar situations.

[Manolescu] I would like to say a few words in defense of the students, who in that morning were no longer in the square. They actually went home after the elections, as they had promised.

[Iliescu] That's true. They were not students.

[Manolescu] They weren't, they really weren't. Nevertheless, Marian Munteanu is charged with inciting to violence. Many people, including the television, heard him plead for nonviolence. The last thing that he and the students can really be accused of is precisely violence. This is exactly what they never wanted.

[Iliescu] This doesn't really agree with the evidence of the prosecution. In other words, after they made that nonviolence statement, which was rather relative—as it happened I also listened to it around 1400—by 1700 he called on the people in the square to go to the Police, where he claimed some of their colleagues were being held in arrest, and to demand their release. In fact, there are pictures of him in front of the Police.

[Manolescu] It seemed that it was not him in that picture, and in any case, he appealed to calm and order and to nonviolence. Witnesses...

[Iliescu] I cannot go into details. The situation is being investigated by the Prosecutor's Office and will be clarified.

[Manolescu] Mr. President, I'm not trying to lead you into making sensational revelations. I represent a literary magazine, not a yellow newspaper, and even less of a scandal rag. But I would like to ask two or three rather special questions, because I think that only very great frankness and openness can eliminate certain ambiguities and unclear situations during, before, and after the Revolution. There are some things about which the public wants to know more, but which have unfortunately remained shrouded in mystery. For example, anyone can of course say whatever he wants about the trial of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu or about the film that was made. But since two specialized institutes in

France and Germany said that there were some "irregularities" in the film which indicated that the two were not executed, but shot before being executed, this has to be dealt with. Aside from a very terse answer from Mr. Voican Voiculescu, there has been no other attempt to explain it. I was abroad at that time and I read all the press comments on that. If that statement had been made by some irresponsible reporters, OK, but those were two very serious institutes whom people are inclined to believe. So I asked myself, why so much mystery? Especially since it was not a matter of interpreting, so to speak, the film, but the manner in which the film had made it at a certain point to France. To this day, neither I nor others know how that film came to France to become the object of a scandal. That was historic footage, the film of our separation from the dictatorship, and that film got to France and into the hands of people who circulated it, thus giving rise to a whole chain of speculations in the international and domestic press.

[Iliescu] This is one of the weaknesses of this period, which makes it impossible to protect people and material properly.

Indeed, a lot of information was circulated which was leaked no one knows how, because of the circumstances prevailing at the time, and various people, who by chance found themselves in the midst of the events, came into the possession of information that they attempted to interpret in all kinds of ways; the same happened with this film.

The speculations are completely false; what does it mean that they were shot before being executed? For what purpose? What good would that have done? After a trial at which a sentence was pronounced! And the people who had been there, including the soldiers of the firing squad, were eye witnesses of the event; both the trial and the execution took place on 25 December. From the trial room the defendants were taken straight out into the yard where the firing squad was waiting, who were also joined by other people in the yard who hastened to shoot; the camera man did not manage to make it into the yard soon enough to capture the moment of the execution. There must be understanding for the very special circumstances in which both the trial and the execution took place, as well as for, how should I say, the technical problems of a movie shot under such conditions.

There is no rhyme or reason in the speculations circulating about the execution or about the implementation of a legally returned court sentence.

In general, the same goes for the claim that the trial was too hasty and that it should have taken place differently. No doubt about that. Politically speaking, we would have liked to have been able to organize a well prepared, public trial. Except that, as has been said before, what were the circumstances in which we had to decide about the trial? After 22 December our military situation was very complex. We didn't even know exactly what the real situation was. On 23 and 24 December there was a lot of unclarity and difficulty about the final results of the confrontations, because we did not have a clear image of our opponent.

The Ceausescu couple were held in a fairly small military unit with not too many men, and there were rumors of a possible "rescue." A reconnaissance helicopter had allegedly been sighted in the area; the unit commanding officer reported that because he was worried.

On the other hand, one of those captured during those days among the people who were firing at the television building and the Defense Ministry, said that they had sworn a life and death oath to Ceausescu and that as long as he was alive they will not stop their armed endeavors. All these factors determined our decision to have Ceausescu tried immediately. This is how the trial panel that conducted the trial on 25 December was formed.

How was the television film smuggled out? That in itself may provide a subject for an entire movie. At a certain point the film was not very well guarded; we were in the National Defense Ministry building, which was under fire from neighboring buildings. We were afraid it may disappear. We had only one copy. We didn't even dare to trust it to a safe. During that night, the film was in the room in which I and Petre Roman slept. Petre Roman hid it under his own pillow. At the same time, the television was insisting that we hand it over to them, the only copy of the film. While there was still shooting in the city, they were requesting that we send it from the Defense Ministry to the television station. How could we be sure that it wouldn't disappear on the way? Or from the television building?

So I told them to come to the Defense Ministry to make a copy. During the interval in which these copies were made, the copy of one version was removed. By whom? How? How did it get abroad? I don't know any of that. I don't know who took the film, which he then probably sold.

[Manolescu] Yes, what's more, it seems that he was a bad businessman and sold it for a pittance.

[Iliescu] Then came the showing on television; first they made an abridged version of that copy, which was shown on the same night. A longer version was then made. I had seen the whole film; some scenes were hard to watch, and we decided that it was better not to show them. On the other hand, for reasons of security, we decided not to show the faces of those who sat on the trial panel, the prosecutor, the defense attorney, witnesses, and so forth. So a version was made which did not show the faces of those who participated in the trial. Later there were insistent calls to show those parts, too. So various versions of the film were shown, which were different from the one that appeared in the West. This gave rise to speculations about why some scenes were omitted. Was it really so interesting from an artistic or historical viewpoint to see several seconds or minutes of Elena Ceausescu bleeding? I thought that moment was terrible. Or what was so interesting in showing how their hands were tied before the execution?

[Manolescu] Interesting or not is not the point; it was a historical document.

[Iliescu] But to show it to the whole public!

[Manolescu] Later it became obvious that it had been important, insofar as it would have cut short rumors, or would not have fed doubts... Another thing I wanted to ask about this: the indictment spoke of 60,000 dead. That figure was not entirely explained. Was that the figure of all the people killed under Ceausescu's dictatorship, or only during the Revolution? Who came up with that figure?

[Iliescu] At that time no one had any idea of the real situation, the killed and the wounded. I don't even remember who suggested that figure in the indictment.

[Manolescu] The figure matched our emotional expectations, so to speak. I remember not being surprised at all when I heard of 60,000 dead.

[Iliescu] Many figures were circulated, more than 10,000 dead were claimed in Timisoara alone.

[Manolescu] Is it now known exactly how many died in that week of December?

[Iliescu] Official figures have been reported. The total number of dead reported was 1,033, of which 540 in Bucharest, 97 in Timisoara, 93 in Sibiu, and 61 in Brasov.

[Manolescu] Are these exact figures?

[Iliescu] This at least is the figure based on data verified so far.

[Manolescu] I also wanted to mention another sensitive figure: the one the minister of national defense reported when he took over his post in the provisional government, namely the existence of 8,400 active officers or members of the securitate. But if we look at a geographical atlas, we see that there are approximately 15,000 localities in Romania; assuming that there was only one securitate officer responsible for each locality, which seems rather little to me, clearly there must have been at least double the number than Mr. Stanculescu reported.

[Iliescu] I don't remember the figures cited by General Stanculescu; 8,400 was probably the number of securitate members incorporated in the army at that time.

[Manolescu] No, he was talking about the active members of the Department of State Security.

[Iliescu] The total number of military cadres (officers, warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers) employed by the former Department of State Security was approximately 15,000 (according to existing official data). Some belonged to intelligence and operations departments, some to technical and signal departments, and some to the Security Troops Command. The majority were removed, and they will be retrained and rehired in civilian sectors (about 4,000 only from the Bucharest securitate alone); some have retired; those who committed actions incurring penal punishment were taken into custody, some have been tried, and others are now being investigated.

[Manolescu] And then there is the problem of the terrorists who were, as Caragiale used to say, sublime, but who have completely disappeared. Is it known to what securitate branch they belonged, what they were all about, and where they are now, if they still exist? This is one problem that will continue to resurface for a long time yet, and that could also be resolved through greater frankness.

[Iliescu] The question about the terrorists is indeed the most obscure; I, too, would like to know who was shooting, for example, while we were in the television building. There is no doubt that shots were fired toward and inside the office in which I was, on the 11th floor. There are still bullet marks in the metal window sill. So the existence of those who came to be known as terrorists was no invention. We used to identify them as Securitate men. There probably were Securitate men, but not only Securitate. So we can still not say exactly who those people were. In any case, for five days I was continually either at the television or at the National Defense Ministry, and those buildings were continually under fire from neighboring buildings. At one point, on the 12th floor above us, the television library caught fire; the water pipes were broken. Several men were arrested inside the building even. One night, while we were walking on the passage toward Studio 4, a man was spotted almost next to me with a revolver in his hand. He unfortunately escaped, they didn't manage to hold him. But he had managed to sneak in. Who were they? To whom did they belong? There are also some unclear questions about several men who were seized and then released. At the time the Prosecutor's Office was not yet involved, the police was disintegrating, and army was not prepared for this type of work, and upon summary investigation, those who arrested them decided that there was not enough evidence to show that they were terrorists, so they let them go. Was there complicity there, or indeed lack of evidence? Who could answer that correctly today? So, I repeat, the question continues to be pretty unclear to us, too, although we would very much like to be able to effectively clear it up...

There are some people under arrest for such charges; some have stood trial, and others are being investigated. The Prosecutor's Office has on the docket over 1,200 files related to the December events. However, not too much is known about the elite snipers who made up the backbone of the action in Bucharest. That is another enigma that we will have to clarify.

[Manolescu] Were there only elite snipers, or other massive forces, because, for example, the fighting around the Baneasa school and Otopeni Airport was extensive, which shows that there wasn't only isolating shooting, as it was said, but that there were clearly other forces involved, too.

[Iliescu] There is some confusion about this; in some cases, military units shot at each other without realizing; also, because of a psychological war (that's a very apt term to describe the situation), we were kept under continual tension for a few days. We received information, for example, about attacks by very numerous forces. At one point there was talk of about 60 helicopters on their way to Bucharest, toward Otopeni Airport, then there was talk of helicopters on their way to the television building, and so forth. We were under a deluge of alarming false reports. Was that the result of a general state of confusion and uncertainty, or an intentional endeavor to poison and throw us into disarray? I don't know, so I can't tell. In any case, I'm not in the habit of talking about what I don't know for a fact.

[Manolescu] I saw in front of the War Ministry the dead bodies of USLA [special army units] men killed by mistake, left to lie there for several days, and no one lit a candle for them because everyone thought they were terrorists.

[Iliescu] That's right. They had been on a team especially summoned to intervene against the snipers shooting from buildings around the ministry, because they were more skilled and better prepared for such operations; but when they came close to the ministry, the army took them for a team of terrorists, and they were unfortunately killed.

[Manolescu] At that time I wanted to publish in ROMANIA LITERARA the extraordinary photograph of one of these terrorists, whose head had been put in a car tire. It was a sensational picture, and the only reason I didn't do it was for technical reasons, it didn't come out. Later I found out that he was no terrorist at all, but a USLA officer and completely innocent. That technical snag stopped me from doing him a posthumous injustice.

[Iliescu] Unfortunately, people don't understand—or some don't want to understand—the situation in which we were in those days. Some people, who had nothing to do with the dramatic events at the time and did not take any risks in those days later had the gall to play the prosecutors, not only asking questions, but even negating the loyalty and good faith of those who had been in the midst of the fighting and literally risked their lives. As if people who put their lives on the line with generous dedication could be interested in keeping such things in the dark. Why would they, I ask you? This is the big lie circulated and manipulated, often for commercial purposes, by the present yellow press. The ones most interested in finding out the whole truth are those who were directly involved in the events.

[Manolescu] That's exactly why I brought up the question, because some of the reports came from people in your immediate circle. For example, the entire discussion about the "plot" in which you allegedly participated ever since 1971 originated with General Militaru, who was the minister of national defense. Also, Mr. Brucan said in an interview that you should have been among the six-signatures letter, but that you protected yourself for the case that you might become president and in order to not deliver yourself into Ceausescu's hands. What do you know about that? Had any of this reached your ears before the Revolution? Or after?

[Iliescu] Concerning Gen. Militaru, there were many speculations and interpretations about some of his statements or declarations which did contain a measure of exaggerated self-estimation of his own merits. It is not a good idea to dabble in such matters, nor to boast too much about one's own doings, when, as you see, the entire yellow press is manically speculating on each sentence and each word. Which it doesn't do without ulterior motives!

Gen. Militaru's merit is to have taken an active position against Ceausescu during the years in question. And not only verbally.

In fact, it is no secret that the discontent was piling up year after year and was vented in different ways by different people. First there were the miners in 1977, who expressed their dissatisfaction very resolutely; then there were the workers of Brasov in 1987; various categories of intellectuals, too, as well as political activists and former officials also took a stand. In the army, too, there were spirited people who expressed the same general dissatisfaction, some of whom even sought solutions. Gen. Militaru was one of the people who even tried to contribute to forming an opposition movement. I, too, talked about it with him, with General Ionita, and with others. But from here to establishing a coherent and organized form of action to remove Ceausescu there is a long way. In point of fact, if there had been such an organized movement, it would have earned great honor in history; there would have been no reason to be ashamed of revealing such an act of great courage. That, unfortunately, was not the case. The only solution turned out to be the explosive outburst of a popular revolt that toppled the dictatorship.

What some people are attempting to do is not to bring up various forms of protest and opposition under the dictatorship, but to compromise those who assumed the responsibility and risk of organizing a new power in the void that was created and to lend credibility to the idea that the revolution was allegedly "confiscated"—an aberrant formulation and an insult to the Revolution itself.

As for the letter of the six, I didn't know it existed until it was published, and no one contacted me, so I cannot say anything about the intentions and thoughts of its authors.

[Manolescu] But would you have signed it if they had contacted you?

[Iliescu] Now it's not so important to say what I would have done if... My position was fairly well known without me having to sign any letter; people knew me very well. I was not reluctant to voice my reservations clearly and explicitely much before that, as early as 1971 and repeatedly after that. That's why there was suspicion around me and why I was closely watched by some (I don't need to say who), while enjoying interest and sympathy in other quarters.

[Manolescu] Now that we have already talked about the press and press exaggerations, the question that brings me close to the end may come at an inopportune moment; namely, are you satisfied with the press, radio, and especially the television, or do you have some complaints against them?

[Iliescu] Yes and no. First of all, this very free expression of opinions is undoubtedly a good thing. We have achieved something that may never have existed in Romania. Not even before the war, when the press was censored for a rather long period of time. The freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and absence of censorship are facts that no honest person can deny; this means that ideas and information can circulate unhindered. We do now need a free and strong press.

At the same time, I am also dissatisfied with the fact that unfortunately, some of the press is deliberately playing a negative role about providing correct information and influencing the public.

In other words, this race for sensational reporting and immediate profit comes at the expense of correct and genuine public information. Our press is still not sufficiently informative; necessary and useful reports are left out of the press, while material that incites to hatred and feeds suspicion, distrust, and unrest continue to take an important place in many publications. The public continues to be exposed to a harsh and violent language. On the other hand, the information itself is distorted; there is slander, untrue reports, and interpretations aimed at discrediting actions or people. This does not contribute to the constructive task of the press and the media in general, which is to provide a genuine meeting grounds for the loyal and objective confrontation of different positions correctly expressed and correctly presented.

Consequently, it is obvious that from this viewpoint there are many complaints and much room for expectations for improvements in the quality of our press, so that it can exercise its specific social role. Indeed, the contemporary press has great power, and sometimes the weapon of word manipulation is more dangerous than others. Therefore, here must be great responsibility for the words used. Along this line, the request to issue a press bill without delay may be justified, although I don't think that it will take care of all the problems; but such a bill is probably necessary primarily to regulate the framework of action of the press. I hope that this long awaited law will also contribute to shaping a journalistic ethics and the ethics of the contemporary Romanian press in keeping with the public's expectations.

[Manolescu] I don't know whether you know that Mr. Iosif Constantin Dragan a few days ago announced on television that he will establish an independent television station in Iasi.

[Iliescu] He, too? I knew that Mr. Ratiu wanted something like that.

[Manolescu] I heard it with my own ears; he announced that he will do it, that he has taken the necessary steps, and that he hopes to establish an independent television station in Iasi, anyway in Moldavia.

[Iliescu] I had not heard about that.

[Manolescu] I would like to remind you that ROMANIA LITERARA was, if I'm not mistaken, the only magazine to which you contributed during the years of your political decline. I am referring to one article three years ago. I wanted to ask whether we can expect contributions from you in the future? This is an offer, anyway.

[Iliescu] With great pleasure, and the proof of that is that we are already working on that. About the article you mentioned—in was during the 1987-88 period. It was published thanks to George Ivascu, who was receptive and assumed the responsibility for printing it. He even said to me after that that the article had laid about for a few weeks and that he was reprimanded—I didn't ask by whom—and it didn't contain any quotation, which was the condition for publishing it. He let them understand that this was something he couldn't request of me, and he published it after asking me to shorten it in some places and make some minor changes.

[Manolescu] If it comes from a journalist like George Ivascu, the information is strictly true. At that time I was only an outside contributor to the magazine, but I was aware of the history of that article. The former Press Directorate and the respective Central Committee department exercized great pressures in all respects. But with his famous tenacity, Ivascu managed to slowly block them and to publish the article.

I want to thank you for having given me so much of your time. At the same time, I don't want to end before asking you whether there is any question that you wish I had asked? Which you may then perhaps answer.

[Iliescu] About the fate of this president. That may have been the most direct question I had expected.

I realize that I have taken on a great responsibility This is not something new, I had said so already in the night of 22 December, namely that it isn't just anyone who can assume such a heavy responsibility at such a difficult time for the country. This may well look like suicide for a politician.

Things have changed very much since last December, and I think that the forecast I made then (and still maintain) was true. Namely, during the past months it became evident that the Romanian society is indeed in the midst of a profound crisis from all viewpoints, which is augmented by people's emotional charges that are the greatest obstacles to changing the bases of our social structures.

I hope that when the new institutions begin working—the newly elected Parliament, the institution of the presidency, and the government—we will be able to enter a new stage, a stage of calmer and more orderly work, with a view to directly confronting the complex problems that we intend to solve.

I think that the entire complexity of the economic situation came through both in the presidential message and in the government's program; the days ahead will not be at all easy in this process of economic restructuring.

The social effects of the transition process will be particularly complex and will generate many sources of dissatisfaction, which forces interested in destabilizing the country will undoubtedly use.

Consequently, those in government, those in power, have a difficult and even very complex period ahead of them. The success of the recovery endeavors, in which the entire country is interested, will depend on whether we can manage to maintain an emotional contact and active communication with the basic factors of the Romanian society, regardless of their political options and positions, in order to achieve the necessary solidarity among the great majority of the people. This applies for all the social strata, including the categories which disassociated themselves from us.

I hope that together we can forge such a national solidarity. Even with the Romanian diaspora. I am rather sad about the difference between the Romanian diaspora and the Hungarian or Polish ones. Whatever the domestic situation in the country or the internal political confrontations, when it comes to national interests, both politicians in the country and their diasporas act in solidarity. We, unfortunately, don't manage to do that. We should all reflect on this, especially the politicians among us, to whatever party they may belong.

Also, at a time such as this, the entire Romanian intelligentsia should constitute a factor of cohesion around the major national requirements. Similarly, we must all cooperate to ensure that Romanians abroad support the country at these fateful times.

I think that this is one of the questions we should all consider; I can assure you that the president does.

[Manolescu] Thank you very much, and I wish you success!

Political Parties Hold Talks on Merger

AU2907204790 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 15 Jul 90 p 3

[D. Paul note: "Toward a New Fusion"]

[Text] The sixth round of talks between several political groups created after the revolution took place yesterday [14 July]. The following parties attended the latest round: the Democratic Unity Party (President Nicu Stancescu); the Socialist Liberal Party (President Nicolae Cerveni); the Democratic Party (President Vigil Vata); the Republic Party for the Unity of Romanians (President Pavel Ghiban); the Progressive Democratic Party (President Virgil Uta); the Christian Social Democratic Party (President Ion. Di Cezare); the Free Democratic Party (President Leon Nica); the Socialist Party of Justice (President Ion Iordache); and the Party for Honoring the Heroes of the Revolution and for National Salvation (President Ioan Antonescu). The presidents or the representatives of these parties decided to set up commissions to work out the details for the creation of a new party with a single structure, through the fusion of these groups. A final decision along these lines will be taken on Tuesday.

It is worth mentioning that other 12 groups had participated in previous discussions; following a consultations within their collective leadership, these groups will define their position toward this new political formation.

Defense Ministry on REUTER 'Insinuations'

AU2907210790 Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 18 Jul 90 p 1

[Unsigned note: "REUTER Agency Disinforms"]

[Text] Regarding certain tendentious commentaries concerning the content of the interview granted by Minister of National Defense Colonel-General Victor Stanculescu to REUTER on Thursday, 12 July 1990, the press section of the Ministry of National Defense is authorized to declare the following:

The interview given to Mr. Steve Pagani was presented only partially and in the form of a commentary, and does not correspond with what the minister of national defense said, because:

—The interview drew no parallels and made no direct reference to the Romanian Information Service and the Gendarmerie or the former Securitate structures. The latter were abolished between January and March 1990, when the former Security Department was subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense.

—The interview does not contain anything that justifies the speculations and insinuations of certain foreign press bodies, and of the Deutsche Welle and Free Europe radio stations, concerning the Romanian Government's intention to set up special forces—from among the already abolished structures of the former Securitate—for reprisals against any future demonstration and domestic disturbance.

We consider that any tendentious and speculative presentation of the interview by other press bodies, aside from REUTER, is part and parcel of the same scenario which prompted the violent and destabilizing actions of 13 June 1990.

Government Session Opens 27 Jul in Bucharest

Agenda Includes Pay, International Issues

AU2707152890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1400 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 27/7/1990—The Romanian Government's session has started today.

The agenda includes issues concerning the retributions pay in June 1990, the package of bills released to the government's members for observations and proposals as well as information on evolutions in Romania's international stand and on the actions recently taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Roman Chairs Session; Productivity Assessed

AU2707205890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1909 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 27/7/1990—Prime Minister Petre Roman chaired a government meeting Friday July 27.

Referring to the first item on the agenda, Mr. Theodor Dumitru Stolojan, minister of finance, spoke about the way in which the personnel was paid in June 1990. The conclusion could be drawn that there still was no economic correlation between production, productivity and payment. In comparison with the same period last year, production and productivity lowered but average wages grew. Given such an upsetting situation which could bring about imbalances on an economic level, the government endorsed a resolution on the formation and payment of the salary fund in state units which is to be temporarily applied starting August 1, this year, till those units turn into commercial companies and autonomous enterprises in compliance with the legislation to be passed. Other measures refer to those enterprises which cannot ensure the salary fund they need. So, they will be economically and financially controlled with a view to elaborating programmes for the recovery and restructuring of the respective units.

Next, foreign minister Adrian Nastase informed about some of Romania's recent international actions, showing that priority was given to making efforts apt to help improve Romania's image abroad as it was affected by the mid-June events. He underlined that in the ensuing period further steps would be taken for this country to intensify its participation in the world arena in accordance with the orientations of the Romanian policy.

Mr. Romulus Neagu, secretary of state at the Foreign Ministry, reported on the Budapest talks regarding the growth of relations between Romania and Hungary. Their constructive, pragmatic and fruitful character and the accords reached on the occasion were highly appreciated. It was decided that the ministries should take the due measures to appropriately carry out the actions agreed upon.

The government members examined afterwards 15 drafts of normative acts that were submitted to debate.

Foreign Affairs Commission Head Address

AU2707190990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1800 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 27/7/1990—Romania is well known to have had highly significant, and occasionally painful, experiences in its long history, in search of its own way in the international community, Senator Corneliu Manescu, chairman of Romania's Parliament Foreign Affairs Commission, told Parliament Friday. It happened with our revolution which managed in a couple of days at year's end to take the whole world by surprise through its sweeping force of liberty, for the restoration of freedom and dignity in pursuit of a higher and brighter ideal of spiritual accomplishment, said Corneliu Manescu adding now when order begins to be set on the normal and lawful rules of the civil state and of Romanian spirit, our century-old tradition should be restored and a several decades-old gap, alien to what we are deep inside us, be bridged.

It is the task of Parliament, said the senator, to show, jointly with the other high state institutions, to other peoples what Romania and its values are and to establish normal relations with all of them.

In reference to the Romanian foreign policy orientation in future the senator said that our country would have to decide its position not with regard to groups of states or political systems, but with respect to each separate country inasmuch as this is possible and that the relations between states should not obscure but bring into the focus the citizen, the person, the individual.

It is our task to carry on a continuous, efficient and resourceful activity, said the speaker, in order to bring Romania back to its stylistic matrix which naturally places ourselves in Europe and in that way in the centre of the world.

I think we will have further to analyse the specific terms Romania must fulfill to take part in various international bodies like the Council of Europe and eventually in the European Economic Community, the senator said.

Besides, he went on, each of us must, to the best of one's knowledge and ability, try to give Romania what it deserves, make it again what it was in crucial, historic times.

"Let us try to integrate Romania in that humankind where one's own country may integrate easily, without losing its specificity, yet contributing to universal harmony" the senator ended his speech quoting from a great Romanian inter-war diplomat, Nicolae Titulescu.

Privatization, National Day Bills Enacted

AU2707201490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1846 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 27/7/1990—Meeting in plenum Friday afternoon, the Assembly of Deputies which re-examined and approved the remaining three articles—Nos. 23, 44 and 45—of the bill of reorganising state economic units into autonomous companies and business societies, enacted the bill with five votes against and seven abstentions.

The bill on setting 1 December the national day of Romania was next put to the vote and carried unanimously to the standing ovation of the house.

The event was duly marked by speeches made by Transylvanian, Moldavian and Wallachian deputies representing all political factions who stated their unanimous agreement with the day which never lost its meaning or significance in Romania's political life.

Deputies Discuss Antiprofiteering Bill

AU2707205590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1942 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 27/7/1990—Romania's Senate approved Friday afternoon a bill that puts a temporary ban on real estate alienation through acts between living persons.

Discussions began in the same session of a bill on protecting the population from black market activities. At the end of several hours of talks one article of the bill was approved and the Senate adjourned session.

It will resume its activity Saturday morning.

Session Ends

AU2707210490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1951 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 27/7/1990—In the last part of its plenary session, the Assembly of Deputies discussed the bill regarding consent on child adoption. The numerous proposals made by deputies with a view to improving the text hindered the conclusion of debates and the approval of the bill in today's session.

At the end of the proceedings, seven members were appointed to take part in the commission of mediation with the Senate to bring into accord certain differences occurred between the two chambers with regard to the bill on reorganizing state economic enterprises as autonomous units and commercial companies.

The Assembly of Deputies resumes its works Saturday morning.

Senate, Deputies Assembly Resume Sessions

AU2807130590 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1000 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Excerpts] This morning, Romania's session resumed its plenary session. As Senate Speaker Mr. Alexandru Birladeanu said, the agenda stipulates the continuation of debates on another important legal document, namely the draft bill on certain measures to defend the population against illicit black market activities. [passage omitted] The Deputies Assembly also resumed its plenary session with discussions on the draft bill on adoptions, which was passed. [passage omitted]

Deputy Calls for RFE Bureau

AU2907182390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1503 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/7/1990—Deputy Liviu Muresan proposed Friday, during a joint session of the Senate and the Assembly of Deputies, that the Romanian authorities make the necessary demarches for the setting up in an institutionalized legal framework of a permanent bureau for Romania of the "Europa Libera" [Free Europe] radio station.

This bureau, the deputy specified, would ensure optimum conditions for better information from direct and authorized sources of the public opinion in the country and abroad about the highly complex evolutions in Romania and at the same time it would render the programmes broadcast by that radio stations more objective.

To support his proposal, the deputy showed that such permanent bureaus of "Europa Libera" radio station [RFE] are functioning or are under organization in the other eastern European countries' capital cities, too, that the Romanian-language programmes of that station "still have an important role that cannot be ignored"; he also made reference to Romania's wish of democracy and integration into Europe as well as to the permanent concern in Romania for a free circulation of information in accord with the Helsinki Final Act provisions.

Black Marketeering Bill Turned Down

AU3007103090 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0742 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 30/7/1990—Romania's Senate turned down, Saturday, for the first time since it started work, a bill against black market activities on which discussions had begun Friday evening. The bill was sent back to the Senate's Standing Legal Commission because its provisions paralleled those of the laws in force. Qualified jurist senators argued that the bill did not fill a legal gap but turned criminal offences into petty offences.

Criticism was leveled at the government for having brought into the Senate a bill that conceals administrative flaws. The senate also stated its concern for the low efficiency of the police and customs officers as well as of the border guards in stemming black market activities which are a result of the country's present economic and moral conditions, and suggested that not only people engaging in all kinds of black market activities be punished but also the officials who are supposed to enforce the law or administer justice.

Furthermore, it was shown that black marketeering could not be fought against efficiently through administrative measures only, and that commodities in Bucharest—the result of the everyday work of every citizen—had also a great role to play.

The Standing Legal Commission was asked to reconsider the bill in two days at the most so that the Senate may resume its discussion in plenum.

Roman, Ursu, Others Attend Officers' Graduation

AU2707210890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1929 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 27/7/1990—A graduation and promotion festivity took place Friday 27 July at the Higher School of Officers of the Ministry of the Interior. This is the first class of post-revolutionary graduates.

Attending the festivity were Prime Minister Petre Roman, Minister of the Interior Doru Viorel Ursu, Minister of Education and Science Gheorghe Stefan, and the head of the Romanian intelligence service, Virgil Magureanu.

An order was read under which 534 graduates of the police, gendarme, border guards and firemen forces were promoted to the rank of lieutenant.

Lt. Georgeta Stefan, who ended top of the 1990 class, recalled to memory moments of the December revolution and thanked the government for having restored the school its prestige by aligning it with the country's higher learning units.

"We cannot promise you an easy life, but we do ask you to do your duty with dignity, determination and courage," the Minister of the Interior, Doru Viorel Ursu, told the graduates.

The prime minister who congratulated the graduates told them that to serve the nation is a sacred duty and that they are responsible for the state of law, and for the Romanian people's definite option for democracy.

Defense Ministry Condemns Destabilization Attempts

AU2707205490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 27 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 27/7/1990—A statement issued by the press office of the Ministry of National Defence—in connection with the posters placed in public places in Bucharest in the past few days that call civilians and military to meetings and strikes in support of the democratization of the Army and a further shortening of the military service—shows that the initiators of such provocations actually pursue to destabilize the Armed Forces, in defiance of the obvious democratization of the military establishment started by the revolution of December 1989.

An appeal of the former Action Committee for the Democratization of the Armed Forces shows that the military firmly dissociate themselves from these actions.

Iasi Students Demonstrate for Munteanu's Release

AU2907181990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1515 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/7/1990—Sunday at noon over 1,000 demonstrators, in their great majority students and intellectuals, started from the University in Iasi an authorized march to protest against Marian Munteanu's and Leon Nica's arresting.

The participants in that march staged by "Agora" society were carrying the portrait of the students' leader, Marian Munteanu, flowers, placards and were chanting slogans.

In their speeches delivered at the meeting in front of the Iasi Prefect's Office, George Pruteanu, Liviu Antonesii and other speakers declared for the liberation of Marian Munteanu and Leon Nica, for the elimination of any forms of totalitarianism and extremism from the Romanian society, for the defence of the human rights and for the moral cleaning of the political and social life. Critics have been heard of the government, the parliament and the country's president.

At the end of the meeting two statements were addressed to Romania's parliament and the General Procurator's Office.

Thousands of inhabitants of Iasi Municipality, present alongside the meeting's route, reacted with indignation and revolt at the protesters' slogans.

Police, equipped with helmets and clubs, ensured the demonstrators' protection, the march and meeting taking place in an atmosphere of order, without incidents.

Iliescu Meets Ethnic German Leaders

AU2807133590 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1000 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] Romania's President Mr. Ion Iliescu is currently meeting at Cotroceni Palace with a delegation of the Democratic Forum of the Germans of Romania, consisting of the members of the Forum's leadership.

Discusses German Minority Problems

AU3007102690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0759 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 30/7/1990—The president of Romania, Ion Iliescu, met Saturday morning with the leadership of Romania's German Democratic Forum—Dr. Thomas Naegler, president, Ingmar Brandsch, member of the Chamber of Deputies, and other leading members.

The forum members stated the specific problems of the German minority and asked for measures to redress all abuses and wrongs done since January 1945 when tens of thousands of ethnic Germans were deported to labour camps in the USSR, which was followed in the fifties by expropriations, evacuations from large cities and forced re-settlement in the Baragan plain. Such reparatory measures, it was shown, could increase the scope of the democratisation process of Romanian society which started in December 1989, and build up confidence as well as add to the German population's stability in Romania. Measures were also discussed for the possible return of ethnic Germans who had emigrated in the course of time.

Education and culture were also covered: Conditions for the further operation of German-language schools, the conservation and protection of historical monuments owed to Saxons or Swabians who lived in Romanian territory, support to German-language publications and books also in future. Emphasis was placed on the role that the Church can play in the stability of the German population.

A legal framework was shown to be required in order that the proposals made during the meeting may take effect. It was agreed that like meetings be held once in three months.

Nastase Plans Diplomatic Ties With NATO

AU3007103390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0957 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 30/7/1990—Romania intends to establish diplomatic relations with NATO, daily "ADEVARUL" announces resuming a statement of Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Nastase in an interview with the national radio.

In connection with Bucharest's intention to set up diplomatic relations with NATO, Romania's foreign minister, the newspaper says that Prime Minister "Petre Roman invited NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner to Bucharest." [sentence as received]

Nastase's Continental Alternatives Criticized

AU2907193190 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 17 Jul 90 p 1

[Viorel Stirbu article: "Romania Threatens"]

[Text] Our new foreign minister, Mr. Adrian Nastase, recently said that our country needs Europe and wants to benefit from the Western program for the economic recovery of former USSR satellite countries. At the same time, the minister stressed that Europe also needs Romania, which we consider a pertinent observation. However, we consider his threat that if the EC refuses to take us as we are "Romania will turn to other continents" as less inspired. The situation seems to be quite clear with the North Americans—the United States will not become involved in such a difficult endeavor without guarantees that the Romanian people will stand to benefit from it at the end of the road. As far as Asia is concerned, it is hard to believe that Japan will launch unilateral projects which may cause it problems with the main advanced countries in the world. China may show some flexibility, given its domestic policies. Unfortunately, China is not a great economic power. There is no doubt that Comrade Kim Il-song would be ready to jump in. The problem is that, aside from the great leader's portrait, there is hardly anything else in that country we could take. So, there is Africa left. We recall that the "odious dictator and his sinister wife" were often visiting there, and not exactly empty-handed. In the days when William Tolbert, Jr. used to spend a good part of the year at Poiana Brasov resort, Ceausescu visited Liberia and gave him credits worth 50 million dollars. Shortly afterward, a sergeant liquidated William Tolbert, Jr., and we do not know if and how the Romanian loan was repaid. His comrade in ideas, his friend Samora, the former Angolan president [as published] said at a rally organized at 23 August enterprise in Bucharest that his country can only offer drinkable water, grapes, and possibly coffee in return for Romanian goods. This is the kind of business relationships we can aspire to if our recovery hopes collapse!

Nastase on Ministry's Efforts Abroad

AU2707211590 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1920 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Interview with Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase by unidentified Bucharest radio reporter in Bucharest on 27 July—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] As reported, a meeting was held today by the Romanian Government at the Victory Palace. After the conclusion of the proceedings, Mr. Adrian Nastase, minister of foreign affairs, was kind enough to grant an interview to our radio station.

[Interviewer] Mr. Minister, you presented a report at today's government meeting in connection with the development of Romania's international situation in the world and the actions taken by the ministry you are leading covering a longer period in the past and up to now. Could you summarize Romania's situation for our listeners as well?

[Nastase] Actually, the report I presented today during the government meeting referred to almost one month of activity carried out by the government and, in this case, to the activity carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in that period. First, this report tried to outline the initiatives and activities characterizing diplomatic work, that is our initiatives concerning relations with foreign countries, and on the other hand to shed light on the current image of Romania as it is perceived through our diplomatic missions.

In the four weeks since the government was set up, there were certain visits abroad. I am referring to the prime minister's participation in the Crans Montana meeting, his unofficial visit to France, the participation of a parliamentary and government delegation in the session of the Council of Europe in Innsbruck and—at the government level—other visits abroad, most of which also sent a clear message about the desire and intention of the Romanian Government to get deeply and firmly involved in building a domestic democratic structure.

I also believe that an important moment—as far as the stage of Romania's international situation is concerned—was the Brussels meeting of EEC foreign ministers which took place on 16-17 July. Certainly it was interesting to follow the way in which changes of that period were perceived, especially in light of the known events and incidents of June.

From this viewpoint, even if one could not really expect the Common Market to reconsider the decision it adopted a month ago in Luxembourg on freezing the agreement with Romania, however—and I said that at the Government meeting—one can note, I believe, a certain positive change of tone and attitude. I believe that all conditions exist for the next Common Market meeting of foreign ministers in September to constructively examine the problems of relations with Romania, as I hope will happen with the other European institutions.

There are also other important moments in the international policy of the past month, connected with the NATO summit in London, with the beginning of a dialogue with the Warsaw Pact countries, and with plans for the adoption of a joint statement. In this respect, I would like to point out that the Romanian prime minister sent a letter to NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner inviting the latter to pay an official visit to our country. The letter also expresses Romania's desire to establish diplomatic relations with NATO and to accredit an ambassador to that organization.

I would also like to recall that the meeting of the preparatory committee for the CSCE summit concludes on 27 July. This meeting also examined certain proposals of the CSCE conference to be held next fall in Paris and various scenarios and proposals on institutionalizing the CSCE process. At the proceedings of this committee, which were held in Vienna, the Romanian delegation presented a working document on the aforementioned subjects.

I could also mention other elements and important moments of this past period, which we submitted for the government's discussion. They are: the Prague proceedings of the commission of government representatives for the examination of the character, functions, and activities of the Warsaw Pact, when the delegations of the member countries presented their current positions in view of the future reorientation of the Pact; the start of bilateral consultations with Poland, Greece, Czechoslovakia, and the Mediterranean countries on specific CSCE subjects—such consultations have already taken place with Greece and Poland in Bucharest; and the five countries of the Danube-Adriatic Group were approached in order to explore various possibilities and emphasize Romania's interest in associating itself with some concrete cooperation projects initiated by this body.

I would also like to mention that, as of 1 August, Romania will take over the chairmanship of the UN Security Council for the period of a month. Likewise, in August, the chairmanship of the Geneva Disarmament Conference, which, as a matter of fact, will conclude its proceedings on 24 August, will also be assumed by our country. Here are quite a few interesting elements for a dialogue with other countries and a good opportunity for us to become involved in multilateral and bilateral diplomacy and to convey our message on the development of a democratic domestic political system and on the establishment of links with the system of European democratic institutions.

I would also like to point out that the government meeting also heard a briefing on the 24-26 July consultations in Budapest between the Romanian and Hungarian Ministries of Foreign Affairs. The Romanian delegation was led by Mr. Romulus Neagu, state secretary and member by the government. On this occasion, he presented the Romanian side's package of proposals regarding the improvement of the climate of bilateral relations. This package is intended to create a pragmatic framework for the gradual promotion—on our western border, at this important moment of overall European changes—of the necessary atmosphere to eliminate various reasons for tension. By positively approaching the relevant issues, we should first try to identify our common interests, then strive to gradually eliminate what currently amounts to perceptions of or reasons for misunderstanding in our assessment of bilateral relations.

President Ion Iliescu Visits Alba County

AU2707152990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1401 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 27/7/1990—Thursday, July 26 President Ion Iliescu was the guest of Alba County. Meeting with inhabitants of the towns of Sebes and Cugir, Mr. Iliescu underscored the significance of the parliament's recent resolution to make the first of December the Romanian people's national day, emphasizing the fact that the historical act of December 1, 1918 would be celebrated this year in that very county, in Alba Iulia, where Transylvania's union with Romania had taken place.

On Thursday the president held talks with mayors and executives of economic units in the county, with representatives of the religious denominations and of political parties, with intellectuals.

Iliescu Meets Union Leaders in Alba Iulia

AU2707190790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1807 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 27/7/1990—As part of his visit to Alba County, President Ion Iliescu met at the carpet manufacturing enterprise of Alba Iulia with union leaders of large local industrial units who were told about the economic restructuring effort and the social implications of transition to the market economy. President Iliescu also visited the towns of Abrud and Cimpeni where he met with the boards of administration of the Rosia Poieni mining combine, of the cotton mill, of the woodworking enterprise and of the knitwear enterprise, and with local administrative bodies.

Parliamentary Cooperation With Japan Discussed

AU2707201490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1834 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 27/7/1990—Vasile Cervdarie, deputy speaker of the Assembly of Deputies, discussed Friday morning the expansion of Romanian-Japanese cooperation on a parliamentary line with a visiting delegation of the Japanese Diet led by reserve general Shigeto Nagano, member of Japan's Foreign Affairs and Security Study Committee.

Environment Protection Talks With Bulgaria

AU2707210690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1847 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 27/7/1990—Talks were held in Bucharest on 26 and 27 July between governmental delegation of Romania and Bulgaria to agree on the text of a convention on Romanian-Bulgarian cooperation for the protection of the environment in the border area.

The discussions were productive and helped the identification of solutions acceptable to both sides.

The talks will be resumed soon to finalize the text of the convention.

Prime Minister Roman Leaves for Visit to Spain

AU2807130790 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1000 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] Romania's Prime Minister Mr. Petre Roman left this morning for Spain. During the visit, the Romanian premier will meet and conduct talks with the Spanish Prime Minister Mr. Felipe Gonzalez. He will also meet with other Spanish officials, with representatives of cultural and artistic circles, and with businessmen.

Markovic Views Economic Development, Elections

AU2907144190 Sarajevo Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Speech by Federal Executive Council President Ante Markovic addressing a rally at Mrakovica on Kozara Mountain—live]

[Text] Comrades, [applause] comrades, dear citizens of Kozara, dear citizens of Yugoslavia: [cheers, applause] Allow me to express my great enthusiasm and excitement at having the honor and the opportunity to be in your company and to talk with you at your rally. [cheers, applause]

You have had full understanding for my work and for my involvement, and you said: We are ready to organize this gathering when you have time to come to us. Here I am, on a wonderful day which shines on Kozara, so that we may get together to talk about what is of interest to you. [cheers, applause]

You are a people, who have been living at a frontier for centuries, a frontier of various worlds, clashes, and wars. You have had no peace or quiet for centuries. Many times you had to struggle for your bread, so that you could live from one day to another. But at the same time, when necessary, you knew how to become fighters ready to fight for your freedom and rights. [cheers, applause]

You also demonstrated this in World War II, in the struggle for the liberation of our country and the struggle for the revolution. You demonstrated this with the Kozara epic, which has become not only synonymous with our war and revolution, but which has also become an idea in Yugoslavia, and has become an idea in the world. [applause]

This epic, equal to the greatest classical tragedies, and at the same time an epic of bravery and struggle for one's rights, roused the citizens, the people of this region, to (?cultivate and to transmit) the messages within Yugoslavia and all over the world, the messages that these people carried within them for centuries. [cheers, applause]

Finally, in this Yugoslavia, you obtained your rights. Regardless of how difficult it was, regardless of how many problems we had, you found yourselves. You lived in peace and calm, you lived in brotherhood, you lived in cooperation. You are very much concerned about everything that may disrupt the peace and quiet of our country, and everything that may endanger its life in common. [cheers, applause]

Worried about all that is happening in our country, and of course also pleased with all the positive things that are happening, but at the same time worried, you desired and wished this communication at this rally, at which you gathered in such imposing numbers, so as to tell us who have come here what bothers you: that you do not want hatred and divisions in our country...[cheers, applause]...that you do not want.... [cheering continues] I understand you do not want any clashes. You do not want any bloodshed any more and least of all...[cheers]...fratricide.

You wish to declare your desire to live lives joined together and not separate. [cheers] You declare that you want to live in Yugoslavia as a common land of all our peoples and nationalities and all the citizens of this country. [cheers, applause]

Of course, there are many forces which want us to quarrel among ourselves again, which want to divide us, which want to build their own power on our differences. However, building this country on the AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] principles, in the revolution led by Tito, we have been opening paths and prospects for the development of our country, not only for our peoples and nationalities, but also for other socialist countries thinking that one cannot develop freedom, democracy, humanism, progress, and mankind with the methods of coercion, dictatorship, monolithism, and dictate.

For this reason, in 1948 Yugoslavia found itself in a confrontation with Stalinism from which it emerged victorious. For this reason, Yugoslavia founded the Nonaligned Movement, so that, in opposition to the blocs which wanted to divide the world, it could act as a pacifier and reduce tensions and enable people to live free of fear of the future bloodshed that could destroy mankind entirely. [cheers, applause]

For years, our Yugoslavia has served as an example for many things. It has been looking for new ways of development along which it will search for ways to develop the socialist system through democratic, human, and other methods of motivating and stimulating people with man in the center. We were successful in this for years. However, there was unfortunately not enough consistency to ensure that the system that was established after the struggle against Stalinism by the most creative and most able forces of this country as a new model that used new methods of management and self-management, the system that was completely improved, delivers results and enables us to solve contradictions in our society.

We encountered serious problems because, burdened by the ideology, we formed the so-called consensus economy and philosophy which was supposed to enable us, freed from the pressure of state socialism, like the one that existed in the USSR and other countries, to look for our own way without recognizing economic laws. Of course, we could not succeed in this because we went against the laws in the development of a modern and civilized world. This is why we encountered difficulties and crises, the result of which is also the present situation in our country. In contrast to what has been happening in our country, as you can see, other socialist countries, which are already former socialist countries, experienced global crisis in their systems and the collapse of these systems. These countries did not think of other alternatives. In contrast to them, we, using all our abilities and strength, working day and night, we, this team of only 17 or 18 people who are members of the Federal Executive Council, have invested all our efforts, knowledge, and experience to find ways out, so that, if we find ourselves in such a situation, we are not in the position like others, in which our system and country would disintegrate without forming something new, healthier, more able, something that would last here for a long time. [applause]

Proceeding from the program of reforms in our country, above all economic reforms and the reforms concerning the state and political system, we opened a process of developing a modern society in our country, which proceeds from recognizing civilized achievements, from what represents proof that it is capable of developing economic efficiency, political pluralism, and a law-governed state. Its functions and roles must protect this economic efficiency and political pluralism, so that we develop a state with social justice, which should enable us to develop new relations in our country, new trust, and, on this basis, form a new Yugoslavia capable of not only living, but also competing with other countries in the world in making progress. [cheers, applause]

Of course, it is not possible to achieve this easily. We are and will be facing enormous resistance. At the same time, we should change the whole system. We should change the entire infrastructure. We should change all institutions of that system. We should build new relations in the country. We should change the political system, the structure, the structure of society as a whole, the structure of some of its functions, as well as our habits, and what is the worst, the people themselves. [cheers, applause]

Working persistently on this program as the new cohesive factor of our country and our society, the Federal Executive Council—I do not have to tell you that again—has achieved great results with this program that has been in use for some time. We succeeded in making our currency convertible. We turned the dinar into a currency respectable worldwide, something that has never been the case, in the old or new Yugoslavia. [cheers, applause]

This currency of ours is not only a measure of the value of our ability to keep up with the world, it is also a prerequisite for us to open up to the world, to which we have widely opened ourselves through all its positive influences, as well as through the influences we have had on it. It is also an excellent social, as well as huge political factor, in the cohesion of our society. [applause]

As you know, at one time lines were drawn and fights started by the way foreign exchange was distributed in this country, by the foreign exchange system. Wars were almost fought, contradictions were created, and now this is a law that has become quite technical because the convertibility of the currency has made it quite (?superfluous) and unnecessary. [applause] As you know, we have created huge foreign currency reserves, which the day before yesterday amounted to $9.15 billion. There has never ever been such wealth in the hands of our state and our society. [applause and cheers]

As you know, we have fought against inflation at a level that no one thought we would be able to, and in a period of only a few months. This inflation will never again return. [applause and cheers]

We have liberated relations with the world. Each of you can find even here goods that are produced throughout the world, and of course all those high-quality goods that are also produced in our country. This is because the system that we are constructing has not only opened our borders toward the world, but also eliminated the (?dividing) borders between us through economic logic. [applause]

We have also constructed the larger elements of a system that allows our citizens to be able to be participants in and owners of our enterprises, so that they can buy up a share in these enterprises with a large discount, in order to manage them, and receive benefits from the result of work in these enterprises. This holds for agricultural estates, and all parts of our country and our society. Through the development of ownership democracy, we are making it possible for a huge number of our citizens and working people to become the actual owners of the huge social property that has been set up in this country without an identifiable owner, to manage it, bear responsibility for it, and share the fruits of its work. [applause]

We have received recognition for this program of ours from throughout the world. There is now no developed country in the world which does not acknowledge these results, stressing that they are not only fascinating, but they are the best results that one country has so far been able to achieve, and serve as an example to all other countries. Teams come from abroad to study how we have done this so that this experience can be used in their countries. Yugoslavia is again winning a reputation in the world, and this reputation can be developed even more, succeeding further in the (?implementation) of the reforms that are before us. [applause and cheers]

Of course, a lot of patience and time is needed [passage indistinct] develop on stable foundations, over a long period, without internal tensions, without internal conflicts, and develop with more and more democracy. We erect our entire program on this (?basic) principle: development of more and more democracy. There is no problem that we cannot resolve with the development of democracy, through talks, through dialogue, and not through mutual conflicts. [cheers, applause]

Of course there are some people who fear democracy, because it negates their inability to rule [Markovic corrects himself] their ruling by force instead of by ability and arguments. [cheers] We are building a society which ought to be such that, regardless of whether one or another party wins in a place, the system must not be jeopardized. The relations in this system must not be jeopardized. [cheers] Let every party that struggles for the confidence of the voters, and for obtaining power, prove that it is capable of further developing and advancing this system in the interest of every citizen, every part of this country, and the country as a whole.

[cheers, applause] If a party is not able or not capable of doing so, do not give it your confidence. [cheers]

In the talks now, when there appeared one declaration and another declaration and a suspension of an assembly—which we have never experienced in the administration of our country—we visited and had talks in all the republics. We had talks with their leaders. We had frank talks, and we said: If you are not in favor of Yugoslavia, please say so and put us out of our misery. [cheers, applause] But if you are in favor of Yugoslavia—and I must say that they all said they were in favor of Yugoslavia.... [cheers, chanting "Yugoslavia," applause, Markovic does not complete the sentence]

We then said: We will not push exclusiveness. We will not push prejudices, we will not push anything that may divide us and may turn us into enemies of each other. We want to talk about, not what relations will reign in our country, but what are the contents of these relations, the quality of these relations, and what kind of country do we need. Do we need a country in which economic prosperity will reign? Do we need it or not? If we need it, then we need a system of market economy. Without this we cannot attain economic prosperity. [cheers, applause]

Do we need a multiparty system? We do need a multiparty system. It is an expression of the freedom of all people. Let them organize themselves as they like. Let them go and elect people in an organized way, but in such a way that they advance the system which we are building, rather than destroy this country and jeopardze its internal and external integrity. [cheers, applause]

Are they in favor of building a law-governed state, which will protect this system and these rights and which will (?ensure that) all are equal, all forms of ownership equally protected, all of them having the right to produce, and nobody able to negate them? Likewise all the rights of peoples and nationalities, all the rights of citizens, all the rights of the republics should be determined, but at the same time, the indispensable rights of the community of Yugoslavia should also be determined, the community should enable the regulations to be overseen in an optimum way, in the interest of every part of the country and every citizen, but also the country as a whole. [cheers]

At the same time we should build a state in which there will be social justice; a state which will not be indifferent to the fact that there are poor, old, and disabled people; a state which will, of course, depending on its abilities, which the new system will increasingly develop and enhance and expand, be increasingly able to solve social questions through both the development of the new, and at the same time through salvaging what shows to be unable [as heard] to be saved through development.

If we, as we said, want this kind of state, with this kind of content, then we must discuss what kind of relations should exist between the population, the citizens and the state; between enterprises and their independence and the state and citizens. We must establish new relations between the republics, and we must establish them between the republics and the joint state which we should build. Only on this basis of a new content, and new quality that we are building, can we build new relations and develop new trust.

We no longer possess those cohesive forces that we used to have, nor the authority which we had in the past. We must jointly build our new community through a new system, a healthy system which will be in the interest of all parts of the country and every citizen, all together. Only in this way will our community have a chance of succeeding and developing. Nobody should impose himself on anybody, and nobody should impose the right to development on anybody else. [cheers, applause]

For this reason, if the Federal Executive Council, aware of its responsibilities concerning the implementation of the program it has formulated, is to make this program function; enable it to develop further; yield results for all parts of our country, so that this may be the ultimate backing and cohesive force on which new relations in our country will be formed; the Federal Executive Council held and is still holding the view that the Constitution should be amended, a law on citizens association be adopted—a new law on elections should also be passed soon—and that on this basis changes to the Constitution be carried out, which would enable the unstoppable march of these reforms to continue, as the march of the revolution once did.

At the same time, by holding multiparty elections to the Federal Assembly by the end of this year, a mandate should be ensured to the people who should continue the march of our reforms so that nobody will be able to question. [cheers, applause]

This is why we have decided—and I can say this now—on the way to do this, because after prolonged obstacles in the Federal Assembly, the law on citizens' organizations within Yugoslavia, including political organizations, has been passed. So far parties were allowed to be formed in every republic, but a Yugoslav party was not allowed.

We proposed this, and now that this law has been adopted, I can say that we, as citizens who work in the Federal Executive Council, have decided to form an alliance of reform forces [savez reformskih snaga] of this country, and to run in elections in Yugoslavia with this alliance. [cheers, applause]

Of course, the program with which we will run in the elections is well known. Almost every citizen of our country knows it and supports it. There is no need to explain this program any longer. We should rally the citizens of the country on this program. We should rally all those political parties and citizens' associations which are ready to identify with this program, and together with them pull forward the cart of our country's reform and adopt a new cohesive and united approach on how to organize our country in the future. [cheers]

This is why we plan to register this party shortly, and to publicly announce it. There is no reason why the initiative committees of the reform forces are not set up in every place, village, and city, to run with us at the elections and win the elections. [cheers, applause]

I am quite convinced that the majority of our citizens, and I dare say, most of the political parties that wish this country well are ready to enter elections together and to bear risks together in them, and to afterward take the risk and responsibility for the further progress of the reforms and the construction of a new future Yugoslavia, which will be wealthier, happier, more humane, and more progressive in all respects. [cheers and applause]

In this respect, we must guarantee the rights of every citizen, the rights of every enterprise, the rights of every republic and province, and we must guarantee the rights of the country as a whole. [applause]

You see, as soon as we said in Banja Luka yesterday that we would go for this, comrades immediately grabbed an exercise book and began to collect signatures because we need 100 signatories to set up such a movement or alliance. [cheers and applause] I dare say: Let a message go out from this legendary Kozara to the whole country and the world. [cheers] Let that message say: Citizens of our country, just as you once held fate in your hands, may you once again hold fate in your hands, by voting tomorrow, by deciding on the destiny of our country. [cheers] Thank you. [applause and cheers]

Long live the citizens of Kozara! [applause]

Views Forming Reform Forces Alliance

LD2907121990 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1141 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] Prijedor, 29 Jul (TANJUG)—In order to continue the reform of the economic and political system, the Federal Executive Council [FEC] has decided—following the adoption of the law on political organization after a great deal of resistance—to form an alliance of reform forces and to present it for the Yugoslav elections, announced FEC President Ante Markovic at today's rally on Mount Kozara. He said that the formation of parties, but not of a Yugoslav party, has been allowed in every republic.

The program that we will present for the elections is well known and every citizen of our country knows it, continued Markovic. It should unite the citizens of our country and all those political parties that are ready to identify themselves with this program, to promote our reform, and adopt a fresh and cohesive approach to methods of organizing our country in the future, stressed the FEC president. He said that the FEC is prepared to register and publicly announce this reform alliance shortly. However, there is no reason why initiative committees for this alliance of reform forces cannot be set up right away in every place and in every village, noted Ante Markovic.

Markovic Addresses Prijedor Businessmen on Economy

LD2807222490 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2045 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] Prijedor, 28 Jul (TANJUG)—Our banks are slaves to their bad investments, because, to a large extent, they have been extending credit to people who are not in any position to repay these loans. It is therefore vitally important for many banks to be restored to financial soundness or to be reorganized. To this end we have also engaged well-known world experts.

This was stressed, among other things, in Prijedor this evening by Federal Executive Council [FEC] President Ante Markovic in talks with representatives from municipalities in Bosanska Krajina. He added that the fate of economic reforms depends primarily on the structure of ownership and that, to him, change cannot be achieved with banks run by bad enterprises. The FEC president repeated the standpoint that there can be no talk of the establishment of state ownership. This, after all, would be tantamount to taking a step backward. He also specified that if the federal government does not find other solutions, it will take administrative measures that will have an impact on curbing the business banks' interest rates.

It is illogical, Markovic stressed, that in a situation in which inflation has been "frozen" at zero, interest rates are as high as 50 percent. It is difficult to find a profit like this being made anywhere in the world, and hence it would be normal for it to be halved.

Speaking about the foreign exchange reserves of about $9.1 billion, the convertibility of the dinar, and the slight growth of the money supply against its demand, President Markovic expressed the conviction that all this could be jeopardized if the next reform package is not implemented. This means, among other things, that so-called political factories and enterprises cannot in the future count on the support of the state—as opposed to those whose orientation is toward a market for capital, labor, and experience.

In this way the president of the federal government answered the questions of most businessmen from the Bosanska Krajina region, who highlighted the difficulties arising from the lack of working capital, the fall in production, and workers' fears that with the application of the new package of economic measures, many enterprises will become bankrupt.

The talks were attended by other republican officials and by Dr. Obrad Piljak, president of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Serbian Kosovo Policy Called 'Counterproductive'

AU2807183690 Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian 22 Jul 90 p 2

[Ymer Jaka article: "The Counterproductive Spiral of Repression in Kosovo"]

[Text] Even a superficial glance at the history of Kosovo in the 20th century shows violence against the Albanian people in this territory to be the predominant feature of the period. From the time when the great powers began to play with their destiny, divided them from their kin-state, and left them to the mercy of those who wished to reduce them to the position of slaves, a position they never accepted, they were, as an indigenous people, faced with the use of violence in their struggle to preserve their national existence. The Albanians lost countless victims in their determination never to submit or bend the knee to unscrupulous rulers who spared no means to subjugate an undaunted people, a people forged in countless battles down the centuries, and who were able to confront with determination the many whirlwinds unleashed against them.

Serbia, blinded by its hegemonist greed and always dreaming of the revival of the empire of Dusan, used all means at its disposal after World War I in order to evict the Albanians from their age-old territories. When they met determined resistance, the Serbian authorities began to use barbarous violence against the Albanian population. Denied all national rights, this population was reduced to a pitiful state. Long columns of Serbian and Montenegrin colonists surged toward Kosovo, taking land from poor Albanian peasants. The Albanian outlaw movement embarked on a struggle against the Serbian state, in this way setting itself against state violence. Thus, the Kosovars' many sacrifices in the late 19th and early 20th centuries against the Ottoman Empire, instead of bringing them freedom, brought them a new form of slavery, and forced them to find new ways of struggling to preserve their national identity and to oppose the implementation of the agreement for their emigration to Turkey, even though some Albanians were forced to leave house and home and to settle in the wastes of Anatolia.

The Albanians Were Also Persecuted After World War II

World War II, the destruction of the Yugoslav monarchy, and the mass participation of the Albanians in the antifascist coalition, despite their many victims, did not bring them true freedom and prosperity, because Kosovo continued to languish as Yugoslavia's most culturally and economically backward region, and the Albanians remained second-class citizens even in socialist Yugoslavia. Their persecution began in 1945, when several thousand Albanians, mobilized to fight against the last remnants of fascism, were massacred in Bar. At the same time, the notorious minister and historian Vasa Cubrilovic, the author of the 1937 project for the emigration of the Albanians to Turkey, drew up a new plan, whose implementation began less than 10 years later, so that a significant proportion of the Albanian population in Kosovo, once again on the basis of interstate conventions, was forced to emigrate to Turkey under the savage pressure of the state security organs which followed the campaigns for the confiscation of weapons and were accompanied by the most barbarous tortures. Thus, even in socialist Yugoslavia, violence against the Albanians continued, and escalated as time passed. All resistance to this violence was punished in the most savage fashion. Innumerable groups of young Albanians were brought before the courts and sentenced to the heaviest sentences as nationalists and separatists, after being subjected to the most merciless tortures while under investigation.

However, these measures of violence, instead of subjugating the Albanian population in Yugoslavia, on the contrary increased their rage and encouraged new forms of resistance, in which the Albanians openly showed that they refused to be classified as second-class citizens.

Savage Repression Since 1981

Repression in Kosovo has assumed especially harsh forms in the last 10 years. Since 1981, the cruelest methods have been used against the Albanians, who expressed nonviolently their dissatisfaction with their status. Dozens of them have been killed and hundreds injured as they demonstrated, empty-handed. Thousands of them fill the prisons in every corner of Yugoslavia. The often cited figure, according to which more than 600,000 Albanians have passed through the hands of the security services, barely suggests the situation in which the Albanian population of Kosovo finds itself in a state which is always full of talk about democracy. The third-largest population in Yugoslavia, which has rightly raised the question of achieving the status of a people in the Yugoslav community, and of Kosovo becoming equal to other federal units, is made the object of unprecedented repression, in total contradiction to the UN Charter of Human Rights and a range of other conventions signed by Yugoslavia. The highest organs of the Yugoslav federation, the SFRY Presidency, the Federal Executive Council, and the SFRY Assembly, under the diktat of Serbian forces, turn a deaf ear to democratic forces in Yugoslavia and to the innumerable protests of the international community over the intolerable position of the Albanian population in Kosovo.

Without any legal or constitutional grounds, the Kosovo Assembly and the Executive Council were suspended, the Albanian-language media were blocked, and public threats were even made against the delegates of the Kosovo Assembly who legally approved the constitutional declaration on 2 July.

The Short-Term Results of Repression

In this way, the state violence openly practiced by Serbia in Kosovo reached its highest possible scale.

However, if these issues are examined in a little more detail, it is clear that these acts are now committed by a system which acts, not on the basis of a logical analysis of the steps it is taking as it violates every constitutional and legal principle, but on the basis of a kind of inertia which is fraught with dire consequences. The first consequence is the isolation of Serbia, which in practice remains without support of any kind either in Yugoslavia or the outside world. Moreover, Serbia remains the only country in East Europe to evade the democratic processes which are taking place so fast and are changing the physiognomy of this part of the world. The experience of history, including even the experience of the times in which we are living, teaches us that repression carried out by even the most totalitarian regimes has only yielded short-term results.

The repression carried out by Serbia in Kosovo throughout this century is the best witness of this historical truth; the more the measures of violence increase, the more resistance to them grows. From the campaigns of the outlaw movement after World War I, we have now reached the point where the entire Albanian people resists Serbian repression. This resistance now includes even those who until yesterday were the blind tools of the Serbian political establishment, and who attached the ridiculous labels of counterrevolution, nationalism, chauvinism, and other phrases to the Albanians' demands for freedom and equality.

As a member of the Pristina Council for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, in the relatively short period of six months since this council was formed, I have acquired some very interesting experience of the effects of the use of violence against innocent people. The majority of those who have turned to our council in order to protest violations of human rights have not bemoaned their sufferings, but have asked that they should be recorded as a testimony to the times, in which an anachronistic regime is using the methods of the medieval inquisition on the threshold of the 21st century.

The majority of those who have been maltreated, beaten, injured, and wounded, including the relatives and friends of the dozens of people killed this year and last, are not only not frightened by the measures which Serbia is taking against the Albanians. On the contrary, they have been filled with rage, have continued to take part in demonstrations of the people's dissatisfaction, and are ready to suffer even greater misfortunes.

The Albanians Cannot Be Subjugated by Clubs

In illustration of this unwavering determination to endure to the end in this struggle for outraged human and national dignity, I would like to mention the case of a man from the commune of Glogovac, who was bestially beaten by the Serbian militia when he took part in the magnificent mass gathering to settle blood feuds at Verrat e Llukes. The representatives of the various international human rights organizations with which our council cooperates, when we showed them the photographs of his injuries which he brought us, were nauseated. These photographs, among many others, were also exhibited at the European Parliament in Strasbourg on the occasion of the adoption of the famous resolution on Kosovo on 11 July 1990. According to reports we received, the members of the European Parliament were left speechless. This man, despite his injuries, which one would imagine would have kept him in his bed for several days, told me when he brought the photographs that on 2 May, only one day after he had been so badly hurt, he had gone to the gathering to settle blood feuds at Gjonaj.

He replied briefly to my question of whether he was not frightened of fresh maltreatment at the hands of the militia:

"I was not the only one injured on the previous day who went to Gjonaj. History has made the Albanian people tough, and anybody who thinks they can be scared by clubs and bullets should think again."

Serbia's repression has therefore turned out to be totally counterproductive. This repression has achieved the total homogenization of the Albanian people in Kosovo and in other regions of Yugoslavia. The Albanians ready to cooperate with the Serbian state can now be counted on the fingers of one hand. Their names are known to the public, and even their closest relatives despise them.

All this is the result of repression, which has steeled the Albanian people and made them more determined in their struggle for national rights, a struggle which is finding increasing support not only in Yugoslavia, but abroad. As always in history, justice will triumph, and justice is on the Albanians' side. Those who impose repression will sooner or later be branded with the mark of shame.

Kosovo 'Sore Point' for Yugoslav Diplomacy

AU2807163590 Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian 22 Jul 90 p 1

[Avni Spahiu commentary: "The World Is Not Deceived"]

[Text] In the last decade, Yugoslav diplomacy has frequently been forced to set all its machinery in motion in an effort to persuade the world of the rationality of the repressive measures which Serbia, with the blessing of Yugoslavia, has taken in Kosovo. It endlessly repeats a "song" learned by heart: The country's integrity is being protected; nor does it ever forget the long- familiar label of "separatism," which is nothing but a word that has taken root in the sick political minds of Great Serbian and anti- Albanian circles.

It is hardly worth mentioning that this diplomacy has met with no success, because it is difficult to defend and justify the policies of a country which violates international conventions which it itself has voluntarily signed, uses violence and repression to impose antidemocratic policies, and airily refuses all the demands of the people of Kosovo, attaching various labels to them. It is difficult to justify a policy which dissolves assemblies in an illegal and unconstitutional way, stamps out the media by force, imposes states of emergency, mistreats an innocent population, and runs counter to all civilized and democratic currents of thought.

The most recent police coup which Serbia carried out against Kosovo has met with a severe response from official circles and institutions and in international public opinion. The most recent EEC resolution expresses revulsion and concern at Serbia's steps; Serbia's policy toward Kosovo has been condemned by the U.S. Congress and by international human rights organizations. These resolutions and responses, which have resulted from thorough analyses that have verified all the facts and evidence, fall so thick and fast that Serbian policy does not know how to reply or behave; it merely blindly and stubbornly persists in its course in the teeth of powerful international opposition.

A new gulf and a new conflict is growing between Serbia and Europe, or rather Serbia and the world (even though Yugoslavia still exists as a geographical entity). It is possible that this may result in political, economic, or other measures against Serbia, with consequences for the whole country which, in the future, may prevent or hamper its participation in the process of European integration.

The Serbian version of its Kosovo policy is incessantly trumpeted by TANJUG, which never presents the Albanian side at all, even though this news agency should be an all-Yugoslav one, and thus should belong to the Albanian people in Yugoslavia also. This cannot but hinder efforts for a democratic solution of the problem of Kosovo, because only one version of the truth is presented, which is in opposition to the political will expressed by the majority of the Kosovo population.

For Yugoslav diplomacy—which continues to be fed by the appalling anti-Albanian propaganda of hegemonist Serbian circles who defend the indefensible theory of their "historical right" to a territory with a 90 percent Albanian population—Kosovo will continue to be a sore point which will continue to undermine the country's prestige. Yugoslavia may continue, as before, to sign international conventions on human rights and even propose fresh initiatives itself, as it did at the Copenhagen conference, but these will be worthless as long as their shameless violation in Kosovo continues.

An entire people cannot be deceived, and still less the entire world.

Deaths Confirmed at 30 in Kosovo Demonstrations

LD2707160690 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1512 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Belgrade, 27 Jul (TANJUG)—The Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs reports at the SFRY Assembly Federal Chamber session held on 25 July, within the framework of the discussion about the situation in the Socialist Autonomous Province [SAP] of Kosovo, following the adoption of the law, on the dissolution of the SAP of Kosovo Assemly and the Kosovo Executive Council. Jovan Vuckovic, the deputy federal secretary for internal affairs, talking about the activity of the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs and other internal affairs bodies on establishing facts and circumstances under which loss of life occured during the January and February demonstrations of the Albanian nationalists and separatists, stated that 30 people were killed. However, some public information media published that 90 people were killed, a figure which could be also found in the shorthand minutes from the session, which, probably is a consequence of the poor audability of the public-address system.

The correct number of those killed in the demonstrations is 30, the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs statement reports. The same figure is cited in a report on the measures undertaken by the internal affairs bodies on preventing the demonstrations and terroristic actions of Albanian nationalists and separatists in the period between 24 January and 3 February of this year. The report was considered and endorsed by the Federal Executive Council and the Committee for Internal Policy of the SFRY Assembly's Federal Chamber. The same figure features in all other material and public speeches relating to the demonstrations, the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs statement concludes.

Attack on Car Carrying Serbian Official

LD2707230590 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2211 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Pristina, 27 July (TANJUG)—Late this evening in the center of Pristina an as yet unknown person carried out an attack on an official vehicle containing Milos Laban, president of the Chamber of Associated Labor of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, and Momcilo Trajkovic, vice president of the Republican Executive Council. Laban and Trajkovic were not injured, while the car was more seriously damaged in this attack. At this moment it cannot be completely reliably said how the vehicle was damaged.

According to a statement by Momcilo Trajkovic, who was here on official business, judging by everything, this is a matter of an organized—in other words prepared—attack. The incident has been reported to the security organs, who are searching for the perpetrators.

Croatian Presidency Comments on Serbian Rally

LD2707221790 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1641 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Zagreb, July 278 (TANJUG)—The state Presidency of Croatia assessed today that a big rally of Serbs in the small Croatian town of SRB two days earlier had represented an attempt to prevent the further development of democracy in the northwestern Yugoslav republic.

An announcement issued by the Presidency said that the rally in which around 100,000 Serbs participated had served the creation of national splits in Croatia with ultra-nationalist Serbian goals.

The Presidency cautioned that the Croatian authorities which were established after the recent multiparty elections would protect the "newly-established democracy in Croatia by every act of a legal state."

Two days ago around 100,000 Serbs at their rally in SRB proclaimed a declaration seeking autonomy. In case Yugoslavia became a confederation, it sought sovereignty for 600,000 Serbs living in Croatia.

Serbs in Croatia also were against the amendments to the Croatian Constitution adopted two days ago for, as they assessed, the amendments were depriving the Serbs of their basic civil rights.

Croatian Foreign Minister Visits, Meets Officials

LD2807020990 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2158 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 27 (TANJUG)—Foreign Minister of the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia Zdravko Mrsic visited Budapest today at the invitation of the Hungarian foreign minister.

Mrsic met with Hungarian Minister Without Portfolio Ferenc Madl and discussed, among other things, Croatia's and Hungary's efforts for the broadest possible inclusion in European integration processes, primarily in the area of economics.

Mrsic's talks with Imre Sokai, deputy state secretary in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, covered bilateral cooperation. An agreement was reached to form a Croatian-Hungarian working group for advancing cooperation.

Both sides expressed special interest in the broadest possible development of all forms of economic cooperation in order to increase Croatia's share in overall Yugoslav-Hungarian economic ties.

The position of Croatians in Hungary and Hungarians in Croatia was also discussed.

Official Regrets Greek Stand at EC Meeting

LD2707223290 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1559 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Belgrade, July 27 (TANJUG)—Greece, in abusing its EC membership, has tried to involved the EC into a bilateral problem and cause international difficulties for Yugoslavia—Deputy Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Milivoje Maksic told a press conference today.

This can be only regretted, said Maksic in commenting that official Athens at an EC ministerial meeting in Brussels two weeks earlier had tried to prevent EC's financial aid to Yuugoslavia because of the dispute that actually centres on Greece's not recognizing the existence of the Macedonian nation. Greece's argument against Yugoslavia as a recipient of EC aid was an allegedly insufficient democratization in Yugoslavia.

Instead of readiness at the EC ministers meeting to remove all obstacles in bilateral relations, Greece apparantly prefered to try to engage others in bringing pressure to bare on Yugoslavia—Maksic assessed.

Yugoslavia proposed a meeting of the two countries' foreign ministers to discuss all outstanding matters of direct concern, including Greece's stand towards the Macedonian nation. But Greece insists that no other point should be discussed but that concerning the quota of transit permits for its lorries through Yugoslavia.